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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation setzt sich mit dem Verhalten während und nach der Ausfüh-
rung routinemäßiger und kreativer Aufgaben in unterschiedlichen Kontexten
auseinander. Während die Forschung zu Routineaufgaben in der experimen-
tellen Wirtschaftsforschung sehr weit fortgeschritten ist, gibt es kaum Studi-
en zum Verhalten bei kreativen Aufgaben. Ein Grund hierfür mag sein, dass
sich die Wirtschaftswissenschaft im Allgemeinen mehr für das ﬁnale Ergebnis,
welches aus einem kreativen Schaﬀensprozess resultiert fokussiert, als auf die
dahinterliegenden innovativen Prozessen und Leistungen. Ein weiterer Grund
könnte es sein, dass traditionelle Forschungsmethoden, wie empirische Studien
im Bereich der Kreativitätsforschung, nur bedingt einsetzbar sind.
Der Prozess des kreativen Denkens an sich ist jedoch grundsätzlich von im-
menser Bedeutung für das Entstehen von Innovation und verdient daher mehr
wissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit. In der Psychologie wird Kreativität schon
seit langem anhand von Feld- und Laborexperimenten erforscht. Feldexperi-
mente bieten dabei zunächst eine hohe externe Validität, sind jedoch ande-
rerseits sehr kostspielig und benötigen meist nachhaltige Kooperationen zwi-
schen Privatﬁrmen und akademischen Einrichtungen. Laborexperimente hin-
gegen stellen eine erfolgversprechende Alternative zu Feldexperimenten dar.
Obwohl diese im Vergleich zu Feldexperimenten eine geringere externe Validi-
tät aufweisen, ermöglichen sie es, aufgrund der größeren Kontrolle, welche der
Forscher über die Daten hat, eﬃzient kausale Zusammenhänge zu untersuchen.
Aufgrund dessen verwende ich in meine Arbeit Laborexperimente, um zu
untersuchen, wie Menschen während und nach der Arbeit an routinemäßigen
und kreativen Aufgaben auf verschiedene Umgebungen reagieren. Hierbei ist
jedoch zu beachten, dass bisher routinemäßige und kreative Aufgaben in der
Regel getrennt voneinander erforscht wurden. Um kreative Leistungen jedoch
umfassend zu erforschen, ist ein direkter Vergleich dieser Leistungen mit rou-
tinemäßigen Leistungen vonnöten, um glaubwürdige Rückschlüsse zur Wirk-
samkeit von Anreizsystemen ziehen zu können und somit deren Relevanz auch
für kreative nachzuweisen.
Die Arbeit ist wie folgend aufgebaut: Nachdem in der Einleitung die Rele-
vanz der Fragestellung dargelegt wurde, wird im zweiten Kapitel untersucht,
ob die Höhe der Anstrengungen und die Art der Aufgabe, Kooperation in
kleinen Gruppen beeinﬂusst. Bisherige Forschungsansätze haben gezeigt, dass
Individuen dazu neigen Dingen, die sie bereits besitzen eine höhere Wertschät-
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zung entgegenbringen als wenn sich diese noch nicht in ihrem Besitz beﬁnden
würden. Zudem neigen Individuen dazu Endowments überzubewerten, wenn
sie hart dafür gearbeitet haben. Insofern wird erwartet, dass wenn die Experi-
mentteilnehmer größeren Aufwand ausüben, sie sich egoistischer verhalten und
ihre Kooperationsbereitschaft im Public Goods Experiment zurückgeht. Dar-
über hinaus hat die Forschung gezeigt, dass Individuen dazu tendieren, selbst
geschaﬀene Dinge und Leistungen überzubewerten. Aufgrund dessen erwartete
ich, dass Experimentteilnehmer dem aus einer kreativen Ausgabe resultieren-
den Gewinn eine höhere Wertschätzung entgegenbringen. Dies könnte unter
anderem dazu führen, dass Individuen zögern zusammenzuarbeiten, da der
eventuelle Verlust ihres Endowments zum einen schmerzhafter wäre und zum
anderen zudem das Risiko im Public Goods Game besteht, dass die anderen
Gruppenmitglieder sich nicht kooperativ verhalten.
Das Ergebnis des Experiments zeigt, dass weder Bemühungsgrad noch Be-
mühungstyp einen Einﬂuss auf die Kooperationsbereitschaft im Public Goods
Game zu haben scheint. Wenn es um soziale Verhaltensweisen geht, wie z. B.
die Zusammenarbeit in kleinen Gruppen, scheinen sich die Individuen stär-
ker auf ihre bisherigen Gruppenerfahrungen, ihre soziale Wertorientierungen
und Persönlichkeit zu verlassen. Eine mangelnde Kooperation in einer Gruppe,
sollte somit eher den individuellen Merkmalen zugeschrieben werden, als den
individuellen Bemühungen der Gruppenmitglieder. Übertragen auf die Mitar-
beiterauswahl im Unternehmen bedeutet dies, dass insbesondere die individu-
ellen Merkmale und Erfahrungen von Mitarbeitern wie zum Beispiel, ob ein
Bewerber bisherige Erfahrung in der Gruppenarbeit hat und wie stark das in-
dividuelle prosoziale Verhalten ausgeprägt ist, bei der Auswahl berücksichtigt
werden sollten.
In Kapitel 3 wird untersucht, wie unterschiedliche Konkurrenzgrade routi-
nemäßige und kreative Leistung beeinﬂussen. Bei Routineaufgaben sind Auf-
wand und Output eng miteinander verknüpft. Im Gegensatz dazu sind kreative
Aufgaben ungewisser und die Leistung nicht nur von der individuellen Leis-
tungsbereitschaft abhängig, sondern auch vom Talenten oder den vorhandenen
Möglichkeiten. Daher erwiesen sich Wettbewerbsanreize änlich wie ﬁnanzielle
Anreize als wenig zielführend bei der Verbesserung der Kreativität. Um den
Stand der Forschung zu diesen Themen voranzubringen, wurde ein Experiment
entwickelt anhand dessen der Eﬀekt welcher ein schwacher und ein starken
Wettbewerb auf die routinemäßige und kreative Leistung hat zu untersuchen.
Darüber hinaus wurde die Auswirkung eines Leistungsfeedbacks in Form eines
Rankings während des Arbeitsprozesses auf die durchschnittliche Leistung der
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Experiementteilnehmer untersucht.
In Übereinstimmung mit der vorherigen Literatur zeigen die Ergebnis-
se, dass ein geringer Wettbewerb die routinemäßige, aber nicht die kreative
Leistung verbessert. Ein starker Wettbewerb steigert jedoch weder die durch-
schnittliche Leistung bei routinemäßigen noch bei kreativen Aufgaben. Dar-
über hinaus scheint die Bereitstellung von Feedback vor dem Abschluss der
Aufgabe bei kreativen Aufgaben einen negativen Einﬂuss auf die Leistung zu
haben. Männer und Frauen scheinen zudem unterschiedlich auf eine starke
Wettbewerbssituation zu reagieren. Während Männer in einer Situation mit
starkem Wettbewerb eine signiﬁkant höhere Leistung bei routinemäßigen Auf-
gaben erbringen als in einer Situation ohne Wettbewerb, kann dies für Frauen
nicht beobachtet werden. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Führungs-
kräfte niedrige Wettbewerbsanreize nutzen können, um Routineleistungen zu
verbessern. Allerdings ist eine hohe Wettbewerbsanreize nicht förderlich für
routinemäßige Leistung. Weder der Einsatz von niedrigeren noch von hohen
Wettbewerbsanreizen fördert kreative Leistung. Zudem scheint ein Feedback
zum Ranking vor Beendigung der Aufgaben demotivierend zu wirken und somit
die durchschnittliche Leistung zu verringern. Bei der Verwendung von Wettbe-
werbsanreizen, sollte somit die Bereitstellung von Leistungsfeedback vor Ende
des Wettbewerbs vermieden werden.
Im vierten Kapitel wird der Eﬀekte von niedrigen und hohen Einschrän-
kungen auf routinemäßige und kreative Aufgaben untersucht. Die traditionel-
le Auﬀassung von kreativem Denken ist, dass es nicht eingeschränkt werden
sollte. Kreative und Schöpfer brauchen die Freiheit, neue Ideen ohne äußere
Einmischung zu erforschen. Im Gegensatz dazu deuten jüngste theoretische
Beiträge in der Literatur darauf hin, dass Beschränkungen jedoch auch moti-
vierend wirken können, indem sie die Aufgabe herausfordernder gestalten. Die-
se These wurde jedoch noch kaum empirisch überprüft. In diesem Kapitel der
Dissertation wird ein ökonomisches Experiment dargestellt, bei dem niedrige
und hohe Qualitätseinschränkungen für routinemäßige und kreative Aufgaben
implementiert wurden. Hierzu wurden die Experimentteilnehmer aufgefordert
Lösungen bereitzustellen, welche jedoch nur entlohnt wurden, wenn ein spezi-
ﬁscher Schwellenwert erreicht wurde.
Entsprechend der konventionellen Sichtweise nahm, sowohl die routinemä-
ßige als auch die kreative Leistung schon bei einer sehr geringen Einschränkung
ab. Die weiteren Analysen zeigen jedoch, dass sich die Experimentteilnehmer
nach der ersten Phase an die Einschränkungen anzupassen zu scheinen. Be-
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trachtet man die Gesamtleistung wird zudem deutlich, dass Experimentteil-
nehmer ohne Einschränkungen mehr qualitativ hochwertigere Lösungen pro-
duzieren als die Experimentteilnehmer welche einer Einschränkung unterliegen.
Dies erstaunt, da die letzteren gebeten wurden, nur qualitativ hochwertige Lö-
sungen zu produzieren. Die Konzentration auf die Produktion von Loesungen
mit hoher Qualitaet, im Gegensatz zu Loesungen mit niedriger Qualitaet, spart
Zeit. Dieses Ergebnis zeigt, dass einige Experiementteilnehmer niedrige Qua-
litätslösungen verwendet haben, um komplexere und qualitativ hochwertigere
Lösungen aufzubauen. Das Forschungsergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass wenn
Qualitätseinschränkungen genutzt werden, z.B. zur Entwicklung eines quali-
tativ höherwertigen Gutes, mit einer gewissen Zeit zu kalkulieren ist bis sich
die Mitarbeiter an diese gewöhnt haben und ihre Leistung der vor der Einfüh-
rung der Restriktion entspricht. Dennoch können Einschränkungen nützlich
sein, insbesondere dann, wenn das Ziel darin besteht, eine einzige hochwertige
kreative Lösung zu ﬁnden.
Im fünften Kapitel untersuche ich die Rolle der domain-speziﬁschen Fä-
higkeiten für kreative Leistung unter Einschränkungen. Im Allgemeinen ist
es bekannt, dass eine Person eine gegebene kreative Aufgabe leichter lösen
kann, wenn sie speziﬁsche Kenntnisse hat. Allerdings hat bisher keine For-
schung die Rolle der aufgabenbezogenen Fähigkeiten untersucht, wenn Schöp-
fer Einschränkungen gegenüberstehen. In diesem Papier wir argumentiert, dass
abhängig vom Qualiﬁkationsniveau, Einschränkungen positive oder negative
Auswirkungen auf die kreative Leistung haben können. Auf der einen Seite
können die Zwänge einen negativen Eﬀekt, d. h. die schrittweise Entwicklung
oder den Aufbau kreativer Ideen verhindern, andererseits können Einschrän-
kungen den Fokus auf qualitativ hochwertige Lösungen ermöglichen und da-
mit die kreative Leistung steigern. Um den Eﬀekt von Einschränkungen auf
die speziﬁsche aufgabenbezogenen Fähigkeiten zu untersuchen, wurde ein La-
borexperiment entworfen, bei welchem Einschränkungen von außen auferlegt
wurden. Die Probanden wurden zudem dazu aufgefordert, eine Selbstbewer-
tung ihrer aufgabenbezogenen Fähigkeiten abzugeben.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Einschränkungen die kreative Leistung Hoch-
qualiﬁzierter erhöhen. Jedoch verringern die gleichen Einschränkungen die
Leistung von weniger Qualiﬁzierten. Der Hauptgrund hierfür mag darin lie-
gen, dass gering qualiﬁzierte Kreativarbeiter auf ihre eigenen Kreationen auf-
bauen und somit nach und nach die Komplexität ihrer Lösungen verbessern.
Beschränkungen scheinen dabei diesen Prozess zu stören. Hochqualiﬁzierte be-
nötigen hingegen keinen Lernprozess und sind somit in der die durch die Ein-
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schränkung bedingte Hürde leichter zu überwinden. Die Implikationen dieses
Experiments deuten darauf hin, dass Einschränkungen verwendet werden kön-
nen, um hochqualiﬁzierten Mitarbeitern dazu anzuspornen, sich auf wertvol-
lere kreative Lösungen zu konzentrieren. Für gering qualiﬁzierte Arbeitskräfte
sollten jedoch keine Qualitätseinschränkungen verwendet werden. Für sie ist
es vorteilhafter, niedrige Qualitätslösungen zu belohnen, um höhere kreati-
ve Potenziale zu ermöglichen. Mit anderen Worten: Erstmaliges Versagen von
weniger Qualiﬁzierten sollte nicht sanktioniert, sondern toleriert werden.
Ich habe in dieser Dissertation untersucht, inwieweit unterschiedliche Kon-
texte die Leistungsfähigkeit bei routinemäßigen und kreativen Aufgaben be-
einﬂussen sowie die Kooperationsbereitschaft im Anschluss an diese Aufgaben
erforscht. Im Allgemeinen unterscheiden sich routinemäßige Aufgaben kon-
zeptionell von kreativen Aufgaben. Der wesentliche Unterschied besteht darin
dass, im Gegensatz zu Routine-Aufgaben, kreative Aufgaben in der Regel int-
rinsisch motivierend sind. Daher können diese Aufgaben oft nicht durch Geld-
mittel gleichermaßen angeregt werden. Kreativität und Innovationen sind zu-
dem komplexe Phänomene, die durch mehrere Faktoren beeinﬂusst werden, die
oft nicht von Menschen kontrolliert werden können. Wirtschaftswissenschaftler
haben erkannt, dass kontrollierte Experimente einen Teil der Probleme lösen
können, indem sie Umgebungen vereinfachen, in denen Inventionen entstehen
und die Variablen, die kreative Leistung beeinﬂussen entwirren. Laborexpe-
rimente scheinen ein vielversprechender Ansatz zu sein, routinemäßige sowie
kreative Aufgaben zeitgleich und systematisch zu erforschen. Aktuelle For-
schungsergebnisse sind angesichts des beschleunigten Wachstums im kreativen
und innovativen Sektor, sowohl für Führungskräfte als auch für Mitarbeiter
dieser Branchen, von hoher Bedeutung. Daher wird erwartet, dass sich diese
Forschungsrichtung in den kommenden Jahren erheblich ausweiten wird. Diese
Arbeit stellt einen der ersten Schritte in diese Richtung dar.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Innovation research is well established in economic science. This is unsur-
prising considering the inﬂuence of innovations on economic growth and more
generally, on human welfare. However, until recently economists did not pay
adequate attention to routes of innovative activities and circumstances that
aﬀect inception of inventions. According to well established models of innova-
tions, there are three major phases of innovative activities: invention, innova-
tion and diﬀusion (see e.g. Hobday (2005) for review). Thus, invention is an
initial phase, triggering emergence, development, and establishment of novel
solutions and practices. Therefore, it is critical to study what factors facilitate
the appearance of inventions. In order to achieve inventions, individuals have
to come up with novel and at the same time useful ideas. In other words,
creative ideas (Amabile, 1988).
Creativity has been long studied in cognitive and social psychology litera-
ture (see e.g. Mayer (1999) for review). Economists and management scientists
have made relatively few contributions to this research direction. Presumably,
one of the reasons that attracted authors’ attention is the fast acceleration
of technological advancements in the late 20th century. This led to a dra-
matic increase in creative jobs (Florida, 2014). To keep up with the progress,
start-up ﬁrms as well as incumbents have to constantly create new knowledge,
or improve already existing one. To support high demand on unorthodox
solutions, company principals have to redesign working environments. An in-
creasing number of economists and management scientists ﬁnds it scientiﬁcally
appealing to analyse creative behaviour and mechanisms that may enhance or
diminish creative performance. This interest is also determined by business
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practitioners’ desire to improve employees’ creative productivity and increase
the return on investment in labour force.
Tasks that are based on simple repetition of trivial, unsophisticated activi-
ties are regarded as mundane or routine. Substantially more research has been
done on changing and motivating performance on routine tasks. Solutions for
routine tasks are usually straightforward and most of the time, principals can
incentivize agents by providing monetary rewards. The main issue in moti-
vating routine tasks is to pay enough (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). While
suchlike tasks are still an essential part of the work in a majority of ﬁrms, the
importance and share of these tasks are decreasing. For instance, a number of
technology companies is heavily investing in self-driving cars. This will cause
loss of millions of (rather uncreative) driver jobs. Thus, companies require
more cognitively demanding creative work, such as programming to perfect al-
ready existing programs for autonomous cars or develop new ones. This brings
up few issues on employee motivation to be solved. Firstly, managers should
know how routine and creative tasks diﬀer. Secondly, and more importantly,
how they should set working conditions and especially, payment schemes to
increase productivity for each of these types of tasks.
One of the most important diﬀerences between these two types of tasks is
that a creative task is often done for its own sake (Amabile, 1996). Individuals
are intrinsically motivated1 to build something new, whether it is for aesthetic
purposes or new, improved functionality. Sometimes intrinsic motivation is
crowded out by external rewards.2 However, this is not always the case and
external motivators may add to already existing willingness to exert eﬀort for
creative tasks. While creative tasks are usually found to be interesting and
engaging, routine tasks are not. In other words, for routine or mundane tasks,
intrinsic motivation is absent. That is why scholars usually do not discuss
intrinsic motivators for such tasks. They rather concentrate on the size of
monetary or other external incentives or how to provide them.
Relatively little scientiﬁc work has been done on comparing how individuals
perform on these two diﬀerent tasks under various payment mechanisms and
contexts. As discussed above, these tasks diﬀer on key characteristics. There-
fore, it can be expected that people respond to similar incentives diﬀerently.
In this thesis I study how individuals behave in diﬀerent environments while
1See Ryan and Deci (2000) for deﬁnition of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
2Discussion of theory on motivation crowding eﬀect can be found in work by Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee (1997).
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working on routine and creative tasks. The ﬁrst chapter of the thesis addresses
cooperation among group members after exerting eﬀorts on these conceptually
diﬀerent tasks. The other chapters investigate eﬀects of various contexts on
performance. Thus, I focus on performances on routine and creative tasks as
well as on the behaviour after completing the tasks.
1.1 Creativity Research in Economics and Man-
agement Sciences
Creativity has been studied from such widely diﬀerent points of view that it
is practically impossible to fully cover this ﬁeld in few pages. Creative ca-
pacity is related to the notion of inspiration, which can be found in early
Roman, Greek, Judaic, Christian, and Muslim traditions and which was based
on the assumption that it gives higher power. During the Romantic era inspi-
ration was associated to human beings and their artistic expression. During
this period originality, ﬂashes of insight, and the creative genius were praised
(Ryhammar and Brolin 1999, p. 206).
From the beginning of the last century creative behaviour mainly became a
research topic for psychologists. Guilford (1950) was probably the ﬁrst scientist
to point out that intelligence tests cannot account for certain phenomena and
that other aspects of cognition, such as divergent thinking, can serve as a
better explanation. Building on Guilford’s work, E. Paul Torrance, "Father
of Creativity", developed tests to measure creativity (Torrance, 1962). These
tests are known as Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT). They have
been updated ﬁve times in 1974, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2008 and are translated
into almost 40 languages.3 These advances in creativity research provided
theories on what creativity is, why it is important, and how to measure it. The
later work already addresses understanding the nature of creativity (Sternberg,
1988), how a context aﬀects creative behaviour (Amabile, 1996), and how
diﬀerent variables inﬂuence creativity in organizations (Mumford, 2011).
While psychologists have been researching creativity for several decades,
economists and management scientists have contributed relatively less. Ar-
guably the main reason is that economists are interested in the ﬁnal output
of creative thinking, that is innovative products, services, or processes. Thus,
3See review in Kim (2006).
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economists have focused more on innovations, devoting relatively less attention
to the antecedents of inventions. Empirical studies are most frequently applied
methodology to innovation research, for example, oﬃcial patent statistics or
micro ﬁrm-level data from surveys. However, this approach is less applicable
to creativity. A more adequate method to study individual creative behaviour
seem to be ﬁeld and laboratory experiments.
The ﬁeld experiments are complicated to administer. Few examples of such
endeavour proved that it demands long term collaborations between academic
institutions and commercial organizations and requires ﬁnances, which are of-
ten only in reach of leading technology companies (see e.g. Boudreau et al.
2011). Analysing pros and cons of diﬀerent methodologies for innovation re-
search, Brüggemann and Bizer (2016) suggest that ﬁeld experiments are overly
costly and despite the lower level of external validity, laboratory studies can
be valuable substitutes for randomized ﬁeld experiments. They can provide
new perspective to research topics inaccessible through “traditional” empirical
methods.
During the last decade a number of authors designed various experiments
to model creative and innovative activities in the laboratory environment. For
example, among others, addressed topics include: issues on intellectual prop-
erty (Brüggemann et al., 2016, Buccafusco and Sprigman, 2011, Crosetto, 2010,
Engel and Kleine, 2015), R&D competition (Aghion et al., 2014, Cantner et al.,
2009) and innovation process (Asanov, 2014). Conducting controlled labora-
tory experiments is a prospective technique to understand how individuals
perform on creative and innovative tasks under diﬀerent payment schemes
(Bradler et al., 2016, Charness and Grieco, 2014, Eckartz et al., 2012, Ederer
and Manso, 2013, Erat and Gneezy, 2015). Experiments can also be very use-
ful to understand how interfering in creative production aﬀects creative output
(Joyce, 2009, Sikora, 2013).
The scientiﬁc work in the last years substantially advanced economic re-
search in this ﬁeld. However, this particular direction of research, studying
creative performance by using lab experiments, is relatively new. Thus, it is
rather undeveloped and there are research gaps to be ﬁlled. The current dis-
sertation addresses the topics which are not yet fully well understood and also
provides new insights on issues which have not yet been analysed.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The purpose of this work is to contribute to the economic literature on cre-
ativity research. Other than few exceptions, the previous literature analysed
creative and routine task performance separately. Such an approach is not
comprehensive and lacks an important benchmark to make credible conclu-
sions about creativity. A probable reason why scholars do not study these
two tasks simultaneously is that there are very rarely routine and creative
tasks that can be claimed to be suﬃciently similar to make a comparison.
Moreover, these tasks are usually done by diﬀerent individuals. To remedy
this problem, experimental methodology can be applied. Generally, labora-
tory economic experiments enable designing situations where everything but
one aspect is changed. This eliminates uncertainties and makes it possible to
relatively easily establish causal relationships.
Moreover, it can be very costly to change working environments and anal-
yse corresponding human behaviour in organizations. Therefore, in this thesis
I depend on controlled economic experiments to study: (1) How people co-
operate after exerting routine and creative eﬀorts. (2) Whether routine and
creative performance can be enhanced by competitive incentives. (3) How
constraints aﬀect routine and creative performance, and (4) how individual
domain/task speciﬁc skills interact with constraints and creative performance.
The second chapter studies if the creativity eﬀect transfers to the social
domain. More speciﬁcally, I design an economic experiment to learn if eﬀort
levels and eﬀort types inﬂuence cooperative behaviour. In the third chapter I
investigate whether diﬀerent degrees of competitive incentives and provision of
feedback improve routine and creative task performance. The fourth and the
ﬁfth chapters experimentally study how constraints or quality requirements
aﬀect routine and creative performance and what role creative competence
plays.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are single-author projects. Chapter 5 is co-authored
with Sanjiv Erat from the University of California, San Diego. It was presented
at the London Experimental Workshop 2016. The initial idea and program-
ming of the experiment was mainly done by Sanjiv Erat. I was primarily
responsible for the literature review and for the data collection. The data
analysis and the rest of the workload was shared equally by the authors.
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1.2.1 Chapter 2
In the second chapter of the thesis I study if endowment and creativity eﬀects
inﬂuence cooperative behaviour. Firstly, I try to validate previously found
results that higher eﬀort causes higher valuation of endowments and makes
individuals more hesitant to contribute to the common pool in a group. Sec-
ondly, I add another dimension of creative eﬀort and check if ﬁndings on routine
eﬀorts and cooperation also hold for creative eﬀorts.
When a group in an organization works on a creative project, members
usually bring in their knowledge acquired through low or high eﬀort. Ratio-
nal economic theory suggests that behavioural sunk costs, i.e. eﬀort spent
on earning, should not matter while deciding what portion of endowment to
contribute (Zeelenberg and van Dijk, 1997). However, recent research ﬁndings
show that if someone worked harder to attain an endowment she might be
more inclined to keep it private (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2009).
For instance, in technology companies programmers or coders often work
in groups. They share their knowledge and experience to increase proﬁtabil-
ity and success of projects. Usually the group members acquire endowments
through diﬀerent sources and eﬀorts. In case the previously spent eﬀort de-
termines willingness to contribute to the group, it becomes very important
for organization leaders to manage those group members who may overvalue
their endowments. However, behavioural sunk costs may actually not enter
the group domain at all. In that case, company principals should use diﬀerent
measures to keep members committed to the group.
In this chapter I designed a laboratory experiment which models the above
discussed situation. Namely, individuals earn through diﬀerent sources and
play a public goods game in a small group.4 According to the results of the
experiment, neither eﬀort level nor eﬀort type have eﬀects on cooperation.
When it comes to social behaviour, individuals usually base their decisions
on their previous experience with other groups, their social value orientation,
and personality traits. Thus, if there is a lack of cooperation in a group, it
should be ascribed to individual characteristics, rather than to eﬀorts that
group members have exerted to acquire their endowments.
4Cabrera and Cabrera (2002) argue that often knowledge sharing in an organization
corresponds to a cooperation dilemma, similar to the public goods dilemma.
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1.2.2 Chapter 3
In the third chapter I report on an economic experiment which investigates
whether competitive incentives can aﬀect routine and creative performance.
Previous research ﬁndings suggest that a routine performance can be enhanced
by putting individuals in a competition environment. However, results are not
unequivocal for creative tasks. Rationally speaking, individuals should respond
to competition by increasing their eﬀort to beat the competitors and receive a
reward. In fact, some scientists demonstrate that competition "chokes" creativ-
ity (Erat and Gneezy, 2015), others did not observe any eﬀect of competitive
incentives for creativity (Eckartz et al., 2012) and some even found positive
eﬀect of tournament incentives (Bradler et al., 2016). Thus, more research has
to be done in this direction.
Usually, organizations have a ﬁxed budget to spend for reimbursing em-
ployees. The dilemma that organizational leaders face is to determine how to
allocate these funds so that the highest productivity is reached. One way is
to pay everyone equally, regardless of their performance. The other options
could be to pay depending on performance (piece-rate) or inﬂict competition.
While there could be many diﬀerent variations of competitive or tournament
incentives, one way is to award a prize to the best performers and pay a mini-
mum wage to the rest. Studying such payment schemes, behavioural scholars
usually studied only one level of competition. However, the eﬀect of competi-
tive incentives may depend on the intensity of competition (i.e. the number of
competitors and the size of reward). For example, on the one hand, low compe-
tition can be more likely to encourage routine or creative workers and increase
performance. On the other hand high competition inheres substantially lower
probability of winning, therefore, it is more expected to cause choking under
competitive pressure. This usually increases the number of quitters and in the
end, decreases average performance.
The results of the experiment suggest that indeed, low competition with
low prize increases routine, but not creative performance. High competition
has no eﬀect in comparison to ﬂat rate payment for both types of tasks. High
competition with provision of feedback during the competition, decreased per-
formance. Thus, in this project I integrated two conceptually diﬀerent tasks in
a single experiment and ﬁnd evidence that low competition is supportive for
routine tasks, but not for creative tasks and that high competition and more-
over, high competition with feedback is least optimal for improving creative
performance.
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To summarize, this chapter expands the existing literature in three ways:
Firstly, it investigates eﬀects of competitive incentives for two diﬀerent types of
tasks. Secondly, it analysis eﬀects for two levels of competition (low and high).
Lastly, it studies eﬀects of feedback in a high competition condition before
the task is completed. The experimental evidence suggests that competitive
incentives have diﬀerent eﬀects depending on the intensity of the competition,
type of task and whether the performance feedback is provided or not.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
In the fourth chapter I study eﬀects of constraints for routine and creative
tasks. Early work on this topic has shown that if creators are restricted in
thinking freely on a given task, their performance decreases (e.g. Amabile
1978, 1996, Amabile and Gitomer 1984). The main reason is that creators
like to explore and invent without being framed. Once they are externally
limited, they cannot be as productive. Some of the recent research ﬁndings
suggest that moderate constraints may have positive eﬀects on outcomes by
challenging creative workers or guiding them to superior creative solutions
(Joyce, 2009, Moreau and Dahl, 2005).
Usually ﬁrms want to have high levels of creative output. To ensure this,
they try to facilitate production of novel ideas which are supposed to trans-
form into new products or services. Ultimately ﬁrm leaders want to have a
high number of qualitatively advanced creative solutions which will fulﬁl or
exceed the company demands. To achieve this, one can impose constraints or
requirements for creative tasks. If the below certain threshold quality is not
rewarded, employees are forced to give more eﬀort and generate highly creative
solutions. In this way creative workers may ﬁnd the task even more interesting
and engaging.
To test whether constraints can positively impact average creativity, I de-
signed a laboratory experiment and tested how low and high levels of con-
straints inﬂuence average creativity. Creativity was measured considering
both, quantity and quality of creative solutions. I manipulated constraints
by setting low and high quality thresholds for creative solutions. In the con-
straint treatments, if the solutions generated by the participants were below
these thresholds, the participants were not rewarded.
According to the results both, low and high constraints are detrimental for
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routine and creative performance. Further analysis shows that it takes some
time to adapt to constraints. After learning the constraints, the participants
performed as well as unconstrained ones. However, this learning over time was
observed only for low constraints. Regardless of eﬀort type, high constraints
were always detrimental for performance.
There was one interesting and at the same time unexpected aspect of de-
creased performance in low constraints condition. Namely, participants who
completed the unconstrained condition were building substantially more high
quality creative solutions than the participants in constraint treatment. Even
though constrained subjects were directly required to come up with only highly
creative solutions, participants were less productive compared to unconstrained
ones. This might suggest that individuals were building up on initial creations.
That is, it could be a case that a small reward for short solutions allowed de-
velopment of more qualitatively complex solutions. In order to explore this
phenomenon I designed a follow-up experiment to investigate the causes and
implications of this result and also, explore the role of domain-speciﬁc skill for
a creative performance.
1.2.4 Chapter 5
In the ﬁfth chapter we5 study how domain-speciﬁc or task-relevant skills in-
teract with constraints. Generally, it is well known that if an individual has
special knowledge related to a given creative task, she will handle it easily.6
However, until now (to the best of our knowledge) no research has investigated
the interaction of skills with constraints. In this paper we argue that depending
on the skill level, constraints may have a positive or negative eﬀect on creative
performance. On the one hand constraints may have a negative eﬀect, pre-
venting gradual development of creative ideas, on the other hand constraints
may enable the focus on high quality solutions and with this enhance creative
performance.
Production of novel ideas which do not meet certain quality standards (i.e.
"worthless" ideas) can be regarded as failure. Traditionally, managers asserted
5The chapter is co-authored with Sanjiv Erat, from the Rady School of Management,
University of California, San Diego.
6See componential model of creativity by Amabile (2012, 1983).
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that in successful companies "failure is not an option".7 However, attitudes
towards failure in innovative ﬁrms have changed recently. Failure in producing
novel ideas may be an important phase towards success (Ederer and Manso,
2013, Manso, 2011). It could serve as an instrument to facilitate build-up of
novel ideas and be a roadmap to breakthrough innovations.
In order to study these two diﬀerent eﬀects of constraints on creative perfor-
mance, we design an economic laboratory experiment. We externally manipu-
late incentives and constraints and use a survey to elicit subjects’ task-speciﬁc
skill level. In line with previous ﬁndings on incentivizing creativity, we ﬁnd
that the piece rate payment has no eﬀect on performance. However more
interestingly, in piece rate payment conditions, a domain-speciﬁc skill level
determines whether the constraints have a positive or a negative eﬀect on cre-
ative performance. Highly competent creative workers are able to respond to
constraints by concentrating on highly valuable solutions and increase overall
performance. Whereas less competent workers suﬀer from imposed constraints.
Furthermore, in support of our hypotheses, we ﬁnd evidence of creative build-
up among low skilled participants. In the unconstrained condition, they were
more frequently extending less creative solutions into more creative ones and
presumably, that was the main reason why constraints appear to be detrimen-
tal for these individuals.
The ﬁndings of this research are highly relevant for decision makers in
innovative ﬁrms. While managers often try to provide maximum freedom for
creative workers, our results point toward the value of more explicit and proac-
tive intervention, such as setting constraints for creative tasks, especially when
the creators are highly-skilled. More broadly, employees’ skill (or task related
knowledge) level must be a key consideration when designing the appropriate
payment mechanisms for creative workers.
7The phrase is attributed to Gene Kranz, ﬂight director of Gemini, Apollo and Space
Shuttle missions.
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Effects of Creative and Routine
Efforts on Cooperation
2.1 Introduction
Cooperation is fundamental for human interaction. From early years of hu-
man development, cooperation was essential for survival, whether it was about
joining eﬀorts to hunt or ﬁghting enemy. Cooperation enabled sharing and ex-
pansion of knowledge, resulting in improved living standards. Many authors
argue that cooperation is the key feature of human behaviour which empowered
the extraordinary progress of the mankind (see an overview of the evolution-
ary study of cooperation in West et al. 2011). Therefore, it is not surprising
that scholars have devoted huge amount of scientiﬁc eﬀort to learning this
phenomenon.
Researchers from diﬀerent ﬁelds have explored cooperation in various set-
tings. One of the most frequently used method in economics and psychology is
experimentation. Probably the most widespread experiment is Public Goods
Game (see review e.g. in Kagel et al. 1995). In this game it is optimal if
everyone contributes to common pool, however, it is individually rational to
free ride. Thus, the game creates a dilemma, a situation when on the one hand
if no one contributes, public good will not be provided and everyone will miss
an opportunity to increase their welfare. On the other hand if one contributes
without others reciprocating then her wealth will drop below the original level.
This, often leads to tragedy of commons, when single individuals are exploiting
11
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the public good without contributing to it (Hardin, 2009).
Scientists have conducted hundreds of public goods experiments by grant-
ing endowments to participants and manipulating various conditions. How-
ever, less attention has been devoted to studying how people behave when
they earn their endowments, that they later use. At a starting point it is sci-
entiﬁcally justiﬁed to simplify economic laboratory experiments, it facilitates
to eﬀectively study complexities (Smith, 1994). From this perspective, grant-
ing participants their endowments was a right choice and eased experimental
work. However, after several decades of research, it is important to relax the
assumption that individuals receive their endowments as "heavenly manna".
To ﬁll the gap some researchers (e.g. Cherry et al. 2002) designed experiments
where the participants had to earn their endowments. While the research ﬁnd-
ings are mixed, the majority of authors argue that earning endowments makes
people endowed to their earnings. As a results they are more likely to overvalue
their possessions and avoid sharing it with others.
Although, in general, the levels of eﬀort exerted for earning endowments
should not matter for making a decision on how to spend it, the research
suggests that people change their behaviour when the behavioural sunk costs
(i.e. eﬀorts) are present (Zeelenberg and van Dijk, 1997).
The principle that people value more what they already possess, is well
documented in behavioural economics. This bias is named endowment eﬀect
(Kahneman et al., 1990, Loewenstein and Issacharoﬀ, 1994). Moreover, some
authors (e.g. Franke and Schreier 2010, Norton et al. 2012) argue that exerting
eﬀort makes individuals overvalue result of their work. Along these lines, it is
credible to assume that if eﬀort aﬀects decision making, then exerting higher
eﬀort should also be diﬀered from exerting low eﬀort (Franco-Watkins and
Acuﬀ, 2013).
In addition to that, it has been demonstrated that creative eﬀort ampliﬁes
endowment eﬀect, causing even higher over-valuation of created artefacts. This
bias is referred as a creativity eﬀect (Buccafusco and Sprigman, 2010, 2011).
Although the eﬀects of real eﬀorts as well as size of eﬀorts on cooperation has
been researched (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2009, Spraggon and Oxoby, 2009),
to the best of my knowledge there is no research done on creative eﬀorts and
cooperative behaviour. Considering the fact that number of creative jobs and
innovator groups is dramatically increasing (Florida, 2014), it is important to
study whether creative eﬀort aﬀects cooperation in small groups.
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In order to better understand if behavioural biases caused by exerting ef-
fort shape cooperation, in the current paper I investigate how eﬀort size (low
vs high) and eﬀort type (routine vs creative) aﬀect contribution decisions in
Public Goods setting. More precisely, I designed an economic laboratory ex-
periment with four treatments. In the ﬁrst two treatments, participants had to
earn their endowments through routine or creative eﬀort and then contribute
to public goods, in the other two treatments, individuals earned in the same
way but had to exert substantially more eﬀort to acquire the same endowments
and also decide on contributing to the public goods.
The results show that eﬀort size and eﬀort type do not change cooper-
ation levels. Instead, participants of the experiment depend on their social
value orientation and personality traits while deciding what portion of their
endowments to contribute to the common pool. Thus, the current project
provides further evidence for the viewpoint that eﬀorts do not usually shape
social behaviour, such as cooperation in small groups (Cherry et al., 2005).
The paper is organized as follows: First, I overview the related literature.
Second, I set the research questions and hypotheses. As a next step I provide a
detailed explanation of the experimental design. Finally, I present the results,
discussion of the ﬁndings and suggestions for future research.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Origin of Endowments and Cooperation
From the rationality perspective the source of money should not matter while
making a decision on how to spend it. Each unit of money has the same value
whether it was earned through hard work or found in a street. In fact Zee-
lenberg and van Dijk (1997) showed that this is not the case and individuals
act depending on how high their behavioural sunk costs are. Scholars from
areas of social psychology and behavioural economics have observed chang-
ing behaviour depending on whether participants of a laboratory experiment
earned their resources or not (e.g. Cherry et al. 2002, Franco-Watkins and
Acuﬀ 2013). The ﬁndings are mixed: some authors found that subjects are
not giving up their wealth easily when they have not been granted it and are
rather hesitant to invest or put their earnings under risk after working for it.
Conversely, some results show that subjects are more generous and eager to
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give up their earnings easily when they have exerted a certain amount of eﬀort
for it (Spraggon and Oxoby, 2009). While there is a suﬃciently large body of
research in this direction, in what follows I overview some of the most relevant
and interesting ﬁndings.
Cherry et al. (2002) designed a dictator game, which controls self-interested
strategic behaviour by giving a person complete control over the distribution
of wealth. Compared to the previous dictator games (e.g. Hoﬀman et al. 1996)
the participants of the experiment played with earned wealth rather than un-
earned wealth granted by the experimenter. The main argument for this is that
the earnings have to be legitimate to produce a rational behaviour. The key
discovery was that the other-regarding behaviour is greatly diminished when
the bargaining involves earned wealth, and this behaviour is nearly eliminated
when the earned stakes are combined with anonymity. In other words, earning
an endowment led decision makers to dramatically reduce a game theoretic
oﬀ-equilibrium behaviour (i.e. giving away positive amount of money). As a
result, the authors conclude that the high cooperation levels and the lack of
free riding could also be caused by the windfall endowments of the players.
Despite this conjecture, Cherry et al. (2005) could not ﬁnd supporting ev-
idence that the origin of endowments aﬀects group members’ contributions to
the public good. They designed a classical linear public goods game, with two
stages: ﬁrst earning and then contributions to the public good. In the earning
treatment (T1) participants had to solve a Graduate Management Admission
Test (GMAT)1 to earn endowments. In the second treatment (T2) the endow-
ments were windfall. The game was played only once to avoid a reciprocal
behaviour by the group members in future periods, triggered by generosity or
defection in the ﬁrst periods. The generated data indicates that there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence for subjects who earned their endowment relative to those
with windfall endowments. Thus, although the experiment protocol of earning
endowments was similar to that by Cherry et al. (2002), the results diﬀer,
which as the authors themselves presume could be because of the diﬀerence
between contexts. That is, the public goods game represents a more complex
task, demanding greater cognitive eﬀort and involving simultaneous decisions
by the other contributors.
Surprisingly, Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) found the opposite eﬀect of earn-
ing money. In their two person public good game some participants earned
their endowments through the GMAT questions, while the others were granted.
1For more information on the GMAT test see www.mba.com.
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They observed that those who earned their endowments contribute more and
those who were given their endowments contribute less. As a possible explana-
tion they suggest that such behaviour is due to the “anticipatory reciprocity”
(also discussed by Cherry et al. 2005, Kroll et al. 2007). That means that
earners expect that non-earners will cooperate and therefore they contribute
signiﬁcantly more expecting this reciprocal behaviour.
Earlier experiment by Loewenstein and Issacharoﬀ (1994) showed that
students, after performing a task, exhibited a stronger endowment eﬀect to-
wards a mug which they received as a compensation, compared to those who
simply received the same mug as a gift. To test whether the level of eﬀort re-
ally impacts contribution in a public good setting Muehlbacher and Kirchler
(2009) designed an experiment where participants had to earn their endow-
ments though an easy or an eﬀortful task. They hypothesize that those who
exerted more eﬀort to earn money should value their endowments more and
contribute less. An important novelty in their design is that subjects within
groups were not informed that their group members performed diﬀerent eﬀort
tasks. Therefore, they claim to measure "pure impact of eﬀort on coopera-
tion". Their experiment was implemented as follows: In a low-eﬀort condition
participants had to watch a TV cartoon series and were questioned about the
episode synchronically. In a high-eﬀort condition the same episode was shown
but they had to listen to a soundtrack from a diﬀerent episode. The results of
debrieﬁng the subjects proved that this manipulation was successful and the
participants contributed signiﬁcantly less when they were assigned to the high-
eﬀort treatment. The approach is somewhat questionable. Participants could
suﬀer from irritation or distraction if they had to listen to sounds which are not
in unison with what they saw. Hence, less contributions could have resulted
not necessarily from the higher eﬀort, rather from other unobserved factors,
such as changes in mood. Moreover, in their experiment incentives were very
low: participants earned 50 ECU, while the exchange rate was 42 ECU = 1
EUR. Therefore, to validate the results of the study further replication and
modiﬁcation of the design are needed.
The notion of "House money eﬀects" was proposed by Thaler and John-
son (1990) and it describes increased risk seeking propensity under certain
conditions. They discovered that individuals choose a risky option more fre-
quently in a two stage game, which allowed certain gains in the ﬁrst stage
and a risky option in the second stage. While the distribution of gains in two
lottery options was the same, players were more risk seeking in a situation
when they had some earning guaranteed in the ﬁrst stage. Clark (2002) in-
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vestigated “house money eﬀects” in the public goods game. He assumed that
the decisions about contributions involve a risky behaviour as the other group
members can always free ride and enjoy beneﬁts at the other’s expense. In
other words, he expected decreased cooperation in the public goods game, in
a situation when participants brought their own money in order to take part
in the experiment. Thus, the experiment did not involve earning resources
through real eﬀort task. The author could not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween the average contribution levels in the own money and the house money
(here it means windfall) treatments.
Harrison (2007) reconsidered the evidence from Clark (2002)’s experiment.
After using appropriate statistical methods for the data analysis he found that
the “house money” does have an eﬀect in the standard public goods game. It
is estimated to reduce the probability of providing something by 8.2 percent
points and this eﬀect is statistically diﬀerent from zero (p − value < 0.01).
Despite the ﬁnal conﬁrmation of the house money eﬀect in the public goods
setting the method of asking participants to bring their money to a labora-
tory is unusual and somewhat problematic. An experimenter cannot control
how much eﬀort participants gave to get the money. Therefore, although the
authors are often referred to in the literature explaining cooperation in the
PGGs, no implications can be made about the eﬀort size and the cooperation
levels.
Marginally relevant to the topic, since the authors take a look at bargaining
rather than cooperation, is a paper by Franco-Watkins and Acuﬀ (2013).
They examined how eﬀort aﬀects perceptions of fairness and allocation of
resources during bargaining situations. In previous literature scientists relied
on one shot bargaining, or the ultimatum game (e.g. Güth et al. 1982) with
windfall money, as a source of bargaining resource. The proposers usually
found an equal split the fairest. To test how real eﬀort inﬂuences valuation and
bargaining, Franco-Watkins and Acuﬀ (2013) demanded that experimental
subjects perform a self-arbitrary task, requiring to click a computer mouse
for 100 times and self-performance task – answering at least 70% of 20 trivia
questions. The results indicated that those who completed the performance
task demanded signiﬁcantly more money when the other party did not have to
endure the same task. That means, that the willingness to accept more money
increased when others performed no task and at the same time the willingness
to pay was decreased when others performed no task. Thus, even if the eﬀort
was not directly linked to the second phase, it had a small but signiﬁcant eﬀect
on bargaining.
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To summarize, the results are mixed: some authors found no impact of
earning endowments on cooperative decisions in the public goods games, while
others did observe an inﬂuence of eﬀort level on cooperation. In some cases,
the higher the stated eﬀorts for earning was, the less cooperative subjects be-
came. However, even if it seems to be quite intuitive that individuals get more
attached to something they worked for, there are some exceptions when no
such eﬀect or even the opposite eﬀects were found. The rational argumenta-
tion also suggests that eﬀorts should not matter at all. Thus, the topic can
still be explored further to set clear links between origins of wealth and the
decision making on cooperation in a public goods setting.
2.2.2 Creativity and Endowment Valuation
All progress and innovation depends on ability to change existing thinking
patterns, break with the present and build something new. Therefore, cre-
ative thinking is an extraordinary capacity of a human mind and has recently
become matter of central importance for interdisciplinary research (Dietrich
and Kanso, 2010). Much attention has been paid to the organizational and
managerial issues pertaining creativity, as it represents a basic and critical el-
ement for innovation process (Udwadia, 1990). Since groups are often built
of creator individuals, it is important to know how creative eﬀorts impacts in-
dividual social behaviour in a group context. This may help to analyse group
members’ decision making and overall group performance. Thus, to link co-
operation and creativity, in this section I overview some scientiﬁc papers on
creativity in experiments which are most relevant.
To understand how creativity aﬀects decision making Buccafusco and
Sprigman (2010, 2011) conducted two experiments. In the ﬁrst one, some
of the participants wrote three-line poems, some were told that they owned
the poems and the others were potential buyers. One of ten such poems had a
chance to win a prize. Then the creators and owners were asked to name the
price for what they were willing to sell their poem. The values of their poems
should theoretically be the value of prize divided by ten. However, subjects
demanded signiﬁcantly more than expected. More speciﬁcally, the money that
the authors were willing to accept was more than four times higher to what
rational choice theory would predict (i.e. probability of winning multiplied
by the value of the prize). The willing to accept by creators was two times of
what bidders were willing to pay. Thus, the owners felt more attached towards
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the poems that they possessed and for the authors of the poems, endowment
eﬀect was even greater. This ampliﬁed endowment eﬀect caused by being an
author oneself is what Buccafusco and Sprigman name creativity eﬀect.
The endowment eﬀect describes situations when the owners’ willingness to
accept the minimum price for their possession is greater than what potential
purchasers are willing to pay. This phenomenon can be a source of substan-
tial ineﬃciencies on markets. Thus, to examine a strengthened endowment
eﬀect, Buccafusco and Sprigman (2011), in their follow up paper, exclusively
focused on valuation anomaly that is related to creation of new works. What
they deﬁne as creativity eﬀect may be not less important and signiﬁcant than
endowment eﬀect. It could be a reason for ineﬃcient allocation of property
rights or the lack of cooperation between creator groups. The second exper-
iment was similar to the ﬁrst. The authors asked painter students from the
School of the Art Institute of Chicago to paint paintings and play the game
identical to the previous one. The new data showed that the valuation gap
between the creators (of paintings) and potential buyers was 4-to-1. This sug-
gests that higher eﬀorts incorporated into creation leads to further divergence
in valuations.
Attraction and over valuation of self-constructed products have been ob-
served by other authors as well. This phenomenon is called as the "IKEA
eﬀect". Norton et al. (2012) have conducted a simple experiment and showed
that the participants of the experiment valued origami paper cranes signiﬁ-
cantly more when they built them themselves. The same pattern was found
by Franke and Schreier (2010). In their experiment participants who designed
scarves valued it more than the same type of scarves designed by others. Fi-
nally, Dohle et al. (2014) found what they call "I cooked it myself" - eﬀect.
In this experiment participants liked and consumed signiﬁcantly more self-
prepared drinks than the same drinks prepared with exactly the same ingredi-
ents and receipt by others.
In what follows, I set research questions and hypotheses based on the pro-
vided theoretical discussion.
2.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
The experimental literature, discussed above, demonstrated that exertion of
eﬀort to acquire endowments ends up in diﬀerent behaviours by subjects. In
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most of the cases hard work causes higher endowment eﬀect towards earnings.
That means participants value their resources, earned through hard work more
and become more hesitant to give them up. Therefore, the ﬁrst research ques-
tion is:
1) How do earning endowments through diﬀerent real eﬀort tasks with
diﬀerent levels of eﬀort aﬀect cooperation in PGG?
Since contribution to public good contains some risks, higher valuation
of endowments could cause less contributions by group members. In other
words, they face uncertainty about others’ decisions and show more risk-averse
behaviour when they have earned their endowments through a real eﬀort task.
Working causes higher valuation of endowments and therefore subjects might
cooperate less when they have earned their resources through diﬃcult (high
eﬀort) tasks. Thus, in line with Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009), hypothesis
I can be formulated as follows:
• Contributions to the public good after earning through high eﬀort task
will be lower than the contributions after earning through low eﬀort task.
In addition, creation can lead to ampliﬁcation of the endowment eﬀect (so
called creativity eﬀect) and emergence of the valuation gap (Buccafusco and
Sprigman, 2010, 2011). Creators get attached to their creation and overesti-
mate its importance. Therefore, it can be presumed that the creativity eﬀect
may inﬂuence individuals’ behaviour, when they have to contribute to pub-
lic good earnings from their creative endeavour. Thus the second research
question is:
2) Do subjects change their cooperation behaviour if they have exerted
creative eﬀort?
Although creators are often too attached to their earnings, sometimes cre-
ators are eager to share their creation with others as well. For example as it
is in the case of Free/Open Source Software (FOSS) (Crosetto, 2010). Such
attitude may even have counter eﬀect on contributions and actually increase
them. However, this case seems to be more of an exception than a common
pattern. Generally, when there is no standard of common sharing, inventions
are assessed by creators themselves and moreover, often overvalued. Therefore,
under such circumstances free riding incentives will be higher and cooperation
level is more likely to be lessened. Thus, hypothesis II can be formulated as
follows:
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• Contributions to the public good after earning through creative eﬀort
task will be lower than contributions after earning through routine eﬀort
task.
In most social dilemma situations, people cannot communicate with one
another and therefore they are uncertain about the decisions of their fellow
group members. To deal with this kind of environmental uncertainty, par-
ticipants use their own social value orientations and personality traits as a
guideline for choice behaviour (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). Thus, the third
research question is:
3) How do individual personality traits and Social Value Orientation aﬀect
cooperation?
Social value orientation (SVO) is deﬁned as a personality variable that in-
dicates how people evaluate outcomes for themselves and others (de Kwaad-
steniet et al., 2006, Messick and McClintock, 1968, Van Lange and Liebrand,
1991). For example, Van Lange (1999) categorized SVO as (a) cooperation,
i.e., the preference to maximize joint outcomes and establish an equal distri-
bution, (b) individualism, i.e., the preference to maximize own outcomes, and
(c) competition, i.e., the preference to maximize relative advantage. Coop-
erators are usually considered as prosocials, individualists and competitors –
proselfs. Depending on this deﬁnition and ﬁndings by Murphy et al. (2011),
hypothesis III (a), can be formulated as follows:
• a) SVO will be predictive for cooperation levels: Prosocials will contribute
more to the public good than proselfs.
The research on personality from the last few decades, has proven that the per-
sonality measures may explain human behaviour in diﬀerent dimensions, such
as cooperation within groups (e.g. Volk et al. 2011). Researchers investigating
the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and social behaviour
(e.g. Volk et al. 2011) found that in PGG setting agreeableness and prosocial
values were indicative of individual preferences for cooperation. In addition, a
laboratory study by LePine and Van Dyne (2001) observed a positive relation
between cooperation and personality traits: agreeableness, emotional stability
and extraversion. Thus, hypothesis III (b) can be formulated as follows:
• b) The Big Five dimensions of agreeableness, emotional stability and
extraversion will be positively related to cooperation.
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2.4 Experimental Design
Procedure and design. The experiment had two, high and low eﬀort treat-
ments, with two types of tasks, routine and creative. Hence, there were four
conditions (see Table 2.2). The experiment was conducted in two phases.
That is, for example, in the low eﬀort treatment participants earned their
endowments through a routing task, made their contributions in a standard
PGG, then they earned through a creative eﬀort task and again made their
contributions to the standard PGG without getting feedback in between. To
eliminate order eﬀects the sequence of the tasks were switched in diﬀerent
sessions. Similar design was applied in the high eﬀort treatments. The only
diﬀerence was the amount of eﬀort needed to solve the tasks. The number of
observations in diﬀerent treatments and diﬀerent sequences of the tasks were
balanced. LTR1 and HTR1 means low and high eﬀort treatments with the task
sequence: routine task - creative task. LTR2 and HTR2 denote the opposite
sequence: creative task - routine task (see Table 2.1).
LTR1 HTR1 LTR2 HTR2
N of obs. 27 36 27 33
Table 2.1: Number of observations in diﬀerent sessions with varied sequence
of tasks
After reading the instructions on how the experiment is organized and how
they are supposed to play the game, the subjects had the opportunity to ob-
serve how hypothetical contributions can be redistributed using PGG calcula-
tor (see instructions in Appendix 2.8.1). There were three person groups. The
participants were informed that they would earn twice and contribute to PGG
twice, however only one of their decisions would be pay-oﬀ relevant. Any
positive contribution was doubled and redistributed among the three group
members.
πi = pi + 1/2
∑
N
i=1(ji)
Where,
• πi - Earnings of i
• pi - allocation to personal account
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• ji - allocation to joint account
• N - number of group members
In this PG experiment marginal per capital return (MPCR) was 0.66. This
is higher than usually used range between 0.4 - 0.5. The reason to opt for
somewhat higher MPCR is that the research goal of the current project was
to observe probable decline in contributions across diﬀerent treatments. The
higher MPCR makes it more likely to detect treatment eﬀects if there are any.
As in most PG experiments, here it is socially optimal if everyone contributes
everything. However, for individuals the dominant strategy is to contribute
zero in all of the treatments (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). After getting to know
how the PGG works, the subjects answered control questions. The subjects
earned 50 ECU in all treatments, i.e. there was no inequality between group
members and across groups. After the control questions they solved real eﬀort
tasks.
Real-effort task N of obs.
Treatment "R.L.eﬀ" Counting a letter 54
Treatment "R.H.eﬀ" Counting two letters 69
Treatment "C.L.eﬀ" Creating words 54
Treatment "C.H.eﬀ" Creating more words 69
Table 2.2: Experimental conditions
Real effort tasks. Examples from the previous literature comparing be-
haviour in PGG after eﬀort exertion include: Graduate Management Admis-
sion Tests (GMAT) (Cherry et al., 2005, Spraggon and Oxoby, 2009); and
answering questions about plot and visual images from a 6 minute episode of
TV cartoon (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2009).
In this experiment, in the routine eﬀort treatments, the participants had to
count one or two letters within given strings of letters.2 For example, count how
many times a letter “a” appears in characters strings with diﬀerent lengths,
the longer the letter strings were, the more points subjects received. After
surpassing a certain threshold of points participants would earn 50 ECUs and
automatically proceed to the next stage (see Figure in Appendix 2.8.2).
2The task was inspired by the real eﬀort task designed by Rey-Biel et al. (2011).
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In the psychological creativity research literature, authors often ask sub-
jects to think of creative stories or creative solutions to open questions, which
are modiﬁcations of the Torrence Test (Torrance, 1968). Other examples of
creative or innovative tasks include: Writing three line poems; Paint paintings
(Amabile, 1979, 1985, Buccafusco and Sprigman, 2010); Designing an Auto-
mobile (Cantner et al., 2009); Word creation task (Eckartz et al., 2012) and
word extension (modiﬁed scrabble) tasks (Crosetto, 2010).
In this experiment I applied a word creation task3 similar to the task, used
by Eckartz et al. (2012). The main reasons behind are that it has many aspects
of a creative task and it mimics quite well a creative innovation. Moreover,
it is one way to avoid using the most widely applied consensual assessment
technique (CAT) (Amabile, 1979). The CAT method, which requires selection
of judges for assessment of creative outputs is time consuming and impractical
(Amabile, 1996). In addition to the fact that the task, that I use, takes less time
than other options, it is easy to program, objectively assesses creativity and
makes it possible to count eﬀorts exerted by players (see Figure in Appendix
2.8.2).
The longer words the participants built, the more points were granted (see
Table 2.3). After getting more than a threshold level4 students earned 50 ECUs
and proceeded to the next stage. The diﬀerence between low and high eﬀort
routine tasks was that in the high eﬀort treatment subjects had to count two
letters in the same letter strings and collect twice more points. In the high
eﬀort creative task subjects had to create words from the same letter string,
however they had to collect one and half times more points than in the low
eﬀort creative task. It has to be emphasized that eﬀortfulness of routine and
creative tasks were maximally approximated: In the low eﬀort routine task
solving the longest letter string would suﬃce to proceed. Likewise, creating
the longest words (which students could usually come up with) was enough to
collect the necessary points. While doing the high eﬀort treatment students
had to solve minimum of three letter strings and ﬁnd about three words to
proceed.
Finally, after making the second contribution decision, the subjects were
3I am thankful to Diego d’Andria and Igor Asanov for providing a code, implemented in
the programming languages Ruby and R, to generate the letter string and the list of possible
words for the creative eﬀort task.
4Students could collect up to 600 points with the given letter string. However, thresholds
were 18 points in low eﬀort treatment and 27 points in high eﬀort treatment to keep the
task suﬃciently eﬀortful, but not too diﬃcult.
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Words from the letter set " a c c d e e e g i n s t "
ad 1 + 2 = 3 points
and 1 + 2 + 3 = 6 points
cats 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 points
... ...
teasing 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = 28 points
Table 2.3: Measuring creativity: Longer words generate more points (Eckartz
et al., 2012)
asked manipulation-check questions. Then, they were informed which of their
contribution decisions was pay-oﬀ relevant, about the amounts of the contri-
butions by their group members and their total proﬁt. As a last step, they
answered SVO (Murphy et al., 2011) and personality (Gosling et al., 2003)
questionnaires. They were remunerated and released.
The experiment was conducted in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The partici-
pants were recruited by Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
(ORSEE) (Greiner, 2015).
2.5 Results
For the statistical analysis and graphs I used R software (R Core Team, 2013).
The experiment was conducted at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena,
during November 2015.5 In total 123 subjects have participated in the exper-
iment, majority of them were students at the university. The average earning
was 8 euros (with a range from 3.8 to 11.2 euros), for a 45 minute experimental
session, which is 25 % higher than minimum student assistant salary.
Manipulation check. To enable comparison of the eﬀort levels exerted,
perceived diﬃculty of the tasks and exerted creative eﬀort, the following ma-
nipulation questions where asked to the subjects: 1. In comparison to the ﬁrst
5The experiment was conducted in German language. In order to make sure that the
participants were ﬂuent in German, they took a short language test (developed by Kirchkamp
and Reiß 2011). Two of the participants failed the test and therefore were disqualiﬁed from
the experiment.
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task did you feel that the second task required higher degree of eﬀort? (1=
same degree of eﬀort; 8= too high eﬀort) 2. In comparison to the ﬁrst task,
did you feel that the second task was as easy as the ﬁrst task ? (1= as easy
as the ﬁrst task; 8= too diﬃcult) 3. In comparison to the ﬁrst task, did you
have feeling that the second task required creative eﬀort? (1= same degree
of creative eﬀort; 8= too high creative eﬀort)6 Results of manipulation check
questions showed that the participants considered creative task to require a
high level of creative eﬀort (p < 0.05). The eﬀort level as well as the perceived
diﬃculty was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for creative and routine tasks in the
same eﬀort level treatments. The diﬀerence between the perceived eﬀort levels
needed to perform on tasks in low and high eﬀort treatments was signiﬁcant
at p < 0.01 level.
In Figure 2.1 contribution frequencies are presented across diﬀerent treat-
ments. Unlike previous research by Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009) (where
there was only one free rider among all the participants) in this experiment, the
portion of the absolute free riders, those who contributed zero is substantial.
The reason behind is the adequate incentivization, which heightens internal
validity of the experiment.
In Figure 2.2 mean contributions across treatments are displayed. As it can
be seen, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences across treatments, which means that
the type of task and the eﬀort levels are not indicative for the chosen level of
cooperation (See Boxplot and the plot for Anova for the contributions across
treatments in Appendix 2.4).
Table 2.4 provides the results from the paired t-tests for the same levels of
eﬀorts and the results from the Welch two sample t-tests for diﬀerent levels
of eﬀort. The examination of the means conﬁrms that there is no signiﬁcant
statistical diﬀerence between the means.
To identify the eﬀect of eﬀort type on contribution size, I ﬁrst pooled all
contributions and regressed7 them on eﬀort type (see Table 2.5). Performing
low eﬀort routine task leads to slightly higher cooperation in comparison to
low eﬀort task, however the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (p − value > 0.1).
Hence, hypotheses I and II are not supported.
Doing Tobit regressions (see Table 2.6) with dummy variables for the task
6In diﬀerent sequences of the tasks, manipulation-check questions were reformulated so
that subjects always compared the creative task to the routine one.
7For the regression tables I used Stargazer package for R program (Hlavac, 2014).
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Figure 2.1: Frequency of contributions across treatments
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R.Low.eﬀ - C.Low.eﬀ Results
1 Paired t-test: t(53) = 1.29, p = .201, d = 0.25
R.High.eﬀ - C.High.eﬀ Results
2 Paired t-test: t(68) = -1.29, p = .200, d = -0.22
R.Low.eﬀ - R.High.eﬀ Results
3 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(117.78) = 1.12, p = .264, d = NA
C.Low.eﬀ - C.High.eﬀ Results
4 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(112.95) = -0.05, p = .963, d = NA
Table 2.4: T-tests
Dependent variable:
Contributions Contributions
OLS/Censored OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3)
R.L.eff 2.189 0.736 3.261
(3.024) (2.215) (4.256)
R.H.eff -0.144 0.753 -0.542
(3.024) (2.314) (4.278)
C.L.eff -1.072 1.159 -2.025
(2.834) (2.127) (4.000)
Constant 24.014∗∗∗ 20.362∗∗∗ 25.019∗∗∗
(2.004) (1.512) (2.831)
Observations 246 171 246
R2 0.005 0.002
Adjusted R2 -0.007 -0.016
Log Likelihood -860.309
Residual Std. Error 16.646 (df = 242) 10.365 (df = 167)
F Statistic 0.402 (df = 3; 242) 0.102 (df = 3; 167)
Wald Test 1.591 (df = 3)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.5: Cooperation and types of eﬀorts
type and eﬀort level provides positive coeﬃcient for low eﬀort routine task.
However, it is not signiﬁcant (p − values > 0.1). Therefore, the inﬂuence of
task type and eﬀort level are not proved.
In Appendix 2.8.5 I dichotomized the dependent variable, distinguishing
between zero and positive contributions.8 For the routine eﬀort task, the eﬀort
level dummy is marginally signiﬁcant for model (3), indicating that higher
8It has to be mentioned that some authors argue that dichotomization of quantitative
variables is rarely defensible and often will yield misleading results (MacCallum et al., 2002).
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Dependent variable:
All Contributions Contribution R. task Contribution C. task
(1) (2) (3)
Eﬀort type dummy 0.548
(3.001)
Eﬀort level dummy -5.109 0.581
(3.981) (4.577)
Constant 24.785∗∗∗ 28.093∗∗∗ 24.542∗∗∗
(2.130) (2.980) (3.434)
Observations 246 123 123
Log Likelihood -861.089 -436.946 -422.745
Wald Test (df = 1) 0.033 1.647 0.016
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.6: Dummies for task type and eﬀort level
eﬀort would cause less positive contributions.
Interestingly, the number of zero contributions to the public good after the
creative eﬀort task was 33% higher than the number of zero contributions after
the routine task. Despite ﬁnding no diﬀerence in mean contributions across
treatments, this ﬁnding relates to hypothesis II, which predicted that creative
eﬀort should lessen cooperation.
In order to analyse the eﬀects of Social Value Orientation, I applied the
methodology developed by Murphy et al. (2011). The personality traits of
the participants were measured by the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI)
by Gosling et al. (2003). Correlation among the Big Five measures and SVO
is provided in Appendix 2.8.4. According to the results, SVO is positively
related to contributions (p − value < 0.05), extraversion is also positively
related to cooperation, however only after performing routine eﬀort task (p−
value < 0.05), for the creative eﬀort task signiﬁcance was marginal (p−value <
0.1). Surprisingly, agreeableness is negatively linked to the contributions (p−
value < 0.05) (All regression results are reported in the appendix 2.8.59).
9Note: In all regressions second model includes reversed measures for the big ﬁve per-
sonality traits.
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2.6 Discussion
In the current paper possible eﬀects of earning endowments on the cooperation
decisions have been investigated. The previous research has identiﬁed that
behavioural sunk costs, i.e. exerting eﬀort to acquire endowments, aﬀected
subjects’ decisions in diﬀerent domains. Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009)
found that an eﬀort level could determine the willingness to cooperate within
a group. However, the ﬁnding contradicts other researchers’ results. For exam-
ple, Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) found that real eﬀorts increased the contri-
bution size compared to those who did not perform any task at all. Whereas,
Cherry et al. (2005) did not observe any diﬀerence in the contribution sizes
among those who did perform a task and those who did not. The main dif-
ference between Muehlbacher and Kirchler’s experimental design and that of
previous researchers was that in other experiments participants were informed
about the asymmetry of origins of endowments. Providing such information
could have led to "anticipated reciprocity", expectation that the non-earners
would contribute more. In order to measure the pure eﬀort eﬀect, Muehlbacher
and Kirchler (2009) did not inform the subjects about the diverse origins of
group members’ endowments. Such approach successfully dealt with part of
the problems, however, the design and the implementation of the experiment
suﬀered from several other technical problems: The eﬀort was manipulated by
watching a cartoon video under various soundtracks, which could have caused
a distraction, annoyance and irritation. Thus, the mood eﬀects could have
played a role rather than eﬀort. Moreover, most likely the incentives in the
experiment were not high enough to trigger self-interested decision making:
endowments 50 ECU = 1.2 EUR, which could have amounted to maximum
earning of less than 3 EUR for the group member who had fully defected, while
all other group members had fully cooperated. Such poor incentive could be
the reason why there was only one defector (contributing zero ECUs).
To ﬁx the above mentioned problems, I paid higher incentives: 50 ECU =
5 EUR. The maximum possible earning was 11.6 EUR. As a results 12.2 %
of all 246 contribution decisions were zeros. Besides, in this research, a letter
counting task was introduced (inspired by the task from Rey-Biel et al. 2011),
which could not have led to any kind of mood eﬀects and required simple
routine eﬀort from the students.
The experiment, also advanced the state of research further. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst experiment to analyse eﬀects of creative ef-
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fort on cooperation. While the previous literature examined the inﬂuence of
diﬀerent levels of eﬀort on cooperation, in the present study, types of eﬀorts
were also addressed by employing conceptually diﬀerent, word creation task
(Eckartz et al., 2012). Understanding whether the eﬀort type aﬀects coop-
eration is very important as in modern knowledge based economies, types of
tasks diﬀer in multiple dimensions. The demand for highly creative workers,
such as programmers, coders and data scientists are several times higher than
available specialists. In addition, such experts often work in small groups.
They usually have earned their knowledge with their past, individual creative
endeavour. Thus, it is important to know how they possibly feel about coop-
erating with their peers. Therefore, the current experiment can be considered
as the opening of a new horizon for future research in this part of behavioural
science.
In line with previous literature it was expected that a higher level of ef-
fort would lead to lower cooperation. Earning endowments could have caused
reversed sunk cost eﬀect, an increase in risk aversive choices, which in this
case was contribution to the public good. Thus, through the "behavioural
sunk cost" (Zeelenberg and van Dijk, 1997), subjects could have gotten more
attached to their earnings and hesitate to cooperate. The reason behind non-
observed diﬀerences could be complexity of the Public Goods Game: Even
though it was well explained and the PGG calculator (an instrument to ease
understanding of the character of the game) was extensively used and posi-
tively regarded, participants might have failed to include the endowment eﬀect
in a more complex environment, demanding greater cognitive eﬀort and involv-
ing simultaneous decisions by other contributors (Cherry et al., 2005). The
alternative explanation for non-observed diﬀerences in mean contributions is
amount of eﬀort exerted by the subjects. Since laboratory experiments usually
take on average one hour, it is diﬃcult to imitate the eﬀort levels exerted in
real life situations.
In addition, to no signiﬁcant eﬀects of eﬀort level, no eﬀects of eﬀort type
were identiﬁed. This could be related to the following factors:
1) The literature which has observed over-valuation of creations - the cre-
ativity eﬀect, has applied tasks related to arts: writing poems or painting
paintings (Buccafusco and Sprigman, 2010, 2011), which are more personal
and could have caused more attachment to the artefacts. In psychological cre-
ativity literature commonly tasks are open questions, related to diverse topics.
The responses are usually analysed by several independent jurors (this method
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is called Consensual Assessment Technique). This study applied a diﬀerent,
word creation task for the following reasons: First, it is relatively easy to pro-
gram and execute in a computer laboratory; Second, no evaluator jurors are
needed, which saves substantial amount of time; Third, despite the analysis
of correlation among jurors’ decisions, estimation of creative performance can
still be considered to be subjective (Mohnen and Ostermaier, 2013). In the
word creation task, eﬀort levels could be easily manipulated by increasing the
threshold of needed points and moreover, it was similar to the routine eﬀort
task in many ways: Both tasks were in verbal domain, in both cases partici-
pants could have chosen alternative strategies: solve short letter strings/ﬁnd
short words and collect needed points in small increments or solve longer let-
ter strings/ﬁnd long words and collect needed threshold with relatively bigger
increments. One of the important issues could be, that letting the participants
know what the exact value (50 ECU = 5 EUR ) of their eﬀort was, probably
limited the individual interpretation and valuation of their creativity. Eventu-
ally there was no room left for the creativity eﬀect to emerge.
2) While in the current experiment participants had to contribute earnings
from the creative task, in the previous research subjects had to make decisions
on their creations. For example, sell paintings drawn by themselves, sell self-
designed scarves, or the self-built origami paper cranes.
3) Eckartz et al. (2012) found that although the word creation task is
considered to demand creative eﬀort, it was also enjoyable, entertaining and
therefore, the incentives could not increase creative performance on this task.
Thus, the enjoyability of the task could have caused additional utility to par-
ticipants, that in the end counterbalanced the unpleasantness of eﬀort exerted
while working on it.
4) It is generally acknowledged that for subjects the environment in a labo-
ratory is often comparable to that during examinations. Therefore, it is logical
to assume that participants get a certain level of stress while performing the
real eﬀort tasks. The research by von Dawans et al. (2012) showed that
the participants who experienced acute social stress, induced by a standard-
ized laboratory stressor, engaged in a substantially more prosocial behaviour
(trust, trustworthiness, and sharing) compared to the participants in a con-
trol condition. Thus, engaging in a prosocial behaviour in response to stress,
functions in an opposite direction compared to endowment or creativity ef-
fects, which initially were proposed to lessen social behaviour.10 As a result,
10I am thankful to Mike Farjam for bringing this point to my attention.
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the above mentioned stress response could have eliminated the manipulation
eﬀect.
5) Another critique of the current project is the manipulation of the eﬀort
levels. The high eﬀort could also be interpreted as solving a more diﬃcult task
within the same time limit as given for an easy task. For example, adding
single ﬁgured numbers multiple times or multiplying two, three-digit numbers
once, by hand within the same time limits. Although such an approach is
interesting, it is relatively complicated to administer, as it may lead to losing
experimental control as an experimenter cannot be sure that the participants
will manage to solve the task in a given time-frame. A solution could be to
invite only specialists of a given task. Therefore, future research can also be
focused on investigating how the eﬀort levels aﬀect cooperative decisions of
individuals specialized in certain ﬁelds.
According to the results, SVO was positively related to the contributions
to the public good. This is one more proof of an accuracy of SVO measure
for prosocial behaviour. The Big Five personality domain of Extraversion
was positively related to the cooperation levels (p − value < 0.05). How-
ever, unexpectedly Agreeableness was negatively related to contribution size
(p−value < 0.05). To measure Agreeableness the participants were asked how
sympathetic and warm did the participants considered themselves on a scale
from 1 to 7. Apparently, those who regard themselves as warm and sympa-
thetic are in fact less cooperative. This could be explained by the social context
that was created in the experiment. Not only environmental inﬂuences change
a person’s behaviour, but behaviour is also aﬀected by individual cognition, i.e.
how they perceive something evoked by diﬀerent contexts (Hennessey, 2003,
Hoﬀ et al., 2012). In this case, once defectors made low contributions, they
might have been inclined to regard themselves as open persons in the Big Five
questionnaire, comparatively more open than those who were actually more co-
operative. With this, they might have tried to present themselves as agreeable
individuals despite their non-cooperative behaviour in the experiment.
To summarize, it can be said that the exerted eﬀort levels, for earning
endowments, are not determinants for the chosen cooperation level in small
groups. Moreover, the creative type of eﬀort does not change preferred co-
operative behaviour. The research has several limitations: ﬁrst, the eﬀort
manipulation took only a few minutes, while in real life individuals invest a
lot more eﬀort to earn their wealth. The experiment tested only for the eﬀects
of a speciﬁc type of creativity, namely verbal creativity. Therefore, further re-
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search is needed to increase the eﬀort level needed to earn money, and to check
for other types of creative eﬀort to conclude that the creative and innovative
eﬀort in general, are not inﬂuencing factors for cooperation.
2.7 Conclusion
The contribution of the paper to the literature is twofold: First, the endeavour
to replicate ﬁndings of already existing research in a cleaner experiment was
made by employing the experimental design free of technical problems. The
past research found that earning endowments inﬂuences contribution decisions.
In some cases exerted high eﬀort discouraged prosocial behaviour, and in other
cases encouraged it. The results of the present research favour the conclusions
made by those who could not observe an impact of eﬀorts on cooperation
(Cherry et al., 2005). Secondly, an inﬂuence of conceptually diﬀerent, creative
type of eﬀort on contributions was tested in a public goods game. Based on the
analysis of the experimental data, it can be stated that there was no creativity
eﬀect found in a public goods setting.
In conclusion, further research is needed to account for the problems raised
in the discussion section. Longer experiments could remedy some of the prob-
lems, also inviting actual creators, such as artists, coders or programmers to
the lab would increase external validity. Lastly, if the participants contribute
self-created artefacts to the public good there is a higher chance that the cre-
ativity eﬀect will inﬂuence the social behaviour.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 General Instructions
Welcome, Thank you for participating in this experimental study!
This experiment will not be particularly diﬃcult or involve trick questions.
You will simply need to follow the instructions as they gradually appear on your
screen. The answers you provide will be conﬁdential. During the experiment,
you will be asked to make choices. It is therefore important for the success
of the experiment that you do not talk to each other and that you read the
instructions very carefully. If you have questions during the experiment, please
raise your hand. At the end of the experiment, you will receive a payment. The
actual amount will depend partly on your choices and partly on the choices of
the other participants. If needed, you can use area below for calculations.
100 ECU = 10 EUR
Good Luck!
PGG Instructions
You will solve two diﬀerent tasks; as a result you will receive 50 ECUs as a
compensation for your eﬀorts for the tasks. In the next step all participants will
be ordered as three member groups. Each player then makes a decision how
much of own endowment (from 0 to 50) to contribute to the common account.
You can think of the contributions to the common account as an investment
in a common project. If any positive amount is contributed to the common
account it will be doubled and redistributed among the group members. YOU
WILL SOLVE TWO TASKS. YOU WILL RECEIVE 50 ECUs TWICE AND
WILL PLAY IN THE GROUP TWICE, HOWEVER ONLY ONE OF THESE
DECISIONS IS PAY-OFF RELEVANT. Information about the results on both
of these games will be provided in the end of the second game. Your total pay-
oﬀ will be calculated as follows:
Total Profit = ( 50 - your contribution to the project ) + 2 *
( Total contribution to the project ) /3
Below you can try out how the proﬁt after the hypothetical contributions
can be distributed.
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Insert the contributions in the gaps and click ’Aktualisieren’. If you have
understood everything well, please click the ’OK’ button.
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2.8.2 Real Effort Tasks
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2.8.3 Contributions: ANOVA and Boxplot
Figure 2.3: Diﬀerence in mean contribution levels
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Figure 2.4: Boxplot for contributions across treatments
2.8.4 Correlation Big Five and SVO
Extra. Agree.R Consci. Emot.R Open. Extra.R Agree. Consci.R Emot. Open.R
Extra.
Agree.R 0.02
Consci. 0.19* -0.09
Cmot.R -0.30*** -0.06 -0.02
Open. 0.31*** -0.06 0.24** -0.15
Extra.R -0.58*** -0.18* -0.02 0.26** -0.05
Agree. 0.22* -0.15 0.15 0.00 0.23* -0.06
Consci.R -0.18* 0.13 -0.64*** 0.06 -0.08 0.12 -0.12
Emot. 0.34*** -0.11 0.21* -0.37*** 0.17 -0.11 0.21* -0.19*
Open.R -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.22* 0.04 -0.30*** 0.14 -0.08
SVO -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.14 0.08 0.14 -0.09 -0.01
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Letter R stands for reversed measure of the personality traits.
2.8.5 Regression Results: Tobit and Logit Models
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Dependent variable:
Contributions Routine Task
(1) (2) (3)
SVO angle 0.408∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 0.359∗∗
(0.163) (0.165) (0.165)
Extraversion 2.843∗∗
(1.397)
Agreeableness -3.316∗∗
(1.570)
Conscientiousness -1.181
(1.503)
Emotional Stability 0.181
(1.423)
Openness -0.124
(1.645)
Extraversion R. -0.666
(1.229)
Agreeableness R. 0.293
(1.298)
Conscientiousness R. 1.472
(1.329)
Emotional Stability R. -1.573
(1.325)
Openness R. -1.054
(1.279)
Education 0.411 0.604 0.510
(0.621) (0.631) (0.634)
Age 0.896 0.684 0.659
(0.745) (0.773) (0.756)
Gender -1.484 -1.392 0.212
(3.992) (4.147) (3.919)
Prev. participation 3.483 4.379 3.398
(4.509) (4.688) (4.658)
Task sequence -3.907 -4.451 -3.707
(3.811) (3.846) (3.864)
Eﬀort level -1.394 -3.106 -4.070
(3.896) (3.900) (3.849)
Constant 2.202 1.815 -2.357
(20.690) (20.053) (18.163)
Observations 123 123 123
Log Likelihood -428.701 -430.803 -432.709
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dependent variable:
Contributions Creative Task
(1) (2) (3)
SVO angle 0.377∗∗ 0.292 0.295
(0.190) (0.193) (0.192)
Extraversion 2.767∗
(1.640)
Agreeableness -4.550∗∗
(1.826)
Conscientiousness -0.342
(1.749)
Emotional Stability 0.707
(1.662)
Openness 0.179
(1.921)
Extraversion R. -0.093
(1.442)
Agreeableness R. -0.826
(1.518)
Conscientiousness R. 0.821
(1.557)
Emotional Stability R. -2.172
(1.555)
Openness R. -1.871
(1.514)
Education 0.176 0.501 0.376
(0.724) (0.736) (0.741)
Age 0.099 -0.152 -0.124
(0.864) (0.895) (0.879)
Gender -0.728 0.523 1.184
(4.669) (4.848) (4.580)
Prev. participation 7.894 8.780 7.801
(5.256) (5.482) (5.431)
Task sequence 0.495 0.263 0.880
(4.452) (4.490) (4.505)
Eﬀort level 3.268 1.289 0.821
(4.562) (4.557) (4.494)
Constant 12.759 22.336 9.580
(24.193) (23.376) (21.165)
Observations 123 123 123
Log Likelihood -415.706 -417.925 -419.853
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
40
Eﬀects of Creative and Routine Eﬀorts on Cooperation
Dichotomized dependent variable:
Contributions Routine Task
(1) (2) (3)
SVO angle 0.067∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.027)
Extraversion 0.344
(0.289)
Agreeableness -0.345
(0.331)
Conscientiousness -0.438
(0.409)
Emotional Stability 0.026
(0.244)
Openness -0.310
(0.344)
Extraversion R. -0.160
(0.239)
Agreeableness R. 0.165
(0.237)
Conscientiousness R. 0.242
(0.264)
Emotional Stability R. -0.226
(0.216)
Openness R. -0.038
(0.231)
Education 0.012 0.023 -0.007
(0.118) (0.109) (0.102)
Age -0.153 -0.203 -0.159
(0.147) (0.145) (0.133)
Gender -0.887 -0.866 -0.496
(0.782) (0.777) (0.686)
Prev. participation -0.397 -0.040 -0.062
(0.871) (0.861) (0.791)
Task sequence 0.951 0.983 1.008
(0.770) (0.789) (0.735)
Eﬀort level -1.210 -1.408 -1.571∗
(0.912) (0.879) (0.851)
Constant 10.032∗∗ 6.663∗ 5.713∗
(4.802) (3.782) (3.268)
Observations 123 123 123
Log Likelihood -29.112 -30.410 -31.831
Akaike Inf. Crit. 84.224 86.820 79.663
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dichotomized dependent variable:
Contributions Creative Task
(1) (2) (3)
SVO angle 0.048∗ 0.048∗ 0.040∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.023)
Extraversion 0.325
(0.229)
Agreeableness -0.318
(0.268)
Conscientiousness -0.234
(0.269)
Emotional Stability 0.109
(0.210)
Openness -0.140
(0.256)
Extraversion R. -0.197
(0.198)
Agreeableness R. -0.084
(0.214)
Conscientiousness R. 0.209
(0.219)
Emotional Stability R. -0.176
(0.197)
Openness R. -0.295
(0.187)
Education -0.118 -0.090 -0.103
(0.097) (0.093) (0.088)
Age -0.109 -0.144 -0.138
(0.119) (0.122) (0.114)
Gender -0.704 -0.584 -0.518
(0.625) (0.653) (0.577)
Prev. participation 0.175 0.288 0.248
(0.671) (0.734) (0.652)
Task sequence 1.167∗ 1.113∗ 1.171∗
(0.677) (0.666) (0.642)
Eﬀort level 0.859 0.531 0.345
(0.683) (0.631) (0.588)
Constant 5.413 6.274∗∗ 4.390
(3.413) (3.153) (2.703)
Observations 123 123 123
Log Likelihood -38.640 -38.275 -40.680
Akaike Inf. Crit. 103.280 102.550 97.360
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.8.6 Regressions with Effort Level and Type Dummies
The ﬁrst table applies Tobit and the second Logit model.
Dependent variable:
Contributions Contribution R. task Contribution C. task
(1) (2) (3)
Eﬀort type dummy -0.548
(3.001)
Eﬀort level dummy -4.450 1.111
(3.913) (4.509)
SVO angle 0.356∗∗ 0.351∗
(0.164) (0.189)
Constant 25.333∗∗∗ 17.773∗∗∗ 14.439∗∗
(2.118) (5.550) (6.396)
Observations 246 123 123
Log Likelihood -861.089 -434.619 -421.043
Wald Test 0.033 (df = 1) 6.341∗∗ (df = 2) 3.449 (df = 2)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dichotomized dependent variable:
Contributions Contribution R. task Contribution C. task
(1) (2) (3)
Eﬀort type dummy -0.324
(0.405)
Eﬀort level dummy -1.407∗ 0.214
(0.812) (0.369)
SVO angle 0.062∗∗ 0.025
(0.025) (0.015)
Constant 2.225∗∗∗ 1.726∗ -0.810
(0.304) (0.896) (0.528)
Observations 246 123 123
Log Likelihood -86.867 -33.928 -83.773
Akaike Inf. Crit. 177.733 73.857 173.547
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Dependent variable "Contributions" includes all contributions re-
gardless of eﬀort level. In models 2 and 3 R. task denotes routine task and C.
task denotes creative task.
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Competitive Incentives for
Creative and Routine Tasks
3.1 Introduction
One of the main topics of economic research has traditionally been innovation
and economic growth. The interest in innovations is understandable as they
are recognized to be the main sources of growth on a micro, ﬁrm level and
also on a macro, national level. Creative idea generation is an initial phase of
innovation process. Therefore, analysing creativity has to be one of the central
research agendas in economics and psychology. Scientists should invest more
eﬀort in exploring ways to facilitate creativity and hence, innovations. Thus,
research on how to design economic institutions to achieve highest creative
output is of utmost importance (Charness and Grieco, 2014).
One of the key mechanisms to increase employee productivity is believed to
be a well tailored payment system. Among diﬀerent alternatives, competitive
incentives are increasingly used in modern organizations. In general, research
on competitive incentives and performance is not new (see e.g. Whittemore
1924). However, researchers have found opposite eﬀects of competition on
performance. While, for example Calsamiglia et al. (2013) ﬁnd that competi-
tion enhances task performance, Baumeister (1984) and Ariely et al. (2009)
show that competition can be detrimental for performance, causing so called
’choking under [competitive] pressure’. As a result of meta analysis of up to
150 research articles Murayama and Elliot (2012) concluded that there is no
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noteworthy relation between competition and performance.
Scientiﬁc ﬁelds such as cognitive and social psychology have considered
aspects of creativity since long ago. Probably the ﬁrst attempt to analyse
the eﬀect of competition on creativity was made by Raina (1968). However,
there has been less work done on this topic in the economic literature (Char-
ness and Grieco, 2014). Since the beginning of this decade, more and more
scholars contribute to the experimental research of creativity and innovations.
This method has the potential to contribute to the understanding of how to
design payment schemes and incentivize creative output (Brüggemann and
Bizer, 2016).
Research ﬁndings on creative behaviour and performance are mixed and
this is not surprising considering the multidimensionality of creative processes
and outcomes. As Jung (1985) put it: “Any reaction to stimulus may be
causally explained; but the creative act, which is the absolute antithesis of
mere reaction, will forever elude the human understanding. It can only be
described in its manifestation; it can be obscurely sensed, but never wholly
grasped.” (p. 218).
Despite the complexity of the problem, many researchers have addressed
the issue by applying experimental methods.1 There is progress in understand-
ing how incentives may inﬂuence creative output. However, some experimental
designs suﬀer technical and methodological problems, others do not include im-
portant variables which would have enabled a comprehensive understanding
of the treatment eﬀects. Thus, research ﬁndings are often contradictory. That
is why more research with improved or even new experimental designs are
required.
In this paper I analyse competitive incentives for routine and creative per-
formance. Since it is very hard to administer ﬁeld studies, laboratory ex-
periments are a promising alternative to learn how competition aﬀects task
performance. The current laboratory experiment allows one to not only com-
pare a ﬂat payment scheme to a competition condition, but also diﬀerent levels
of competition. The innovative experimental design makes it possible to ask
experimental subjects to solve two similar, but conceptually diﬀerent routine
and creative eﬀort tasks. Moreover, I shed light on eﬀects of feedback on per-
formance. Usually it takes time to assess employee performance in companies
1See page 7 in Brüggemann and Bizer (2016) for examples on research, applying experi-
mental methodology to innovation and creativity research.
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and provide information on individual achievement. In ﬁeld experiments, it
is very diﬃcult to show a ranking and comparative performance of creative
workers and probably impossible to have full control over creative production
(see e.g. work by Boudreau et al. 2011). In this laboratory experiment, par-
ticipants learn how good their performance is at a given task while they are
still in process of solving it and how their performance compares to that of the
leading participant.
The paper is organized as follows: ﬁrst, I review the literature on incen-
tives for creative task performance. Second, I set the research questions and
hypotheses. Then I provide the experimental design, followed by the data
analysis and results. Finally, I discuss the results, make implications and con-
clude.
3.2 Literature Review
In the last years, research on incentives and creativity made substantial progress.
Behavioural scientists designed various experiments to learn how incentives for
creativity work. A popular idea on creativity suggests that a creative task is
inherently appealing and is often done for its own sake (Amabile, 1996). How-
ever, in organizational settings individuals usually perform creative tasks for
monetary purposes. The previous studies on incentives on creativity have fo-
cused on inﬂuence of reward size (Ariely et al., 2009), ﬁnancial incentives for
two diﬀerent types of creativity, ”closed” and ”open”,(Charness and Grieco,
2014) and multitasking and creativity (Laske and Schroeder, 2015).
A growing body of research analyses the inﬂuence of diﬀerent payment
schemes on creative performance. However, results are not always in the same
line. For example, Eckartz et al. (2012) ﬁnd that monetary as well as com-
petitive incentives do not aﬀect creative task performance. Erat and Gneezy
(2015) compare piece rate and competitive incentive to baseline, ﬂat payment
and ﬁnd that neither type of incentives improve creativity. On the opposite,
they show that competitive incentives may have a choking eﬀect and can be
even counter-productive. Contrary to that, in their latests contribution to the
literature Bradler et al. (2016) argue that competitive incentives are eﬀective
and that tournaments substantially increase creative output, with no evidence
of crowding out intrinsic motivation.
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Although competition and creative performance has been studied by the
number of scientists, not much attention has been devoted to analysing eﬀects
of diﬀerent degrees of competition. One example is the contribution by Baer
et al. (2010). In their experiment they prove that groups’ creative performance
increases as intergroup competition level increases from low to intermediate
and to high levels. Another research project applied empirical data from quasi-
experimental competitions on commercial logo designing. The author found
that intensiﬁed competition induces agents to explore novel, untested ideas
over tweaking their earlier work, but heavy competition drives them to stop
investing altogether (Gross, 2015).
Most of the above discussed papers examine incentives for only creative
tasks. However, it is also important to analyse a routine task as a benchmark
for a creative task. Only a minority of the research papers have analysed these
two types of tasks simultaneously. In an experimental study Frey et al. (2013)
argue that wage premiums might be motivating for routine task workers, but
not for creative workers. Eckartz et al. (2012) suggest that linear payment as
well as tournament incentives have very little to no eﬀect on a creative and
also on a routine tasks and that diﬀerences are mainly driven by individual
skilfulness. In contrast, Bradler et al. (2016) ﬁnd that for both types of tasks,
tournament incentives have similar positive eﬀects.
Employing a laboratory experiment Aghion et al. (2014) ﬁnd that increased
competition leads to a signiﬁcant increase in R&D investments by neck-and-
neck ﬁrms and that increased competition decreases R&D investments by ﬁrms
that are lagging behind. Another experiment on innovation contests was done
by Brueggemann and Meub (2015). They implement an experiment with a
creative eﬀort task and compare a benchmark treatment, without an innova-
tion contest to two diﬀerent types of contest schemes. In one scheme there was
a prize for overall innovativeness and in another scheme the prize was awarded
for the best innovation. According to the results, neither of these two contest
schemes inﬂuenced total innovation activity.
Another interesting aspect for performance under competition is provision
of feedback on relative performance. The previous research observed both,
positive and negative eﬀects of introducing feedback mechanisms (Liden and
Mitchell, 1985, Podsakoﬀ and Farh, 1989). In his theoretical contributions Ed-
erer (2010) concludes that "performance evaluations motivate some employees,
but at the same time the information they convey will demotivate other workers
and may also reduce equilibrium eﬀort of all workers, in particular, when this
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information creates a very uneven playing ﬁeld between the contestants..."(p.
762). For example, in a simple ﬁeld experiment Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)
show that when schoolchildren participate in a running competition and their
performance is calculated by seconds needed to complete the run, they usually
try their best. Whereas, if they run next to each other and thus, can instan-
taneously see their relative performance, the losers quit without even ﬁnishing
the competition. Aghion et al. (2014) suggest that similar pattern can be ob-
served for creative or innovative actors. As soon as they realize that they will
almost certainly lose, laggards quit or disengage from competition and reduce
R&D investments. It also has to be mentioned that there are some instances
when authors failed to ﬁnd any eﬀect of feedback. For example, Eriksson et al.
(2009) analysed routine performance with piece-rate and tournament incen-
tives with discrete and continuous feedbacks. They ﬁnd that giving feedback
(discrete or continuous) does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the average perfor-
mance in neither the piece-rate nor the tournament pay scheme. Likewise, in
recent contribution Wooten and Ulrich (2016) ﬁnd that there is no discernible
diﬀerence between direct feedback and no feedback conditions for stimulating
performance in innovative task.
Research has also found that some personality traits may aﬀect creativity.
According to Klotz et al. (2012) extraversion and openness are unrelated
to motivation, but positively related to creative behaviour, while neuroticism
and conscientiousness are not associated with creativity, but were positively
related to motivation to perform on a task. Thus, taking into account workers’
psychological design is also important when assigning diﬀerent types of tasks
and designing various payment schemes.
3.3 Hypotheses Development
Eﬀects of competitive incentives may diﬀer according to what type of task
has to be done. A creative task is more cognitively demanding and depends
on individual skills as well as chances. These characteristics make creative
work uncertain and this can cause choking2 under competitive pressure (Ariely
et al., 2009, Erat and Gneezy, 2015). This usually translates into decreased
productivity and performance. This argumentation is related to research by
2Compte and Postlewaite (2004) deﬁne choking as a physical response to a perceived
psychological situation, usually fear of not performing well or failing.
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Fershtman and Gneezy (2011), who ﬁnd that in high powered tournaments
there are signiﬁcantly more quitters.
Routine tasks, on the contrary, do not include uncertainties and are usually
well deﬁned, close-end tasks. According to Madjar et al. (2011) a routine task
eﬀort usually refers to quantity of task rather than to quality. In other words,
routine tasks are usually identiﬁed as repetitive mundane activities that are
not uncertain, require relatively less cognitive input and can be easily fulﬁlled
by following simple instructions.
Usually when there is a high competition, larger prizes are at stake. The
larger stakes on the one hand make the prize more desirable and competition
exciting, on the other hand it becomes more stressful. Thus, those who are not
conﬁdent that they are better than a large amount of competitors are more
probable to get choked. This pattern should be similar for creative and routine
tasks. In other words, low competition is less likely to lead to choking, but
high competition is more probable to reduce performance on the expense of
choked, under-performing participants and on the expense of quitters.
Thus, Hypotheis I and II can be formulated as follows:
• Low competition increases routine performance, however high competi-
tion decreases routine performance.
• Low competition does not aﬀect or only slightly increases creative perfor-
mance, however high competition decreases creative performance.
As discussed above, performance on a task can heavily depend on feedback
that workers receive. When laggards are informed that they are far behind the
winners, they get demotivated and may disengage from the task. Whereas,
if the competition is neck-to-neck, individuals should exert maximum eﬀort
to surpass the current winner. Those on the top of competition should also
stay alert not to lose their position and keep exerting maximum eﬀort. This
behavioural response should be similar regardless of the type of the task. Thus,
it is expected that in high competition treatments, when the feedback on
relative performance is immediately provided, the gap between the winners
and the losers will be larger compared to low competition treatments. This
also relates to the characteristics of creative tasks. These tasks are uncertain
per se and competitive pressure will probably be enhanced for uncertain and
complex tasks.
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Thus, Hypothesis III can be formulated as follows:
• Providing feedback on individual ranking within a group decrease average
performance for both types of tasks.
In general, females do not perform as good as males under tournament
conditions (Croson and Gneezy, 2009, Erat and Gneezy, 2015, Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2004, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). Therefore, if competitive
incentives have a positive impact on performance, such result will be mainly
driven by males. Finally, if an individual easily gets nervous and negatively
responds to uncomfortable environment she is more likely to under-perform
(Maslach et al., 2001). Thus, I formulate Hypotheses IVa and IVb as
follows:
• Males respond to competitive incentives more positively than females.
• Big Five dimensions of openness and extraversion will be positively as-
sociated with both types of performance.
3.4 The Experimental Design
Procedure and design. The experiment was conducted at the Friedrich
Schiller University Jena (Germany). It was computer based and was pro-
grammed with Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The participants were recruited
using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE)
(Greiner, 2015).
The experiment had four treatments (see overview in Table 3.1). The
ﬁrst was a baseline treatment with a ﬂat rate payment of 5 euros for each
subject. The second treatment was a low competition treatment. In this
condition experiment participants were grouped in three person groups3 and
the best performer won a prize of 10 euros and the losing group members earned
only the show-up fee of 2.5 euros. In the third, high competition treatment,
3I decided to have three person groups to approximately have the same size of groups
as other authors. For example (Eckartz et al., 2012) had four person groups and (Erat and
Gneezy, 2015) had two person groups.
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participants played in 18 person groups4 and the best performer won 47.5
euro, while the rest of the participants earned 2.5 euros (see payment schemes
in the Table 3.2). The fourth treatment, high competition with feedback, was
basically the same as the high competition treatment. The only diﬀerence was
that the subjects instantaneously received information on their ranking and
on what the performance measure of the current winner was. Thus they knew
not only their performance and ranking while solving tasks, they also received
information which enabled them to calculate the gap between themselves and
the winner.
Routine Task Creative Task
Flat rate 5 euros per subject 5 euros per subject
Low Competition
3 competitors. The
best gets 10 euros
3 competitors. The
best gets 10 euros
High Competition
18 competitors. The
best gets 47.5 euros
18 competitors. The
best gets 47.5 euros
High Competition
with Feedback
18 competitors. The
best gets 47.5 euros
18 competitors. The
best gets 47.5 euros
Table 3.1: Experimental conditions.
Each player solved two types of tasks: a routine and a creative task. In the
end of the experiment one of these tasks was randomly selected by computer
to be pay-oﬀ relevant. The subjects were provided full information on the
process of the experiment in advance (see instructions in Appendix 3.8.1).
That is, they knew that they would have to work on two diﬀerent tasks and
that only one of them would determine how much they earned. Right before
the start of the tasks subjects read the task instructions, which explained the
rules of the game and provided examples. To cancel out the eﬀect of the task
order, i.e. sequence in which subjects solved two diﬀerent tasks, the sequence
was switched in diﬀerent sessions. To put it simply, some subjects solved the
routine task ﬁrst followed by the creative task and others solved the creative
task ﬁrst, followed by the routine task.
Real effort tasks.
In the routine eﬀort treatments participants counted letters within given
4This size of the high competition group was determined by the maximum capacity of
the laboratory at the University of Jena.
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Rank Flat rate L. Comp. H. Comp. H. Comp. Feedback
1 5 10 47.5 47.5
2 5 2.5 2.5 2.5
3 5 2.5 2.5 2.5
... ... ... ...
17 5 2.5 2.5
18 5 2.5 2.5
Av.
Pay.
5 5 5 5
SUM 90 15 90 90
Table 3.2: Payment for subjects in Euros.
strings of letters.5 For example, subjects had to count how many times a letter
”a” and ”b” appeared in letter strings with diﬀerent lengths. The longer the
solved letter strings were, the more points subjects received. After the given
time (3 minutes for each type of task) was up, they automatically proceeded
to the next stage (See ﬁgure in Appendix 3.8.2).
As a creative task, I use a word creation task similar to one used by Eckartz
et al. (2012). The main reasons for this are that it has many aspects of a
creative task and it mimics quite well a creative innovation. Also, it takes less
time than other options, it is easy to program, objectively assesses creativity
and makes it possible to count eﬀorts exerted and performance achieved by
players (see ﬁgure in Appendix 3.8.3). Moreover, subjects’ ranking can be
instantaneously updated and displayed in real time.
Similar to the routine task, the longer the words the participants built,
the more points they earned (see Table 3.3). After the given time was up,
they automatically proceeded to the next stage. Thus, for both types of tasks
performance is measured by the amount of points subjects accumulated in a
given task.
One more, supportive argument for using these tasks, is the neutrality
of the tasks in terms of gender diﬀerences. While for math tasks usually
there is a bias in favour of males, for verbal tasks there is less evidence that
there are performance diﬀerences among males and females (see e.g. Gitelson
et al. 1982, Skaalvik and Skaalvik 2004). Therefore, if there is a diﬀerence in
5The task was inspired by the real eﬀort task designed by Rey-Biel et al. (2011).
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Words from the letter set " a c c d e e e g i n s t "
ad 1 + 2 = 3 points
and 1 + 2 + 3 = 6 points
cats 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 points
... ...
teasing 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = 28 points
Table 3.3: Measuring creativity: Longer words generate more points (Eckartz
et al., 2012)
performance it can be ascribed to individual skills and decisions to exert eﬀort
under diﬀerent treatment eﬀects.
Another important feature of creativity is that the tasks may be "open"
or "closed". The closed creativity implies a solution of a task with a speciﬁc
and delineated goal, for example, reducing the size of a computer, developing
a drug for speciﬁc purpose. Whereas open creative tasks do not have ex-ante
goals or directions. For example, improve usability of electronic devices or
making them more aesthetically appealing. As Charness and Grieco (2014)
show, ﬁnancial incentives are ineﬀective in incentivizing open creativity. The
word creation task is a "closed" task. Application of it in this experiment is
also justiﬁed from this perspective.
In diﬃcult tasks, people overestimate their actual performances but also
mistakenly believe that they are worse than others; on easy tasks, people un-
derestimate their actual performances, but mistakenly believe they are better
than others (Moore and Healy, 2008). To put it diﬀerently, doing diﬃcult
task makes people think they are under-performing, while doing an easy task
leads to beliefs that they are over-performing. To avoid this, in the current
experiment, the real eﬀort tasks are calibrated so that the diﬃculty of the
tasks are maximally approximated. Diﬀerent performance responses resulting
from such an approach can be assigned to skilfulness and more importantly,
to the eﬀects of competition levels.
After completing the second real eﬀort task, the participants answered ma-
nipulation questions, asking which task they found more creative, diﬃcult, and
requiring higher eﬀort. After that, subjects learned their ﬁnal performance,
their ranking if they were not playing control treatment, and the total pay-oﬀ.
Finally, they responded on personality and demographic questionnaires. The
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personality traits were measured by Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) by
Gosling et al. (2003).
3.5 Results
For statistical analysis and graphs I used R software (R Core Team, 2013).
The experiment was conducted at Friedrich Schiller University Jena, during
October-November 2016. In total, 290 subjects participated in the experiment,
the majority were students at the University of Jena. I dropped two obser-
vations because the participants did not pass the German language test6 and
three more observations, because the participants did not understand the re-
quirements of the tasks. In Table 3.4 I provide the number of observations
for each experimental condition. The experiment lasted about 30 minutes and
average earning was 5 euros (ranging from 2.5 Euros for those who lost in
any of the competition treatments to 47.5 euros for those who won the high
competition treatments). 65% of the participants were females. Average age
was 25.1 years (SD = 4.35).
Treatment N of obs.
"No Competition. R" 737
"No Competition. C" 73
"Low Competition. R" 68
"Low Competition. C" 68
"High Competition. R" 72
"High Competition. C" 72
"Feedback High Competition. R" 72
"Feedback High Competition. C" 72
Table 3.4: N of observation in each condition
Manipulation check. In order to check if the creative task manipulation
worked, the students were asked the following question: In comparison to the
counting task, did you have a feeling that the word task needed more creative
6The experiment was done in German language. In order to make sure that the partici-
pants were ﬂuent in German, they took a short language test (developed by Kirchkamp and
Reiß 2011).
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eﬀort? (The answers could range from 1 = no creative eﬀort to 7 = very high
creative eﬀort). On average, response to this question was 5.3, that indicates
that students found the word task more creative than the counting task.
In Appendix 3.8.4 I show frequencies of total points collected by students
for each treatment and task type. As it can be seen in Figure 3.2 in the
baseline treatment, none of the players collected very high number of points
and this goes in line with the argument that if a task is routine, mundane,
and relatively uninteresting, ﬂat-rate payment will not motivate individuals
to exert extremely high eﬀorts. On the opposite, for the creative task, even
in the baseline treatment there were participant who worked extensively and
collected substantially more points than average (see Figure 3.3). Moreover, it
has to be emphasized that in the baseline treatments, for routine tasks, there
were more players who collected less than 20 points. These were individuals
who decided to shirk. If looking at the right hand tail, in the ﬂat rate treat-
ment very few participants collected more than 250 points while in treatments
with competition such performance was more frequent. Lastly, it has to be
mentioned that the creative performance distribution is positively skewed,8
while performance on the routine task is more normally distributed with long
tails. This is not surprising, considering the nature of creativity and the fact
that only very few individuals can be exceptionally creative.
In Table 3.5 I provide results of t-tests. Test 1 compares the routine perfor-
mance in baseline and low competition treatments. As predicted in hypothesis
I, competition increased routine performance (p− value < 0.1). Test 2 shows
that the diﬀerence was not statistically signiﬁcant when the baseline perfor-
mance is compared to performance in the high competition treatment. In test
3 I compare the performance for the low competition treatment participants
and the performance in the high competition treatment with feedback. The
diﬀerence in performance was not statistically signiﬁcant (p − value > 0.1).
Test 4 compares baseline and low competition treatments for the creative task.
There is no statistical diﬀerence. Test 5 and 6 compare performance in the
low and high competition treatments with the performance in high competition
treatment with feedback. In both cases the diﬀerence is strongly signiﬁcant
(p − value < 0.05). Figure 3.1 visualizes mean performances across all treat-
ments.9
8The skewness suggests that it is more appropriate to use Tobit models for the creative
task. That is why in Appendix I demonstrate results of both, OLS and Tobit models.
9In the ﬁgure the bar heights represent mean performance. The bar heights within the
same tasks and not across tasks have to be compared. The diﬀerent tasks are color coded.
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Test for routine task Results
1 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(113.73) = -1.79, p = .077.
2 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(112.76) = -1.55, p = .125,
3 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(135.61) = 1.14, p = .255,
Test for creative task Results
4 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(137.43) = -0.98, p = .328,
5 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(123.56) = 2.41, p = .018,
6 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(131.83) = 2.03, p = .044.
Table 3.5: T-tests
In Appendix 3.8.6 I regress performance on routine and creative tasks on
treatment variables. Only low competitive incentives were supportive for rou-
tine tasks. As it has been shown by other authors, competitive incentives did
not have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on creative performance. In Appendix
3.8.6 I set the low competition treatment as reference point and examine how
high competition with and without feedback aﬀected performance. The results
show that high competition with provision of feedback had a signiﬁcantly neg-
ative eﬀect on creative performance. This result supports the third hypothesis
that if competitors receive information that suggests that they are highly likely
to lose, they are will reduce their eﬀort causing a decline in average perfor-
mance.
Performance by different genders. The hypothesis IVa predicted that
males would be more responsive to competition. The data analysis shows
that this was the case for the high competition treatment. In Appendix 3.8.5
I show performance across all treatments for males and females separately.
While males responded to a high competition environment by signiﬁcantly in-
creasing routine performance (p−value = 0.02), females shied away from high
competition. Their performance slightly decreased in comparison to the aver-
age performance in low competition (although the eﬀect was not statistically
signiﬁcant p − value > 0.1). A similar pattern was observed for the creative
performance (however diﬀerences were not signiﬁcant for the creative task). If
comparing performance of females and males in high competition treatment,
in routine task, males performed better. The diﬀerence was signiﬁcant at
p− value = 0.06 level (see Figure 3.6 in Appendix).
In the data analysis I include a number of control variables (the regres-
sion tables are provided in Appendix 3.8.6). The results suggest that those
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Figure 3.1: Average performance for all treatments
participants who ﬁnd the creative task requires more eﬀort performed better
on routine task and worse on the creative task. The participants who were
not native language speakers10 performed signiﬁcantly worse and those who
like word games in general performed better on both tasks. The older age of
participants was also a negative factor for both types of performance. Having
participated in similar experiments previously inﬂuenced the task performance
positively.11 When the creative task was done ﬁrst, followed by the routine
task, participants performed worse on the creative task. This probably indi-
cates that, even if the tasks were not related, the routine task helped to "warm
up" or prepare for the creative task.
Thus, the data provides supportive evidence for hypothesis I and partial
support for hypotheses II, III and IVa. Namely, the routine task was incen-
tivized by inducing low competition but not high competition. Creative per-
formance did not signiﬁcantly increase with introduction of competition. High
competition had a positive eﬀect on males and had only slight negative eﬀect
10Overall there were 14 foreigner subjects who passed language test. Exclusion of these
observations from the data analysis does not change the treatment eﬀects.
11For this experiment only those individuals were invited who have not participated in the
experiments with used real eﬀort tasks, however 9 subjects indicated that they had taken
part in the laboratory experiment with the similar games. Exclusion or these participants
from the data analysis does not change the results.
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for females. However, competition with feedback was strongly detrimental for
the creative task and slightly detrimental for the routine task. In what follows
I discuss the results and suggest possible policy implications.
3.6 Discussion and Implications
The previous research ﬁndings on competitive incentives for performance are
mixed. Scholars have found positive, negative and no eﬀects of competition on
creative performance. The competitive incentives were more often found to be
conducive for routine tasks. However, the diﬀerences in how people respond
to competition on two diﬀerent tasks have not been systematically studied.
The majority of the work in this direction considered either routine, well de-
ﬁned tasks or creative, relatively uncertain tasks.12 This paper analyses the
performance on both types of tasks simultaneously. Moreover, the tasks were
done by the same individuals, therefore it is legitimate to compare competition
eﬀects across the task types.
The ﬁrst result shows that low competition enhances routine, but not cre-
ative performance. This result is in line with previous ﬁndings on creative
performance (Eckartz et al., 2012, Erat and Gneezy, 2015), that competition
is not supportive for creative output. This is probably caused by the main
feature of creativity: it requires abstract thinking and usually is intrinsically
motivating. People get engaged in such tasks not only for monetary incentives
or hoping to get reward, but also because it is interesting and enjoyable to work
on such tasks. This is diﬀerent for the routine tasks. These types of tasks do
not generate additional utility and the main motivating factor to do the task
is monetary reward.13 Moreover, the performance on routine task is directly
linked to eﬀort. When a worker increases eﬀort it is directly reﬂected in im-
proved performance. This is diﬀerent for the creative tasks, because creative
tasks are uncertain and require speciﬁc set of skills. Therefore, the increased
eﬀort is not always linked to higher performance.
12The exceptions are recent contributions by Eckartz et al. (2012) and Bradler et al.
(2016).
13Eckartz et al. (2012) found that competition did not increase even a routine performance.
The reason could be that they used Raven’s matrices and number adding tasks, which are
not totally mundane tasks and unlike the task used in this experiment, they could still be
intrinsically motivating.
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The second result suggests that high competition did not have an eﬀect on
the routine or the creative performance. For the creative tasks this ﬁnding can
be explained with the same argument as for the low competition treatment.
Competition, regardless of it’s intensity, cannot be a supportive instrument for
the creative task performance. In case of the routine task, high competition
had a very small positive eﬀect. However, the eﬀect was also not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
The third result concerns the eﬀects of the fourth treatment - high compe-
tition with feedback. In comparison to the ﬂat payment there was no diﬀerence
in performance, however when comparing to the low competition performance,
high competition with provision of detailed feedback on ranking and position
of the leading competitor had a detrimental eﬀect on average performance.
The adverse eﬀect is driven by individuals who either quit as they see that
there is a very low chance of winning or get anxious as they are losing the
game and under-perform.
There is one interesting behavioural pattern when looking at competition
and performance: Namely, in the low competition conditions competitors are
more likely to have approximately equal points. It is more reasonable if the
subjects assume that performance spread is not too large and is rather nar-
row. Therefore, it is worth to keep exerting maximum eﬀort. However, in high
powered tournaments with more competitors, it is more likely that there is a
distinct leader who has substantially more points. That is why in low com-
petition conditions the best creative performers exert very high eﬀort. When
feedback is provided, leader competitors, able to outperform others easily,
keep exerting just enough eﬀort to beat the second best. This observation is
somewhat related to the ﬁndings of Cantner et al. (2009) and Aghion et al.
(2014), who show that in R&D competition, laggard ﬁrms are more prone to
quitting, whereas those who are in neck-and-neck competition increase R&D
investments.
The fourth result on diﬀerences in how diﬀerent genders react to high com-
petition suggests that males respond to high competition more positively. As
other scholars have documented (see e.g. Gneezy et al. 2003), I ﬁnd evidence
that males respond by increasing eﬀort when they face high competition. This
pattern was especially revealed in the routine task, where, on average, male
participants outperformed female ones.
The above discussed results provide some interesting implications for orga-
nizational management: 1) When deciding whether to introduce tournament
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incentives in a company, managers should distinguish between a routine and
a creative task. Those tasks, that are mundane and at the same time can
be completed with simple repeated actions14 can be incetivized by competi-
tion. However, the competition should not be too intense, i.e. optimally, few
competitors should be assigned to a task and relatively low prize should be
provided. In line with previous research, the evidence from this experiment
suggests that competitive incentives do not work for creative tasks. Therefore,
employers should rather come up with a diﬀerent reward scheme. 2) If opting
for a competition incentives with high prize and a high number of competi-
tors, managers should expect decreased average performance if they provide
full feedback on ranking and position of the leading competitor before the end
of the tournament. Disclosure of information on status quo of the competition
de-motivates laggard competitors decreasing performance. Thus, if a ﬁrm is
interested in increasing average performance by setting up a high prize tour-
nament, it is better not to disclose information on performance until everyone
completes the task. 3) Managers should also consider that there is a diﬀerence
in how males and females respond to competition. It is more likely that males
will be encouraged by high competitive incentives, whereas females are more
negatively aﬀected by the intensity of a competition.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that a tournament size and competition in-
tensity has to be adapted with the company size. While in a lab, behavioural
scientists are limited with the available space and funds to run experiments, in
the real world, companies have much higher number of employees and larger re-
sources to fund tournaments. Nevertheless, authorities in organizations should
not ignore the behavioural patterns observed in the laboratory. Although
external validity of experimental results are limited, experiments represent
the only instrument to control the environment and investigate pure treat-
ment eﬀects. Thus, business practitioners should learn from scientiﬁc ﬁndings
and maybe test the eﬀects with actual employees. Ideally, they can select a
representative sample of employees and investigate how competitive incentive
change their productivity.
14An example of such work is installing wind-shields on cars (see Lazear 2000).
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3.7 Conclusions
In this paper I investigate how diﬀerent levels of competition aﬀect routine
and creative tasks. The results suggest that low competition increases routine
performance, but does not aﬀect creative performance. As previous work on
creativity has observed, creative tasks are usually intrinsically motivating and
additional monetary or competitive incentives are less functional. In addition, I
examine how the provision of feedback on the current ranking and performance
of the leader in the competition aﬀects average performance. As the results
suggest, individuals under-perform when they have full information and thus,
can realistically assess chances of winning.
The ﬁndings suggest that managers can signiﬁcantly improve employee
performance by introducing low competition if the workers have to do a routine
task. Moreover, if designing a winner-take-all competitive payment scheme,
it is better not to reveal performance of the highest achiever. This way it
is possible to avoid discouragement of lagging competitors and decrease in
overall performance. Lastly, I ﬁnd that males respond more positively to high
competition compared to females. Therefore, high competition can improve
routine performance of males.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that although this paper provides new in-
sights on competitive incentives, it could not cover all possible variations of
diﬀerent payment schemes and diﬀerent task types. For example, future re-
search should also investigate how feedback aﬀects performance in ﬂat payment
and low competition conditions. Besides, this paper researched performance
on "closed" creativity, where the number of possible solutions is limited. Fu-
ture research should shed more light on "open" creative tasks and competitive
incentives. Similarly, routine tasks can be mundane, but still be cognitively
demanding. Therefore, studying diﬀerent types of routine tasks is also desir-
able.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 General Instructions
In this experiment you will work on two diﬀerent types of tasks. As a show up
fee you will get 2.5 Euros. You can earn additional money depending on your
performance in these games.15 You will play the games in 3 [18]16 person group.
Only if you collect the most points in your group you will get 10 [47.5] Euro
prize, otherwise you will earn show up fee! TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THAT YOUWILL PLAY TWO DIFFERENT GAMES BUT ONLY ONE OF
THEM WILL BE RANDOMLY CHOSEN TO BE PAY-OFF RELEVANT.
Therefore, you have to collect maximum points in both games. Each game
will last 3 minutes. [While playing the task, you will get information about
your current performance as well as performance of the best player and your
ranking in the group.]17 You will receive the instructions about the rules of the
tasks just before starting the tasks. Information on how well you performed
and how much you earned will be provided in the end of the second task.
3.8.2 Routine Task Instructions
Counting Task
In this task you have to ﬁnd letters in given letter strings and put correct
ﬁgure in the gaps. After each counting you have to click OK button to get
feedback whether your response was correct or not and how many points you
have. Only if you count letters correctly you get points. The longer strings
you solve the more points you get. Here is an example:
Assume you have to count letters "a" and "d" and the letter string is: abcde-
abcab
- Correct answer is 4, because there are three times letter "a" and once "d"
In the task your goal is to collect as many points as possible!
15In baseline treatment participants were told that they would earn 5 Euros for playing
both games and that they could not earn extra money.
16In the high competition treatment the number of group members was 18 and prize was
47.5 Euros.
17In feedback treatment instructions was same as in high competition treatment. Only
diﬀerence was that this sentence was added.
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3.8.3 Creative Task Instructions
Word task
In this task you are given a letter string with what you have to build
German words. You can build small and big words and also prepositions.
After building each word you have to click OK button to get feedback whether
your response was correct or not and how many points you have. Only if you
build real German words you get points. The longer the words you build are,
the more points you get. Here is the full set of rules:
Assume you have to build words with a letter string: abcdeabcab
-word "bad" is allowed ;
-word "abbe" is allowed, because there is two “b” in the string;
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- word "babe" is NOT allowed, because it is an English word;
-word "baden" is NOT allowed, because there is no letter "n";
In the task your goal is to collect as many points as possible!
3.8.4 Descriptives
Distribution of points in each treatment
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of points for routine task
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of points for creative task
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3.8.5 Average Performance of Different Genders
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Figure 3.4: Performance of males
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Figure 3.5: Performance of females
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Figure 3.6: Performance under high competition treatment
3.8.6 Regression Analysis
Treatment Effects
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Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
(1) (2)
Low Competition 21.713∗ 6.420
(11.700) (6.180)
High Competition 18.411 3.896
(11.554) (6.090)
High Competition Feedback 9.467 -7.785
(11.554) (6.090)
Constant 134.964∗∗∗ 58.507∗∗∗
(8.700) (4.291)
Observations 267 285
R2 0.016 0.021
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.011
Residual Std. Error 64.518 (df = 263) 36.666 (df = 281)
F Statistic 1.398 (df = 3; 263) 2.026 (df = 3; 281)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.6: OLS model
Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
(1) (2)
Low competition 22.139∗ 6.203
(11.697) (6.175)
High Competition 18.538 3.896
(11.554) (6.083)
High Competition Feedback 9.893 -8.017
(11.551) (6.086)
Constant 134.538∗∗∗ 58.507∗∗∗
(8.701) (4.286)
Observations 267 285
Log Likelihood -1,482.992 -1,423.101
Wald Test (df = 3) 4.291 6.164
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.7: Tobit model
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Treatment effects with Low Competition as baseline
Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
(1) (2)
High Competition -3.301 -2.524
(10.746) (6.117)
High Competition Feedback -12.246 -14.204∗∗
(10.746) (6.117)
Constant 156.676∗∗∗ 64.926∗∗∗
(7.706) (4.387)
Observations 212 212
R2 0.007 0.029
Adjusted R2 -0.003 0.020
Residual Std. Error (df = 209) 63.546 36.176
F Statistic (df = 2; 209) 0.702 3.111∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.8: OLS model
Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
(1) (2)
High Competition -3.592 -2.311
(10.718) (6.126)
High Competition Feedback -12.246 -14.221∗∗
(10.715) (6.129)
Constant 156.676∗∗∗ 64.714∗∗∗
(7.684) (4.395)
Observations 212 212
Log Likelihood -1,176.345 -1,054.280
Wald Test (df = 2) 1.393 6.290∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.9: Tobit model
Regressions with control variables: OLS and Tobit models
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Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
(1) (2)
Found C.task Effortful 12.689∗∗∗ -2.993∗∗
(2.722) (1.384)
Found C.task Difficult 0.513 -1.885∗
(2.180) (1.120)
Found C.task Creative -2.763 -1.330
(2.413) (1.215)
Extraversion -5.382 1.905
(3.481) (1.788)
Agreeableness.R 2.847 1.637
(2.683) (1.371)
Conscientiousness 0.306 1.785
(3.406) (1.754)
Emotional Stability.R -5.738∗ -1.581
(3.243) (1.656)
Openness 1.872 -0.380
(3.576) (1.810)
Extraversion.R 0.166 -0.417
(3.023) (1.564)
Agreeableness -0.908 0.654
(3.760) (1.903)
Conscientiousness.R -1.732 1.189
(3.116) (1.588)
Emotional Stability -0.721 -0.065
(3.192) (1.634)
Openness.R 1.847 2.512∗
(2.903) (1.485)
Age -2.088∗∗ -0.933∗
(0.961) (0.500)
Not Native Speaker -37.318∗∗ -31.129∗∗∗
(17.695) (9.233)
Gender 1.118 -5.524
(8.660) (4.437)
Education 0.736 0.594
(1.156) (0.593)
Previous participation 22.818 30.005∗∗∗
(22.029) (11.536)
Task sequence 9.052 -13.358∗∗∗
(8.508) (4.445)
Liking word games 6.687∗∗ 3.280∗∗
(2.996) (1.515)
Freq. word games 4.475 7.481∗∗∗
(3.980) (1.986)
Low Competition 13.822 9.709∗
(11.661) (5.722)
High Competition 8.136 12.911∗∗
(11.860) (5.861)
High Competition Feedback -2.091 -2.891
(11.768) (5.805)
Constant 126.420∗∗∗ 49.574∗∗
(48.589) (24.449)
Observations 267 285
R2 0.197 0.313
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.250
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
(1) (2)
Found C.task Effortful 13.052∗∗∗ -3.004∗∗
(2.617) (1.330)
Found C.task Difficult 0.617 -1.939∗
(2.089) (1.076)
Found C.task Creative -2.928 -1.338
(2.315) (1.167)
Extraversion -5.549∗ 1.951
(3.335) (1.718)
Agreeableness.R 2.829 1.668
(2.572) (1.317)
Conscientiousness 0.082 1.755
(3.266) (1.686)
Emotional Stability.R -5.592∗ -1.602
(3.108) (1.591)
Openness 1.792 -0.420
(3.425) (1.740)
Extraversion.R 0.050 -0.387
(2.899) (1.503)
Agreeableness -0.860 0.731
(3.602) (1.829)
Conscientiousness.R -1.806 1.151
(2.985) (1.527)
Emotional Stability -0.762 -0.107
(3.057) (1.570)
Openness.R 1.783 2.461∗
(2.781) (1.429)
Age -2.411∗∗ -0.927∗
(0.961) (0.480)
Not Native Speaker -36.601∗∗ -31.099∗∗∗
(16.955) (8.869)
Gender 1.399 -5.756
(8.309) (4.265)
Education 0.799 0.581
(1.110) (0.569)
Previous participation 24.077 30.079∗∗∗
(21.124) (11.082)
Task sequence 9.033 -13.430∗∗∗
(8.149) (4.272)
Liking word games 6.717∗∗ 3.264∗∗
(2.870) (1.455)
Freq. word games 4.671 7.520∗∗∗
(3.814) (1.908)
Low Competition 14.134 9.553∗
(11.181) (5.499)
High Competition 8.135 12.998∗∗
(11.374) (5.630)
High Competition Feedback -1.959 -3.045
(11.283) (5.579)
Constant 134.197∗∗∗ 49.933∗∗
(47.160) (23.486)
Observations 267 285
Log Likelihood -1,455.022 -1,372.674
Wald Test (df = 24) 66.812∗∗∗ 129.657∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Effects of Constraints on
Routine and Creative
Performance
4.1 Introduction
Scientists have deﬁned creativity in many diﬀerent ways. Authors have even
contributed book chapters and scientiﬁc articles to the discussion of what is a
true meaning of creativity (e.g. Amabile 1996, Ford and Harris 1992, Runco
and Jaeger 2012). However, most frequently creativity is understood as a
production of novel and at the same time, useful ideas (see e.g. Amabile
1988).
Creative work is usually viewed as the ﬁrst step or ingredient for innovation
(Madjar et al., 2011). It is often associated with free streams of ideas and
eﬀorts, which lead to discovering new solutions that are both original and
practical, or in the domain of arts, aesthetically appealing. The products of
creative thinking are supposed to increase value by combining old materials in
a diﬀerent, unconventional way or applying new materials in an old, commonly
accepted way. In fact, when it comes to actual work, within an organizational
framework, creators are expected to achieve certain goals and produce solutions
with speciﬁc features.
Managers and organizational leaders often assign tasks that are not routine.
They require certain types of solutions, but there is no simple guideline on
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how to reach the required speciﬁcations. Under such circumstances, outcomes
below the predetermined threshold may have very little or no value. In such
cases, one can speak of constraints for a given task. Here, with constraints I
mean setting clear performance demands and not reimbursing task solutions
with below threshold performances. Thus, principal decision makers have to
decide whether to impose constraints or not.
Rationally speaking, solutions which do not add value should not be re-
warded. That means, managers should set constraints, demanding certain
types of solutions and not rewarding those employees who did not reach the
required minimum. However, this kind of approach may not always be optimal.
In this paper I investigate how imposition of constraints aﬀect routine and
creative task performance. Responses to constraints may diﬀer depending
on types of tasks. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research done,
which integrates the analysis of constraint eﬀects on these two types of tasks
in a single study. Moreover, research done on constraint degrees and creative
performance is very limited and the results from those few contributions are
not unequivocal. Therefore, I design an experiment to investigate what are
the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of constraints on routine as well as on creative
task performance.
In what follows, I ﬁrst review the literature on performance and constraints.
Second, I formulate the research questions and hypotheses, followed by descrip-
tion of the experimental design in detail. Then, I provide the experiment re-
sults. Finally, I discuss the results, oﬀer theoretical and practical implications
and conclude.
4.2 Literature Review
The notion of constraints is not uncommon in psychological creativity litera-
ture. It appears in seminal works of leading scientists, who claim that there are
important relations between creativity and constraints (see e.g. Amabile 1996,
Johnson-Laird 1988, Kaufman and Sternberg 2010). Some of them go even fur-
ther asserting that without constraints there can be no creativity (Onarheim
and Biskjaer 2013, Stokes 2005).
It often is believed that creative work needs freedom to generate diverse,
novel and useful ideas (see e.g. Amabile 1979, 1996, Crutchﬁeld 1962, Koestler
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1964, Rogers 1954). In her seminal book Amabile (1996) describes how great
creative minds, such as Einstein, Picasso and Woody Allen suﬀered and es-
caped from constraints. In addition, Amabile writes that autonomy in creative
thinking process fosters creativity. She argues that giving people freedom in
how they approach their work heightens their intrinsic motivation and sense
of ownership. Freedom about process also allows people to make use of their
expertise and their creative thinking skills. In this way, the task may seem to
be diﬃcult, but individuals can use their competence to meet the challenge
(see Amabile 1998, p. 82).1
However, the growing interdisciplinary literature on constraints and cre-
ativity questions this belief. The majority of research contributions approach
this subject theoretically, providing various hypotheses based on case studies
and mere observations of few instances. However, there are some empirical
and experimental papers worth mentioning. (In Appendix 4.8.1 I provide a
list of some studies focussing on creativity and constraints in various research
ﬁelds).
Constraints on creativity can be diverse. They can be restrictions on inputs,
i.e. resources (Moreau and Dahl, 2005), on time (Amabile, 1998, Baer and
Oldham, 2006, Karau and Kelly, 1992), on skill and ﬁnances (Hoegl et al.,
2008, Scopelliti et al., 2014) or on outputs. The latter may relate to demands
on ﬁnal products (Ward et al., 2002) or goals (Peterson et al., 2013) of creative
processes.
For example, Onarheim (2012) classiﬁes constraints in six diﬀerent dimen-
sions:
1. timing (initial to late);
2. ﬂexibility (non-negotiable to negotiable);
3. importance (nice to have to must have);
4. source (e.g. user, subject, client, personal, task);
5. domain (e.g. internal, external, domain, inherent);
6. purpose (e.g. validity, non-functional, quality).
1It has to be mentioned that Amabile does not totally reject the fact that some level of
constraints might be beneﬁcial for creative outcomes.
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More generally, Kaufman and Sternberg (2010) suggest that creativity may
reside in a person, a process, a product or a place. Therefore, constraints may
stem from these loci.
From an imposition perspective, constraints can be classiﬁed in three cate-
gories: intrinsic (inherent in the material), imposed (by external agents client),
and self-imposed (initiated by the creative agent himself in expectance of a
higher creative pay-oﬀ) (Elster, 2000). While the self-imposed constraints
are usually used in arts, externally imposed constraints are more common in
engineering and technology. Moreover, engineers refer to constraints as re-
quirements,2 while in art domain, for example in poetry, requirements are
regarded as ’genre conventions’, stating what is allowed to be done (Onarheim
and Biskjaer, 2013). In the current project, I externally impose constraints on
experiment subjects and hence, the manipulation can be perceived as setting
rules on what an employee in an innovative ﬁrm is allowed to do.
For the purposes of this paper I use the deﬁnition of constraints as limita-
tion or restriction for what can and what cannot be done in problem solving,
and for what the ﬁnal solution should fulﬁl (see Lombardo and Kvålshaugen
2014, p.3 and Onarheim 2012, p.324).3 Thus, I model the type of constraint
that externally permits or prevents certain creative solutions for a given task.
Some authors (see e.g. Burroughs and Mick 2004, Moreau and Dahl 2005)
have shown that constraints may positively aﬀect the extent of creative pro-
cesses. A relatively small body of research has explored a curvilinear relation
between creative performance and constraints (see e.g. Baer and Oldham 2006,
Liikkanen et al. 2009). Moreover, most of these works have focused on time
pressure as an impediment or a facilitator of creative solutions. Therefore, fur-
ther research has to be done on other types of constraints to improve general
understanding and links between constraints and creativity.
Below I focus on some of the scientiﬁc contributions which applied ex-
perimental methodology to investigate relations between creativity and con-
straints.
2Constraints as requirements should not be mixed with creative requirements which are
perceptions that one is expected, or needs, to generate work-related ideas. Being a percep-
tion, creative requirement is the experienced, psychological aspect of both explicit require-
ments (e.g., being told to be creative) and other cues (e.g., as a response to task demands)
(Unsworth et al. 2005).
3 See Amabile 1978 for early work on eﬀects of extrinsic constraints.
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In their experiment, Amabile and Gitomer (1984) placed schoolchildren
under behavioural constraints. They had to make collages using a subset of
a large array of materials. Half of the children could use the materials they
wished, the other half had to use only those that were preselected by the
experimenter. Collages were judged by a group of artists. According to the
results, the unconstrained choice was conducive to creativity.
In a similar experiment Moreau and Dahl (2005) ask experimental subjects
”to design a toy, anything a child (age 5-11) can use to play with”. They
were provided with a subset of 20 diﬀerent shapes, parts to use for designing.
Authors manipulated two types of constraints. 1) Input restrictions: compo-
nent parts were chosen either by participants or experimenters and 2) input
requirements: participants could use as many parts as they wanted or they
were required to use all ﬁve parts. The creativity of the ﬁnal products was
assessed by expert judges. The results show that the subjects produce signif-
icantly more creative toys when they were restricted in both ways. That is,
they had to apply all component parts and were required to use preselected
shapes.
Another relevant experiment was conducted by Joyce (2009). In her ex-
periment she asks subjects to come up with creative products related to the
health industry. In a low constraint treatment participants were asked to ad-
dress any issue related to the general topic of health. The moderately low
constraint prompt asked them to solve any of ﬁve subtopics related to health.
The number of subtopics listed was reduced to three in the moderately high
constraint prompt, and ﬁnally, there was only one subtopic in the high con-
straint prompt. The experiment had two phases: Research phase and proposal
writing phase. The results conﬁrmed that moderate constraints may play a
supportive role and be conducive for creative performance. However, there are
few technical issues related to experimental design: This way of manipulating
constraints is somewhat problematic. Asking to do research and choose a topic
requires much more search time than directing individuals to ﬁnd information
on particular types of products. Moreover, performance on writing a proposal
on a single speciﬁc type of product may very much depend on idiosyncrasies
of the products and the availability of information on the web. The data anal-
ysis proved that the time spent on the research phase was signiﬁcantly and
negatively correlated to creative performance.
To summarize, research ﬁndings are mixed. Some authors have observed
negative, some positive and others rather curvilinear links between constraints
77
Chapter 4
and creative performance.
4.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Most of the recent scientiﬁc literature on creativity and constraints suggests
that restriction does not always lead to decreased creative performance. While
shortage of resources such as ﬁnances or time are more likely to be detrimental
for performance in general, some types of constraint for creative tasks, such as
requirements, that could also serve as guidelines to solutions, might serve as
facilitators. Thus, my ﬁrst research question is:
1) Do constraints impair or enhance task performance?
Intuitively constraints should have an adverse impact on creative task per-
formance, since creative thinking is often associated with breaking existing
rules and merging knowledge in a novel and useful way. Therefore, require-
ments and demands to subjects should impair freedom and decrease creative
performance. However, as some authors have shown, moderate restrictions can
in fact help to improve solutions. The right amount of complexity may lead
subjects to feel challenged and improve their performance.4 Thus, I formulate
hypothesis I as follows:
• Creative performance will be curvilinearly related to task constraints.
According to Madjar et al. (2011), routine performance refers to the quantity
of work. Therefore, restrictions on routine task can be interpreted as increased
quantitative demands, rather than qualitative. Unlike creativity tasks, routine
tasks do not include uncertainty about implementation. Thus, urgency pres-
sure emerges from demands to meet certain goals by repeating mundane ac-
tivity. In situations when uncreative solutions are needed, constraints usually
are linked to increased amount of boring and straightforward eﬀort. There-
fore I expect that high levels of constraints should hinder routine performance.
Hence, hypothesis II can be formulated as follows:
• Routine performance will be negatively related to task constraints.
4See KEYS Scale of Assessing Environmental Stimulants to Creativity (Amabile, 1996).
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Emotions can also be constraining factors for creativity (Yang and Hung, 2015).
For example, some personality traits, especially openness to experience may
have a moderating eﬀect and support creativity (Baer and Oldham, 2006, Xu
et al., 2016). Thus, the second research question is:
2) How do previous experience and personality traits aﬀect routine and
creative performance?
Previous experience and attraction to tasks are usually positively linked to
creative activity. Creators often work on creative solutions as ends rather than
means to achieve extrinsic goals, such as earning money (Amabile, 1996). Since
subjects usually come to laboratories for earning extra money, I expect that
lab incentives will not have a crowding out eﬀect and will rather amalgamate
with intrinsic interests in the creative task. Thus, hypothesis III can be
formulated as follows:
• Previous experience and liking the task will be positively related to creative
performance.
In line with Baer and Oldham (2006) I conjecture that certain personality traits
may positively inﬂuence creative task performance. Finally, as hypothesis IV
it can be stated:
• Openness to experience and extraversion will be positively related to cre-
ative task performance, but not to routine task performance.
4.4 The Experimental Design
Procedure and design. The experiment had three treatments: No con-
straints, Low constraints and High constraints, with two types of tasks, routine
and creative. Thus, there were 6 conditions (see Table 4.1). Each participant
of the experiment worked on both types of tasks of the same treatment, i.e.
no, low or high constraints treatment. In order to eliminate task order eﬀects,
the sequence of the tasks were switched for some subjects. That means, some
individuals worked on the routine task ﬁrst and then on the creative task,
while others worked on the creative task ﬁrst and then on the routine task.
The number of observations for the reversed sequence treatments were mostly
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balanced. (In the Table 4.2 NCnst1, LCnst1 and HCnst1 denote observations
for the treatments where subjects solved the routine task ﬁrst. NCnst2, LC-
nst2 and HCnst2 denote observations where subjects solved the creative task
ﬁrst.)
Real-effort task N of obs.
Treatment "No Cnstr. R" Build letter permutations 33
Treatment "No Cnstr. C" Build English words 33
Treatment "Low Cnstr. R." Build letter permutations 34
Treatment "Low Cnstr. C" Build English words 34
Treatment "High Cnstr. R." Build letter permutations 31
Treatment "High Cnstr. C" Build English words 31
Table 4.1: Experimental conditions
NCnst1 NCnst2 LCnst1 LCnst2 HCnst1 HCnst2
N of obs. 18 15 16 18 7 24
Table 4.2: Number of observations in diﬀerent sessions with varied sequence
of tasks
After entering the laboratory, subjects were seated and informed about
the basic rules of participation in the experiment, such as prohibition to use
cellphones and to talk to each other. Then, they were told that the instructions
of the game are provided on the computer screens and they are self explanatory.
After starting the experiment, students read the general instruction on the
computer screens (see Appendix 4.8.2). After reading the general instructions
they could proceed to the real eﬀort task instructions. This varied depending
on which treatment and which task sequence they were participating in.
The real effort tasks.
Creative Task. In this experiment I used two conceptually diﬀerent types
of tasks. While authors in psychological and economic creativity research have
applied a wide variety of real eﬀort tasks, it has been proven that tasks which
require juries to assess performance are cost ineﬃcient and despite usually
observed correlations between the jurors, the estimates can still be considered
as subjective (Mohnen and Ostermaier, 2013). Therefore, I apply a word
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creation task, used by Eckartz et al. (2012). In this task, participants have
to create words from letters. For the purpose of the experiment, I call this
task as ’Word Task’. The longer the words participants create are, the more
points they receive (see Table 4.3). Their goal is to accumulate as many
points as possible. The task participants had to build words out of a random
set of letters.5 The most frequent deﬁnition of creativity is generation of novel
and useful ideas or recombination of ideas into new ideas (Amabile, 1996).
Thus, in this task ”materials” (letters) are combined to create new ”products”
(words), which are semantically more than the sum of the materials. The task
allows diﬀerent solutions, which vary in creativity, because participants can
combine letters into any word rather than ﬁnd one single solution (Mohnen and
Ostermaier, 2013). In addition, this task is time eﬃcient, compared to other
possible options. Each task took three minutes. It is also easy to program and
objectively assesses creativity. Moreover, the task makes it possible to assess
the performances of the players in real time and provide immediate feedback
on performance (see Figure 4.4 in Appendix).
Routine Task. I wanted to have a task which would be suﬃciently similar
to the creative task, but would not require creative thinking. Thus, for the
routine task, students are asked to build permutations of letters from the same
set of letters as for the creative task. Thus, the task was about writing diﬀerent
combinations of letters using a given set of letters. In this case, accepted solu-
tions were mere combination of materials and did not have an added semantic
value. This task resembles a paragraph typing task, where subjects had to type
a speciﬁc paragraph without making mistakes (see Dickinson 1999). I call this
task a ’String Task’. The longer the permutations that participants built were,
the more points they received. The points were awarded using the same score
system as for the creative task. Since the string task was signiﬁcantly easier,
based on pilot sessions, I decided to set conversion rates for the word task:
100 Points = 1 US Dollars and for the string task: 300 Points = 1 US Dollars.
After each task participants received information about their earnings for the
task. In the end, the computer randomly chose one of the tasks to be pay-oﬀ
relevant.
Constraint Manipulations.
5The letter set used was the following: ’a e e i o u l n m s s r’. The maximum number of
words that can be built with this letter set is 1503 and maximum number of points that can
be accumulated using this letter set is 26 720. Source: http://www.wineverygame.com/
See number of words and points for each solution length in table 4.6 in Appendix.
81
Chapter 4
In a baseline, control treatment there were no restrictions or requirements
on solutions. The main rule for the Word Task was that the solutions had to
be English words from the English dictionary and for the String Task, strings
had to use only letters from the given letter set.
I manipulated constraints by asking subjects in treatment groups to build
words or strings using a minimum required number of letters. In case of low
constraints, solutions with a minimum of four letters were needed, whereas for
the high constraint treatment subjects had to submit solutions with a minimum
length of six letters.
Once the subjects ﬁnished the ﬁrst task, they proceeded with demographic
questionnaires and responded to a short personality questionnaire (TIPI, by
Gosling et al. 2003).
The experiment was programmed in programming languages Python and
Javascript and conducted on the Google Chrome browser. Participants were
recruited using Cloud-based Participant Management Software (SONA).
Words from the letter set " a c c d e e e g i n s t "
ad 1 + 2 = 3 points
and 1 + 2 + 3 = 6 points
cats 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 points
... ...
teasing 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = 28 points
Table 4.3: Measuring creativity: Longer words generate more points (Eckartz
et al., 2012)
4.5 Results
For statistical analysis and graphs I used R software (R Core Team, 2013).
The experiment was conducted at Rady School of Management Incentives
Lab, at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) in May-June 2016. In
total 109 subjects participated in the experiment. I dropped 7 observations
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because of technical problems6 and 4 observations because those participants
did not read/understand the instructions. All participants were students of
UCSD. The experiment lasted 30 minutes and the average earning was 8 US
Dollars (With the range from 5 USD to 12.8 USD). 63% of the participants
were females.
Manipulation check. To check if the creativity task manipulation worked
the students were asked to indicate to what degree (from 1 = strongly disagree
to 7 = strongly agree) they agreed or disagreed with the statement ”The word
building task requires more creativity compared to the string task”. On average
students rated creativity on 5.45 level out of maximum 7, this conﬁrms that
the word task required more creative eﬀort, compared to the string task.
Treatment manipulation was eﬀective for the high constraints treatment,
but was less eﬀective for the low constraint treatment. Subjects who faced
no constraints built correct words with an average length of 4.2, those who
had low constraints built words with a mean length of 4.6 and those with
high constraints built words with the length of 6.2. A similar pattern can be
observed for the string task (see Figure 4.1 below). However, it has to be
mentioned that in low and high constraint treatments the percentage rate of
mistakes compared to the baseline condition gradually increased (see Table 4.8
in Appendix). This suggests that although experiment subjects were exerting
eﬀort, constraints caused more mistakes and therefore, the exertion of more
unproductive eﬀort.
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Figure 4.1: Average solution lengths
6These 7 subjects accidentally pressed the backward button on the browser that restarted
the task. This means that these participants could have used a few additional seconds for
the task.
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Appendix 4.8.4 shows frequencies for sum of points collected by subjects.
For both types of tasks the imposition of constraints caused a decline in per-
formance. Namely, in the constraint treatments, a higher number of subjects
were performing worse than in the no constraint condition. These translated
in signiﬁcant decline in average performances (see Figure 4.2).7
Table 4.4 provides t-tests. Test results 1 and 2 compare mean points for the
routine tasks. Tests results 3 and 4 compare mean points for the creative task.
Average accumulated points are marginally less in low and high constraint
treatments for routine tasks. However, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant for the
creative task (p− value < 0.05). Appendix 4.8.7 provides regression analysis.
The results are the same for both, OLS and Tobit models.8 They suggest that
constraints were impediments and signiﬁcantly worsened performance of the
participants.
Test for Routine Tasks Results
1 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(54.80) = 1.89, p = .065,
2 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(55.02) = 1.17, p = .246,
Test for Creative Tasks Results
3 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(64.80) = 2.23, p = .029,
4 Welch Two Sample t-test: t(44.48) = 5.39, p < .001.
Table 4.4: T-tests
Thus, when looking at all the data, supportive evidence for hypothesis I was
not found. There is no curvilinear relation between constraints and creative
performance. Introduction of even low constraints negatively eﬀected creativ-
ity. As expected, in support of hypothesis II, constraints were detrimental for
the routine task performance as well.
Performance by minutes. Since learning the constraints could have
taken some time, I analysed performance of the experiment participants for
each minute (see Appendix 4.8.5). In the ﬁrst minute, the performance on the
creative task was worse for the constraint group in comparison to the uncon-
strained group. However, the situation changed in the second minute. Once
the constraint treatment subjects learned the requirements they performed
7In the ﬁgure the bar heights represent mean performance. The bar heights within the
same tasks and not across tasks have to be compared. The diﬀerent tasks are color coded.
8Experiment participants could collect only positive number of points. Therefore, Tobit
model is censored at zero.
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as good as the subjects without constraints. The diﬀerence in performance
for the second minute is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally, in the
third minute, the diﬀerence between the constrained and unconstrained group
re-emerges. This could be ascribed to the constrained group running out of
solutions, which led to decreased performance.
Regression analysis by minutes (see Appendix 4.8.9) conﬁrms that for the
creative performance low constraints had a negative eﬀect only in the ﬁrst
and the third minute. The coeﬃcient for the second minute is still negative,
however it is not signiﬁcant (p − value > 0.1). For the Routine performance
the results are somewhat diﬀerent. Experiment subjects in the low constraint
treatment performed worse in the ﬁrst two minutes, however, they did as well
as the unconstrained group in the third minute. Finally, high constraints were
detrimental for both types of tasks.
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Figure 4.2: Average performance
Appendix 4.8.8 I provides quantile regressions. The analysis studies how
the distribution of outcomes are shifted with diﬀerent levels of constraints. I
present quantile regressions for 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles of the distribu-
tion of outcomes. The results show that for both, routine and creative tasks,
the upper tail of performance gradually shifts downward in a low constraint
treatment. The coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant for 25th percentile, however
it becomes signiﬁcant with higher percentiles. This indicates that the con-
straints aﬀected those who would have collected a high number of points. In
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case of high constraints, coeﬃcients are always signiﬁcant and the negative
eﬀect increases with high percentiles.
The analysis of the most creative solutions shows that the subjects built
the longest words when they faced constraints (see Table 4.7 in Appendix). In
other words, if the subjects are asked to build longer words then they are most
likely to come up with the longest ones. This result is not surprising and goes
in line with what rational theory would have predicted: Subjects will build the
longest words in treatments where the longer words are incentivized.
Regression analysis shows that those subjects who found tasks diﬃcult
actually performed worse. Those, who considered the word task to demand
high creative eﬀort also performed on average worse. Being an English native
speaker and good knowledge of English were both positive factors for the word
task performance, however, not for string task performance. Experience with
word games was not indicative of better performance.
As predicted in Hypothesis IV, personality trait, extraversion was positively
related to creative performance, but not to the routine task performance.
4.6 Discussion and Implications
The results for the whole data go in line with the ﬁnding of the researchers
who conﬁrmed the negative relationship between constraints and performance.
In order to observe improved performance for the constraint treatment groups
in the experiment, I imposed very low level of constraints for the second,
Low Constraints treatment. This was proved by the manipulation check, that
shows that in control treatment subjects built on average only slightly shorter
words compared to those in the low (4 letters) constraint treatment. The
signiﬁcant decline in performance emerged because of the reduced number of
correct solutions for the low constraint manipulation.
The high constraints treatment, which required submission of solutions
with the length of 6 or more letters appeared to be extremely diﬃcult for
experiment participants. As a result, creative performance decreased by the
factor of three in comparison to the low constraints group. Decrease in perfor-
mance was less prominent for the routine task. However, there is a clear trend
that imposition of high constraints hurt both types of performances.
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I have analysed the performance for each minute of the experiment and
found the following pattern: For the creative task, performance of the low con-
straint group was as good as for the unconstrained group only in the second
minute. This suggests that, it took some time to learn the task, incorporate
the constraints and requirements of the task. Once the subjects have achieved
that, they were as good as unconstrained subjects. However, this improved
performance could not be sustained in the third minute. It seems that subjects
ran out of correct solutions which fulﬁlled the minimum four-letter-length re-
quirement. Thus, in the third minute performance for the constrained subjects
worsened again.
In case of the routine task, performance across minutes was somewhat
diﬀerent. In the low constraint treatment, subjects could do as well as the
unconstrained group only in the third minute. That means, for the routine
task, it took longer to learn the constraint and improve performance compared
to ﬁrst minute. This could happen because despite the fact that the task was
routine, required simply typing diﬀerent combinations of letters, it was also
a novel task, a task that is not common and the subjects have never done it
before. Lastly, the high constraints had adverse eﬀects for both types of tasks
for each minute.
The results for the minute-by-minute analysis oﬀers a few interesting impli-
cations: 1) Managers of ﬁrms, where employees perform creative or innovative
tasks, can expect that there will be a worsened performance in the ﬁrst phase
of imposition of constraints or requirements. Once the workers learn how to
deal with the constraints they will perform as well as the others. 2) Managers
of a ﬁrm where employees work on routine tasks should anticipate that learn-
ing and improvement on constraints could bear adverse eﬀects on performance
for a longer period of time, especially if they do not have experience or are not
familiar with the task. 3) Imposition of high constraints worsens performance
so much that managers shall not expect improved performance neither in the
short and medium, nor in the long period of time.
As already mentioned above, the fact that the longest creative solutions
were found in the high constraint treatment is not unexpected. When asked
to build words with the minimum length of six letters, it is more likely that
subjects will come up with eight-letter-long solutions. However, there still is an
important managerial notice: If principal agents care about the most creative
solutions rather than high average creativity, then constraints are presumably
the best strategy to achieve the goal.
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Reversed measure of Big Five personality trait, extraversion was negatively
related to creative performance. In other words, those who are not extraverse
were performing worse on a creative task. This suggests that when it comes
to creative assignments, managers should pay attention not only to technical
skills and experience, but also to personalities of employees. Individuals who
are not sociable, eager to communicate with others may be less able to handle
creative tasks.
The most striking were the results about the number of correct solutions
with the length of 4 letters and more. The imposition of even low constraints
decreased the number of correct solutions so much that unconstrained subjects’
correctly submitted solutions with the length of 4 or more exceeded that of
the constrained group’s solutions. To put it diﬀerently, in addition to solutions
with length 3 and less, unconstrained subjects came up with more solutions
with the length of 4 and more (954 solutions) than the constrained group
(735 solutions). Thus, ignoring small, with 3 letters and shorter solutions, the
unconstrained group built almost 30 % more solutions, which had 4 or more
letters .
This result raises the following question: What should company manage-
ment do when it needs solutions with a certain threshold or speciﬁcations?
Should it reimburse solutions which are below threshold? Rationally, paying
for something that is useless is wrong, but as the results show it may still make
a lot of sense. Imposition of constraints blocks simpliﬁed thinking which can
serve as a basement for more sophisticated solutions. Constrained individuals
are forced to directly provide comprehensive solutions. Since complex solu-
tions usually lead to more errors this approach may get quite time consuming.
In comparison, when employees still get moderate reward for below threshold
results, they do not hesitate to fail in reaching the desirable outcomes initially.
Thus, I think that tolerance of failure and even rewarding it may increase over-
all creativity. This point is crucial and deserves further experimental analysis.
To summarize, looking at all participants, constraints had adverse eﬀects
for routine and creative task performance. However, after examining develop-
ment of the performance over time, I ﬁnd that low constraints actually may
not hurt the performance of the participants. Previous research ﬁndings are
mixed. With the current ﬁndings, I add new evidence which demonstrates
that constraints at least, at some stage of implementation may not be harm-
ful. Namely, when individuals get an experience and know how to deal with
the quality demands imposed by management they will be able to handle them
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once they get used to it.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper I examined how constraints inﬂuence routine and creative per-
formance. The results suggest that in general, constraints are detrimental for
both types of tasks. While low constraints have relatively mild negative ef-
fect on performance, as expected, regardless of the task type, high constraints
always have a strongly negative impact on performance.
The paper also researched performance during diﬀerent phases of the tasks.
In the creative task, after learning the constraints and gaining experience, sub-
jects performed as well as unconstrained ones. Whereas, for the routine task,
a marginal improvement in the low constraints treatment appeared in the last
minute of the experiment. Surprisingly, the number of correct solutions in the
unconstrained treatment, with the length required in the constrained treat-
ment, exceeded number of correct solutions in the constrained treatment. In
other words, constraints led to signiﬁcantly fewer correct high quality solutions.
These ﬁndings call for future research to investigate how performance de-
velops over time with the introduction of constraints. It is also very important
to know whether a so called build-up of inventions (i.e. learning from one’s
own ideas) takes place in creative tasks. It could be a major reason causing
constraints to have detrimental eﬀects. In a follow-up study I check if exper-
iment participants actually improve on their own ideas. More importantly, I
study what role does task speciﬁc skills play when low constraints are imposed.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Studies on creativity constraints
Discipline Author(s)
Psychology
(Amabile and Gitomer 1984, Knoblich et al. 1999)
(Ward et al. 2002)
Marketing (Burroughs and Mick, 2004, Moreau and Dahl, 2005)
Management (Joyce, 2009, Martinsons and Brivins Martinsons, 1996)
Engineering (Maiden et al., 2004, Onarheim, 2012)
Computer games (Bogost, 2007)
Software development (Maiden and Robertson, 2005)
Linguistics (Nida, 1998, Tin, 2012)
Nursing (Bellman et al., 2003)
Sports (Hristovski et al., 2011)
Art Stokes (2005)
Music Kao (1997)
Table 4.5: Literature on constraints and creativity.
4.8.2 Instructions
General Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this study! All the answers you
provide are conﬁdential.
In this experiment, you will be asked to complete two tasks, one after
another. In one of these tasks you will be asked to create English words
(Word Task), and in the other task you will be asked to create any arbitrary
permutation of letters (String Task).
At the end of the experiment you will receive $5 for having completed the
experiment. In addition, the computer will randomly select one of the two
tasks, and we will pay you based on your performance in that selected task.
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The method we use to determine your earnings is subtly diﬀerent between
the tasks. Before each task we will describe in detail how your payment is
determined. Please make sure that you read the instructions carefully to avoid
any misunderstanding. Each task is expected to take less than 4 minutes to
complete.
Please click below when you are ready to proceed to the instructions for
the ﬁrst task.
String Task Instructions
String Task
Please read the instructions carefully before starting on the current task.
Depending on your solutions, you will receive points.
And for every 300 points that you obtain by the end of the task, you will
receive $1.
In this task you will be given 3 minutes to come up with as many strings
as you can that use only a speciﬁc set of letters.
The longer the strings that you build, the more points you get.
Note that any permutation of the letters that we provide will be awarded
points.
The actual set of letters you have to work with, and the points you receive
for diﬀerent strings lengths are given on the next page.
Before clicking below to proceed, please read the full set of rules below.
• You may use only the letters in the set that we give you. For instance,
if the set of letters we gave you is A, E, E, L, B then strings
– the string ALB is allowed (since the set has letters A, L and B);
– the string AAL is not allowed (since the string has two As and the
set only has one A);
– the string AEE is allowed (since the string and the set both have
two Es).
• With the letters we provide, you may build small strings or large strings.
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Longer words receive more points compared to shorter words.
Note that only the words that we identify as coming from a commonly used
English language dictionary will be awarded points.
The actual set of letters you have to work with, and the points you receive
for diﬀerent words lengths are given on the next page.
Before clicking below to proceed, please read the full set of rules below.
• You may use only the letters in the set that we give you. For instance,
if the set of letters we gave you is A, E, E, L, B then words
– word ALE is allowed (since the set has the letters A, L, and E);
– the word BELL is not allowed (since the word has two Ls and the
set only has one L);
– the word EEL is allowed (since the word and the set both have two
Es).
• With the letters we provide, you may build small words or large words.
• Just repeatedly building the same words will not get any additional
points.
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Word length Number of words(s)
11 1
10 3
9 22
8 86
7 203
6 334
5 389
4 309
3 122
2 38
Table 4.6: Word length and number of words.
4.8.4 Descriptives
Distribution of accumulated points across treatments.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of points for routine task
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of points for creative task
4.8.5 Performance by minutes
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4.8.6 The longest solutions and letters used for the cre-
ative effort task
Absolute terms Percentages
Length of the words >5 >6 >7 >5 >6 >7
Treatment "No Cnstr. C" 64 12 0 6.11% 1.15% 0 %
Treatment "Low Cnstr. C" 65 15 1 9.27% 2.14% 0.14%
Treatment "High Cnstr. C" 117 25 2 100% 21.37% 1.71%
Table 4.7: The longest solutions across treatments
N. of letters used % of useless letters
Treatment "No Cnstr. C" 5893 25.39%
Treatment "Low Cnstr. C" 4701 32.08%
Treatment "High Cnstr. C" 2285 68.14%
Table 4.8: Total letters used and share of letters used in wrong words.
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4.8.7 Regression Analysis: OLS and Tobit models
Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
Word task_diff 70.498 -21.716∗∗
(43.243) (10.290)
String task_diff -99.902∗∗∗ 6.296
(34.804) (8.282)
Found task creative 34.050 -22.473∗∗
(37.732) (8.979)
Native speaker 215.886 145.256∗∗∗
(140.698) (33.481)
English knowledge 36.568 26.689∗
(61.929) (14.737)
Freq. word games 138.805 -2.892
(91.528) (21.780)
Liking word games 4.076 8.256
(51.337) (12.216)
Risk seeking -42.448 1.855
(46.644) (11.100)
Extraversion 16.000 -10.575
(30.770) (7.322)
Agreeableness.R -23.319 -6.562
(34.904) (8.306)
Conscientiousness 39.716 23.493∗∗
(44.501) (10.590)
Emotional stability.R -6.682 -6.704
(40.248) (9.577)
Openness 47.763 6.595
(45.740) (10.884)
Extraversion.R -20.652 -21.252∗∗
(33.824) (8.049)
Agreeableness 10.577 3.142
(38.680) (9.204)
Conscientiousness.R -11.587 7.392
(34.658) (8.247)
Emotional stability -11.261 1.569
(36.680) (8.728)
Openness.R 26.580 -3.457
(34.899) (8.305)
Gender 58.424 -10.613
(130.215) (30.986)
Sequence 59.030 -28.415
(113.267) (26.953)
Low Constraints -333.448∗∗ -82.788∗∗
(142.483) (33.906)
High Constraints -601.967∗∗∗ -263.291∗∗∗
(162.655) (38.706)
Constant 344.197 339.884∗∗
(597.029) (142.071)
Observations 98 98
R2 0.439 0.688
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.597
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dependent variable:
Routine Performance Creative Performance
Word task_diff 70.498∗ -21.435∗∗
(37.830) (9.240)
String task_diff -99.902∗∗∗ 5.087
(30.447) (7.557)
Found task creative 34.050 -23.531∗∗∗
(33.008) (8.030)
Native speaker 215.886∗ 148.838∗∗∗
(123.085) (30.021)
English knowledge 36.568 31.437∗∗
(54.177) (13.393)
Freq. word games 138.805∗ -2.488
(80.070) (19.472)
Liking word games 4.076 4.601
(44.911) (11.028)
Risk seeking -42.448 1.380
(40.805) (9.897)
Extraversion 16.000 -10.016
(26.918) (6.539)
Agreeableness.R -23.319 -6.418
(30.535) (7.535)
Conscientiousness 39.716 24.077∗∗
(38.930) (9.454)
Emotional stability.R -6.682 -4.342
(35.209) (8.719)
Openness 47.763 7.582
(40.014) (9.719)
Extraversion.R -20.652 -21.983∗∗∗
(29.590) (7.199)
Agreeableness 10.577 5.721
(33.838) (8.276)
Conscientiousness.R -11.587 8.593
(30.320) (7.411)
Emotional stability -11.261 3.882
(32.088) (7.890)
Openness.R 26.580 -3.975
(30.530) (7.442)
Gender 58.424 -16.846
(113.915) (28.275)
Sequence 59.030 -32.128
(99.088) (24.085)
Low Constraints -333.448∗∗∗ -84.169∗∗∗
(124.647) (30.228)
High Constraints -601.967∗∗∗ -279.922∗∗∗
(142.294) (35.161)
Constant 344.197 309.058∗∗
(522.291) (128.236)
Observations 98 98
Log Likelihood -734.172 -573.306
Wald Test (df = 22) 76.603∗∗∗ 213.758∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.8.8 Quantile Regressions
Dependent variable:
Routine Performance
(q25) (q75) (q95)
Word task_diff 42.821 125.742∗∗∗ 92.730
(28.546) (47.086) (87.374)
String task_diff -175.610∗∗∗ -124.514∗∗ 15.138
(18.568) (52.329) (84.605)
Found task creative 6.788 14.161 2.440
(23.299) (37.662) (74.356)
Native speaker 13.779 213.882 640.090∗∗
(119.550) (211.659) (303.479)
English knowledge 88.280∗ 15.035 -221.346
(50.169) (100.625) (172.497)
Freq. word games 174.243∗∗ -21.250 84.406
(71.200) (132.543) (176.606)
Liking word games -27.600 89.573∗ 54.211
(35.766) (49.303) (66.476)
Risk seeking -48.038∗∗ -146.147 -113.438
(22.429) (91.561) (119.087)
Extraversion 30.229 37.125 38.613
(18.956) (45.520) (58.312)
Agreeableness.R -22.487 -8.467 25.085
(20.602) (41.744) (92.382)
Conscientiousness -2.766 -43.276 -70.473
(28.673) (78.511) (129.699)
Emotional stability.R 18.272 55.944 89.326
(24.464) (68.541) (55.607)
Openness 72.482∗∗ -47.335 82.911
(28.867) (73.142) (118.486)
Extraversion.R 35.941∗∗ -70.839 -83.561
(17.817) (51.220) (86.773)
Agreeableness -15.783 91.455 -34.845
(22.646) (64.541) (97.789)
Conscientiousness.R 7.575 -40.803 -51.982
(27.818) (44.220) (61.662)
Emotional stability -38.712 25.134 161.047∗∗
(35.008) (59.395) (64.169)
Openness.R -10.161 90.071∗∗ -1.207
(22.679) (45.092) (89.781)
Gender 66.905 -3.216 212.358
(62.685) (196.554) (218.006)
Sequence 86.475 210.898 224.267
(74.400) (200.012) (151.588)
Low Constraints -140.430 -325.407∗ -789.699∗∗
(94.078) (191.824) (348.843)
High Constraints -438.243∗∗∗ -649.134∗∗∗ -1,317.480∗∗∗
(100.179) (205.036) (489.143)
Constant 241.085 762.451 2,149.769∗∗∗
(449.793) (1,024.957) (779.708)
Observations 98 98 98
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dependent variable:
Creative Performance
(q25) (q75) (q95)
Word task_diff 42.821 125.742∗∗∗ 92.730
(28.546) (47.086) (87.374)
String task_diff -175.610∗∗∗ -124.514∗∗ 15.138
(18.568) (52.329) (84.605)
Found task creative 6.788 14.161 2.440
(23.299) (37.662) (74.356)
Native speaker 13.779 213.882 640.090∗∗
(119.550) (211.659) (303.479)
English knowledge 88.280∗ 15.035 -221.346
(50.169) (100.625) (172.497)
Freq. word games -4.687 2.185 38.699∗∗∗
(26.931) (26.890) (0.000)
Liking word games 14.082 5.679 2.620∗∗∗
(14.913) (14.942) (0.000)
Risk seeking 3.246 -4.189 8.413∗∗∗
(11.028) (13.962) (0.000)
Extraversion -15.210∗ -4.517 -16.387∗∗∗
(8.721) (8.580) (0.000)
Agreeableness.R -6.473 -7.913 −14.007∗∗∗
(8.743) (9.500) (0.000)
Conscientiousness 24.789∗∗ 5.585 47.155∗∗∗
(11.585) (17.188) (0.000)
Emotional stability.R -6.050 -14.152 −8.541∗∗∗
(12.756) (14.053) (0.000)
Openness 6.330 -2.125 −6.603∗∗∗
(13.693) (14.288) (0.000)
Extraversion.R −26.025∗∗ −20.323∗ −15.324∗∗∗
(10.299) (11.287) (0.000)
Agreeableness -1.563 6.063 −14.122∗∗∗
(10.094) (10.997) (0.000)
Conscientiousness.R 15.596∗ 8.877 0.336∗∗∗
(8.810) (6.815) (0.000)
Emotional stability 0.912 4.659 1.371∗∗∗
(9.865) (8.213) (0.000)
Openness.R 3.523 1.615 −5.405∗∗∗
(9.180) (9.792) (0.000)
Gender -10.387 -16.434 −46.879∗∗∗
(39.529) (36.453) (0.000)
Sequence -4.863 -27.919 7.413∗∗∗
(26.107) (27.806) (0.000)
Low Constraints -48.048 −96.151∗ −118.417∗∗∗
(42.117) (49.659) (0.000)
High Constraints -176.049∗∗∗ −308.927∗∗∗ −355.487∗∗∗
(46.125) (48.924) (0.000)
Constant 167.360 535.869∗∗∗ 605.098∗∗∗
(143.186) (202.494) (0.000)
Observations 98 98 98
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
102
Eﬀects of Constraints on Routine and Creative Performance
4.8.9 Regressions by minutes: OLS
Dependent variable: Routine Performance
(Minute 1) (Minute 2) (Minute 3)
Word task_diff 9.779 38.839∗∗ 13.358
(14.084) (16.559) (15.889)
String task_diff -11.716 -29.902∗∗ -44.024∗∗∗
(11.906) (14.020) (13.018)
Found task creative 3.893 15.233 15.519
(11.501) (13.704) (13.121)
Native speaker 71.830 88.152 42.825
(49.626) (58.912) (56.226)
English knowledge -0.462 5.807 18.583
(15.886) (18.881) (17.883)
freq. word games 59.788∗ 19.937 68.544∗
(33.365) (39.207) (37.680)
liking word games -3.983 13.213 -10.653
(18.081) (21.514) (20.412)
Risk seeking -18.422 -11.658 -14.720
(16.000) (18.982) (18.217)
Extraversion 4.892 1.457 7.421
(6.824) (8.138) (7.849)
Agreeableness.R -2.517 -6.048 -8.677
(8.183) (9.901) (9.618)
Conscientiousness -7.222 8.012 7.747
(7.862) (9.291) (8.912)
Emotional stability.R -8.349 6.697 4.417
(10.157) (11.943) (11.328)
Openness 4.116 8.212 9.919
(8.238) (9.719) (9.344)
Extraversion.R -10.682 -3.108 -3.432
(8.354) (9.937) (9.568)
Agreeableness 7.574 5.291 -5.032
(7.882) (9.338) (8.779)
Conscientiousness.R -4.871 -5.791 0.770
(8.383) (9.994) (9.630)
Emotional stability -1.099 3.671 -1.927
(7.706) (9.157) (8.508)
Openness.R 14.584 6.131 2.038
(8.946) (10.662) (10.312)
Gender 22.672 -14.840 92.731∗
(47.744) (56.707) (53.825)
Task sequence 72.498∗ -3.893 -12.638
(39.354) (47.988) (45.818)
Low Constraints -117.517∗∗ -115.946∗∗ -81.404
(46.255) (55.046) (52.824)
High Constraints -213.306∗∗∗ -241.350∗∗∗ -139.651∗∗
(54.644) (65.442) (63.266)
Constant 232.261 -75.286 100.508
(260.488) (307.873) (293.346)
Observations 96 97 97
R2 0.392 0.375 0.423
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.189 0.252
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dependent variable: Creative Performance
(Minute 1) (Minute 2) (Minute 3)
Word task_diff -31.508∗∗ -21.441 -21.195∗∗∗
(11.942) (15.871) (0.000)
String task_diff 2.538 9.555 12.271∗∗∗
(11.243) (14.447) (0.000)
Found task creative -5.935 -35.819∗∗∗ -22.879∗∗∗
(14.994) (12.097) (0.000)
Native speaker 124.136∗∗∗ 151.032∗∗∗ 165.448∗∗∗
(41.097) (30.262) (0.000)
English knowledge 20.943 28.936 7.845∗∗∗
(16.441) (21.405) (0.000)
Freq. word games -4.315 4.042 -3.068
(10.885) (9.553) (8.320)
lining word games 0.144 4.909 1.172
(5.915) (5.242) (4.518)
Risk seeking 2.646 -4.858 2.974
(5.222) (4.625) (4.032)
Extraversion -1.498 -0.142 -2.226
(2.236) (1.983) (1.726)
Agreeableness.R -2.101 -1.866 -1.983
(2.837) (2.412) (2.102)
Conscientiousness 6.033∗∗ 1.833 1.104
(2.545) (2.264) (1.972)
emotional stability.R -0.032 0.988 0.628
(3.250) (2.910) (2.496)
Openness 3.251 1.458 2.832
(2.673) (2.368) (2.062)
Extraversion.R -0.227 -7.641∗∗∗ -5.508∗∗
(2.729) (2.421) (2.110)
Agreeableness -0.783 1.308 1.637
(2.505) (2.275) (1.937)
Conscientiousness.R -1.775 1.637 1.699
(3.028) (2.435) (2.119)
emotional stability 1.194 -0.644 -0.127
(2.439) (2.231) (1.880)
Openness.R -4.383 0.331 0.418
(2.941) (2.598) (2.262)
Gender -9.777 4.285 -5.680
(15.152) (13.817) (11.763)
Task sequence -23.011∗ 2.450 -12.268
(13.176) (11.692) (10.140)
Low Constraints -37.761∗∗ -13.241 -32.057∗∗∗
(15.076) (13.412) (11.689)
High Constraints -87.555∗∗∗ -85.401∗∗∗ -98.729∗∗∗
(18.263) (15.945) (13.844)
Constant 112.258 176.350∗∗ 94.517
(84.630) (75.015) (64.868)
Observations 95 97 98
R2 0.522 0.628 0.647
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.517 0.543
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Creativity through Constraints:
The Role of Domain-specific
Skills
5.1 Introduction
Innovativeness and creativity are fundamental to many economic activities,
and a source of advantage for ﬁrms operating in hyper-competitive markets.
This increasing relevance of innovations and creativity has motivated a growing
body of research to study the factors that foster creative performance, above
and beyond what is known about managing routine tasks.1 In routine tasks, a
person’s eﬀort is (for the most part) directly linked to output and performance
(Madjar et al., 2011). However, because of its inherent nature, the same is not
true for creative tasks.
This chapter is co-authored with Sanjiv Erat from the Rady School of Management,
University of California, San Diego.
1See for instance, Aghion et al. 2014, Bradler et al. 2016, Cantner et al. 2009, Charness
and Grieco 2014, Crosetto 2010, Eckartz et al. 2012, Ederer and Manso 2013, Erat and
Gneezy 2015. See also Brüggemann and Bizer (2016) for a review of experimental research
on creativity and innovation.
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Such creative tasks are often enjoyable to people and require intrinsic mo-
tivation to generate valuable output (see Amabile 1996, Deci and Ryan 1975).
Monetary incentives may not always motivate task performance in a same way
as they do for routine tasks (Amabile, 1996, Eckartz et al., 2012, Erat and
Gneezy, 2015). While past research indicates that the performance in creative
task is diﬃcult to improve purely by monetary incentives, we provide evidence
that the nature of creative process oﬀers a novel managerial lever - the extent
to which we constrain it - that has the potential to improve performance.
Traditionally, constraints have been thought to be detrimental for perfor-
mance (both for creative and routine tasks). In the case of creative tasks,
constraints might frame a person’s thinking and not let them freely explore
new ideas (see e.g. Amabile and Gitomer (1984) for early empirical study on
eﬀects of constraints on creativity).2
Moreover, creativity rarely has a single eureka moment when a high quality
solution is found all of a sudden, and instead is an iterative process where
people often improve on their own ideas. Constraining the performance by
only incentivizing solutions that exceed a predetermined threshold can possibly
reduce the breadth of search, and might prevent people from building-up from
poorer quality solutions to better quality solutions.3
On the ﬂip side, constraints can guide the creative process and prevent
excessive and unproductive experimentation as has been argued by several
management writers in the popular press. For instance, Sull, writing for the
McKinsey Quarterly, notes that “[creators] have long recognized that con-
straints spur and guide innovation” (Sull, 2015). Similarly, Whitney Johnson
argues that “without any constraints [creators] can easily lose [their] way” and
that constraints can be “a tool of creation” (Johnson, 2013). A small body of
research has recently investigated this positive eﬀect of constraints (Burroughs
and Mick, 2004, Joyce, 2009, Moreau and Dahl, 2005).4
2The question of how constraints of various types (such as resource constraints, or time
constraints) aﬀect creativity has concerned psychologists since the second half of the past
century (see e.g. Amabile 1979, 1996, Crutchﬁeld 1962, Johnson-Laird 1988, Kaufman and
Sternberg 2010, Koestler 1964, Rogers 1954). While anecdotal evidence abounds for the
value of constraints, most experimental studies which have examined the question has found
only negative eﬀects of constraints on performance.
3See for instance, Sikora (2013) and Kavadias and Sommer (2009), for a discussion of
beneﬁts of incorporating and building on other’s ideas.
4 For more arguments for constraints as enablers, see (Onarheim and Biskjaer, 2013) and
(Stokes, 2005).
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The current study employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the ef-
fects of incentives and performance constraints on creative outcomes. We adapt
a previously used creative task in experimental economics (Eckartz et al., 2012)
to explicitly manipulate the incentives and constraints, and use a survey to
elicit our subjects’ task-speciﬁc skill level.
The study oﬀers a ﬁrst look at when constraints have a negative eﬀect
(preventing build-up), and when they have positive eﬀect (enabling focus on
high-quality solutions). We demonstrate how the importance of each is moder-
ated by the creators’ skill level, and that performance constraints (that reward
only high quality solutions) reduces the total performance of only the low-
skilled creators. We provide a novel measure of creative build-up in our task,
and use this measure to show that constraints disrupt build-up by low skilled
individuals, and thus reduce their performance. In contrast, for the high skilled
individuals, our results show that these exact same constraints enhance their
total performance. Furthermore, our results show that performance constraints
also increases the number of high quality outcomes for high skilled creators,
but decrease it for low skilled creators.
Our paper contributes to theoretical understanding and helps to recon-
cile the two divergent perspectives on the role of constraints on creativity by
demonstrating (i) the value of build-up and allowing unconstrained creation for
low skilled individuals, and (ii) the value of focus and of constrained creativity
for high skilled ones. Moreover, from an applied perspective, our ﬁndings are
highly relevant for decision makers in innovative companies. Managers in such
organizations are constantly looking for ways to design policies and mecha-
nisms that would enhance creative output, with some ﬁrms oﬀering employees
signiﬁcant leeway to do creative work.5 Our results point toward the value of
more explicit and proactive intervention, such as setting constraints for cre-
ative tasks, especially when the creators are highly-skilled at the task. More
broadly, employees’ skill (or knowledge) level must be a key consideration when
designing the appropriate policies and mechanisms to enhance creativity.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the
relevant literature and develops our hypotheses. Details on the experimental
design, procedures and treatment manipulations are provided in section 3.
Section 4 reports the results, and section 5 concludes with a discussion of our
research ﬁndings and its managerial implications.
5See for example, Schrage (2013) for a discussion of the relatively unconstrained work
policies, at least for some engineers, at Google.
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5.2 Theory and Hypotheses
Consistent with the viewpoint that constraints may harm creative processes,
organizational management literature has argued that allowing failures (i.e.,
“worthless” outcomes), by allowing learning, can enhance creative productivity
(see e.g. Matson 1996, Tahirsylaj 2012, Sitkin 1992). In contrast, if initial
failures are penalized, people may not adequately explore the solution space.
In one of the few experimental studies (that we are aware of), Ederer and
Manso (2013) employ a search task and ﬁnd that failure tolerance in initial
phase improves the ﬁnal performance (for a theoretical model, see Manso 2011).
Research at the aggregate organizational level (Tian and Wang, 2014) has
also observed that when venture capital investors are willing to continue invest-
ing in under-performing ventures, and exhibit a greater tolerance for failure,
then the ﬁrms backed by such investors are signiﬁcantly more innovative.
We propose that the above provided argument can be reconciled with the
view that constraints enhance creativity (by preventing costly and unproduc-
tive experimentation and guiding to greater focus) by considering the mod-
erating role of domain/task relevant skills. Although the relation between
domain/task relevant skills and performance is straightforward and by now
well-understood,6 it is less clear how task related skill interacts with constraints
and determines creative performance.
When it comes to creative problem solving, performance constraints that
push people to start oﬀ with high-quality solutions can be cognitively demand-
ing, especially so when the person has low task relevant skills. In contrast,
starting with relatively low-quality solutions allows build-up. In this way,
removing performance constraints makes high-quality solutions more easily
obtainable for the low skilled individuals.
On the one hand, imposing a constraint, by not rewarding low performance,
does not hurt workers with high task relevant skills since they have a lesser
need for build-up. Hence, performance constraints will prevent them spending
time on less valuable solutions by focusing them on high quality solutions,
and thus, increasing the total number of high quality solutions and the overall
performance. Combining the two, we restate our novel hypotheses below:
6Amabile (2012, 1983) oﬀers a componential theory of creativity, with domain relevant
skills as one of the key components, and argues for its importance in driving performance.
See also the meta-analysis by Liu et al. (2016).
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H1: Average performance is impacted by quality constraints.
H1.1: Quality constraints increase the performance for workers with high
task-speciﬁc skills.
H1.2: Quality constraints decrease the performance for workers with low
task-speciﬁc skills.
H2: The number of high-quality solutions is impacted by quality constraints.
H1.1: Quality constraints increase the number of high-quality solutions for
workers with high task-speciﬁc skills.
H1.2: Quality constraints decrease the number of high-quality solutions for
workers with low task-speciﬁc skills.
Our main research focus is on eﬀects of constraints and its interaction with
worker’s task-speciﬁc skill level elucidated above. Still, for completeness we
note that with respect to the main eﬀect of monetary incentives, consistent
with the past research, we do not expect to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect (either
positive or negative).
5.3 The Experimental Design
Task
The participants of the experiment worked on a word creation task, similar
to the task used by Schweitzer et al. (2004) and Eckartz et al. (2012). This real
eﬀort task has the beneﬁt of having objective measures of performance, unlike
many other real eﬀort tasks such as the alternate uses task (Guilford, 1967) or
brainstorming tasks (Osborn, 1953) that rely on judges’ subjective assessment
of performance (Mohnen and Ostermaier, 2013). Moreover, the word creation
task allows automatic scoring, which was necessary since we chose to conduct
the experiment on a computer and to give the participants immediate feedback
(and payments).
The task involved participants creating as many English words as they
could using only a speciﬁed set of letters in 3 minutes.7 The participants
7The letter set used in our study was: ’a e e i o u l n m s s r’. The total number of English
words that use only this letter set is 1503. Source: http://www.wineverygame.com/
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accumulate points for each word that they build, with longer words getting
more points than shorter words. The actual points a subject obtains for a
speciﬁc word, and the payment she receives for the total accumulated points
depended on which of the 4 treatments they were assigned to.
Treatments
Our between-participant design had 4 diﬀerent treatments (see Table 5.1).
For our 2 (ﬂat rate vs. piece rate) x 2 (short words allowed vs. short words
disallowed) design, in the two constrained treatments, the participants were
told that they will receive 15 points for words with four and more letters
and zero points otherwise (for the short words); and in the two unconstrained
treatments, the participants were told that they will receive 15 points for words
with four and more letters and 5 points otherwise (for the short words). In
the ﬂat payment treatments, the subjects were informed that they will be
paid ﬁxed amount (USD 3) for completing the task; whereas in the piece rate
treatments the subjects were told that they will be paid 1 USD for each 100
points that they accumulated by the end of the experiment.
In all treatments, subjects were told that their goal in the task was to col-
lect as many points as possible. In addition to completing the word creation
task, the subjects also completed a questionnaire designed to elicit the partic-
ipant’s English proﬁciency (as a proxy for their domain/task-speciﬁc skills).
The questionnaire also collected demographic information and some additional
personality traits (measured using the standard Ten Item Personality Inven-
tory, Gosling et al. 2003). While we do not have any speciﬁc hypotheses on
how these aﬀect task performance, we had included it only for oﬀering some
preliminary exploratory analyses.
The main experiment was programmed in Python and Javascript, and was
conducted on the Google Chrome browser on lab computers; and the ques-
tionnaire was programmed in widely used survey platform Qualtrics. Detailed
instructions and a screen-shot of the task that the subjects saw on computer
monitors are given in Appendix 5.6.2.
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab at a large US university
during July-November 2016. While 244 subjects participated in the experi-
ment, we are unable to use 26 of those because of some technical problems
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Label Incentive Constraints Explanation
FY Flat rate Yes $3 irrespective of ﬁnal score; and 15
points for long words, 0 points for short
words
FN Flat rate No $3 irrespective of ﬁnal score; and 15
points for long words, 5 points for short
words
PY Piece-rate Yes $1 for each 100 points; and 15 points
for long words, 0 points for short words
PN Piece-rate No $1 for each 100 points; and 15 points
for long words, 5 points for short words
Table 5.1: The four treatments
Incentives Constraints Number of Subjects Average Payment
Flat rate No 53 $3.00
Flat rate Yes 58 $3.00
Piece rate No 54 $3.57
Piece rate Yes 53 $3.38
Table 5.2: Average payment and number of subjects
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that prevented the data from being recorded.8 This left us with 218 usable
observations. Table 5.2 shows the number of participants and their average
payments in each of the 4 conditions.9 The experiment lasted approximately
30 minutes and the participants were undergraduate students of whom 66%
were females.
All the statistical analysis were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2013).
Next, we report our results.
5.4 Results
Figure 5.1 illustrates and Table 5.3 reports the results of a linear regression
with subjects’ total accumulated scores as the dependent variable and the main
treatments and their interaction (Incentives and Constraints) as the indepen-
dent variables. Consistent with the past literature that ﬁnds limited value of
incentives for improving the performance in creative tasks, our results show
that piece rate incentives do not signiﬁcantly change the performance rela-
tive to ﬂat payments (344.0 for FN vs 356.6 for PN, t(214)=-0.30, p=0.7;
and 283.7 for FY vs 338.2 for PY, t(214)=-1.36, p=0.17). Moreover, con-
straints by themselves do not signiﬁcantly change the performance (344.0 for
FN vs 283.7 for FY, t(214)=1.50, p=0.13; and 356.6 for PN vs 338.2 for PY,
t(214)=0.45, p=0.65).
While our results indicate that incentives and constraints do not inﬂuence
performance on the word building task (at least on average), incentives and
constraints are not without any eﬀect on how our subjects go about completing
the task. Speciﬁcally, if we look at the total number of words (including those
receiving a zero score) that are created by our subjects, we see that piece rate
incentives increase the number of words (33.3 vs 29.1, t(215)=1.78, p=0.07),
and constraints decrease them (28.5 vs 33.9, t(215)=-2.26, p=0.02). Table 5.4
reports the results of a regression with total number of words submitted as the
dependent variable.
8A massive DDoS attack made much of the web, including Qualtrics, inaccessible from
the university computers during part of a day. On another separate day, a technical problem
with Qualtrics data center made part of the experiment unavailable.
9All the results tables were automatically generated from the data using stargazer R
package (Hlavac, 2014).
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Table 5.3: Eﬀect of incentives and constraints on performance
Dependent variable:
Creative Performance
(1) (2)
1{piece rate} 16.94 16.75
(14.28) (14.30)
1{constraints} -19.86 -19.68
(14.28) (14.30)
1{piece rate and constraints} 10.50
(14.30)
constant 330.35∗∗∗ 330.64∗∗∗
(14.28) (14.30)
Observations 218 218
R2 0.02 0.02
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.004
Residual Std. Error 210.71 (df = 215) 210.94 (df = 214)
F Statistic 1.72 (df = 2; 215) 1.32 (df = 3; 214)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 5.1: Performance in the 4 conditions
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Table 5.4: Eﬀect of incentives and constraints on number of words (including
those receiving 0 points)
Dependent variable:
Number of words
(1) (2)
1{piece rate} 2.10
∗ 2.09∗
(1.18) (1.18)
1{constraints} -2.68
∗∗ -2.66∗∗
(1.18) (1.18)
1{piece rate and constraints} 0.64
(1.18)
constant 31.20∗∗∗ 31.22∗∗∗
(1.18) (1.18)
Observations 218 218
R2 0.04 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03
Residual Std. Error 17.43 (df = 215) 17.46 (df = 214)
F Statistic 4.26∗∗ (df = 2; 215) 2.93∗∗ (df = 3; 214)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Thus, it appears that while incentives motivate the subjects to work harder
(by submitting more words), performance on the word creation task, similar
to many other creativity tasks studied in the past literature, seems to be
relatively insensitive to motivation and eﬀort. Moreover, our results show that
constraints change the way people work (by reducing the number of words they
submit), but the performance is not signiﬁcantly impacted. We summarize the
results about incentives and constraints before proceeding to analysing the role
of domain/task-speciﬁc skill.
Result1: Piece rate incentives, while increasing the number of submissions,
do not improve performance relative to ﬂat payment.
Result2: Constraints, while decreasing the number of submissions, do not
signiﬁcantly impact performance.
Descriptive statistics about our subjects’ assessment about English lan-
guage proﬁciency, which we use as a proxy for their skill, is reported in Ap-
pendix 5.6.3. While we expect English language proﬁciency to be a stable
characteristic, especially given that the 7 point scale asks about general En-
glish knowledge and not about the task (“How well do you speak, read and
write in English language?”), we conducted a one-way Anova to ensure that
English proﬁciency was on average equal across our treatments (F-value=0.09,
p=0.96). Thus, the particular treatments do not aﬀect self-reported proﬁciency
(see also Table 5.8 in Appendix).10
Table 5.5 reports the results of a linear regression with subject’s score as
the dependent variable, and the subject’s skill along with the main treatments
as the independent variables. The interaction of skill with constraints is sig-
niﬁcant. To more easily interpret the results, we split the skill as High or
Low based on whether it is above or below the median skill and created the
plot (for piece-rate incentives) shown in Figure 5.2. High skilled subjects per-
form better with constraints compared to without constraints (514 vs 330,
t(210)=2.48, p=0.01). Low skilled subjects perform worse with constraints
compared to without constraints (268 vs 367, t(210)=98.9, p=0.03). We state
this result below before proceeding to examine it in more detail.
Result3: Under piece rate incentives, constraints decrease performance for
10A second, and perhaps less important, concern might be that (perception of) skill level
itself might be driven by the performance. However, note that this would predict an asso-
ciation between skill and performance and not the interaction between skill and constraint
that is our main hypothesis.
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Table 5.5: Interaction of skill with constraints
Dependent variable:
Creative Performance
(1) (2)
1{piece rate} 16.88 -91.12
(13.78) (83.51)
1{constraints} -20.35 -168.77
∗∗
(13.78) (82.82)
Skill 57.87∗∗∗ 61.79∗∗∗
(13.92) (13.98)
1{piece rate and constraints} 8.52 8.23
(13.79) (13.70)
Skill ×1{piece rate} 18.16
(13.96)
Skill ×1{constraints} 25.04
∗
(13.84)
constant -10.76 -34.15
(83.25) (83.63)
Observations 218 218
R2 0.09 0.11
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.09
Residual Std. Error 203.34 (df = 213) 201.96 (df = 211)
F Statistic 5.39∗∗∗ (df = 4; 213) 4.46∗∗∗ (df = 6; 211)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 5.2: Interaction of constraints with skill (in piece-rate treatment)
Low/High skill plotted by splitting at the median skill level
low skilled subjects while constraints increase performance for high skilled
subjects.
To understand the interesting interaction of skill with constraints, it is
useful to also examine the exact number and type of words that are created in
the constrained conditions by low- and high-skilled subjects.
Unsurprisingly, since short words are worth 0 points in the constrained
condition, we ﬁnd that both low- and high-skilled subjects make fewer of those
words when they are constrained compared to when they are not (0.0 vs 5.13
for high-ability, p<0.001; and 0.0 vs 5.12 for low-ability, p<0.001). But case of
longer words is drastically diﬀerent. Figure 5.3 illustrates and Table 5.6 reports
the results of a linear regression with dependent variables as the number of
long words (≥ 4 letters) that the subject created, and the subject’s skill along
with the main treatments as independent variables.
High skilled subjects create more long words with constraints compared to
without constraints (34.2 vs 20.3, t(210)=2.83, p<0.01). Low skilled subjects
create fewer long words with constraints compared to without constraints (17.9
vs 22.9, t(210)=1.61, p=0.10). We summarize these below before exploring the
underlying mechanism in some more detail.
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Figure 5.3: Average number of long words (in piece rate conditions)
.
Low/High skill plotted by splitting at the median skill level
Table 5.6: Eﬀect of constraints and skill on number of long words (for piece-
rate conditions)
Dependent variable:
Number of Long Words
(1) (2)
1{constraints} -0.04 -14.82
∗
(1.35) (8.61)
Skill 5.21∗∗∗ 5.38∗∗∗
(1.45) (1.44)
Skill ×1{constraints} 2.51
∗
(1.44)
constant -8.40 -9.48
(8.67) (8.61)
Observations 107 107
R2 0.11 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.11
Residual Std. Error 13.90 (df = 104) 13.77 (df = 103)
F Statistic 6.46∗∗∗ (df = 2; 104) 5.40∗∗∗ (df = 3; 103)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Result4: In piece rate treatment, constraints decrease the number of long
words for low skill subjects, while constraints increase the number of long
words for high skill subjects.
Our results show that, for high-skilled subjects, constraints helped by pre-
venting them from making shorter words and instead forcing them focus more
on generating longer (and more valuable) words. This is especially interesting
since there is nothing preventing these subjects from generating longer words
(even in the unconstrained condition) and obtaining greater overall score; but
without the constraint, our high-ability subjects fail to emphasize creating
longer words and focus instead on the shorter (possibly easier to construct)
words at the cost of losing out on the ﬁnal score.
In the case of low-skilled subjects, constraints prevent them from making
short words and long words. This result is consistent with the view that novel
or complex solutions require gradual build-up, and constraints which prevent
such build-up will be detrimental to ﬁnal performance.
The above set of results give indirect evidence for build-up, especially for
low skilled people. However, our data also yields much more direct evidence.
Speciﬁcally, our subjects create words sequentially (over a period of 3 minutes)
allowing us to measure similarity between a word and words that came before
it. And to the extent that a long word is preceded by “similar” words, we can
view it as build-up occurring.
We measure the normalized similarity of two words as follows: we calcu-
late the longest common substring (i.e., the longest string that can be obtained
by pairing characters from the two words while keeping the order of charac-
ters intact). The normalized distance between the two words is the number
of unpaired characters divided by the sum of word lengths (see van der Loo
2014 for details on the algorithm for calculating the distances). The normal-
ized similarity, which is our measure of build-up, is 1 minus this normalized
distance.11
With this measure of build-up, we examined how the average build-up for a
given subject is related to his skill. Table 5.7 reports and Figure 5.4 illustrates
these results. As may be observed, the subjects with high skill levels exhibit
signiﬁcantly less build-up compared to subjects with low skill level. Thus, it
11As an example, consider the two words “SLATE” and “ATE”. The distance substring
“ATE” is common, and the number of unpaired characters is 2 (namely, S and L). Thus,
the normalized distance is 2
5+3
and the normalized similarity is 1− 2
5+3
= 0.75.
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Table 5.7: Buildup of words among subjects (in unconstrained condition)
Dependent variable:
Buildup (word similarity)
(1) (2)
1{piece rate} -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Skill -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Number of words 0.0001
(0.0005)
constant 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Observations 107 107
R2 0.06 0.06
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.03
Residual Std. Error 0.08 (df = 104) 0.08 (df = 103)
F Statistic 3.38∗∗ (df = 2; 104) 2.25∗ (df = 3; 103)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 5.4: Buildup of words (in unconstrained conditions)
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appears that high skilled subjects do not need (and do not use) build-up as
much as low skilled subjects. Consequently, when working under performance
constraints, it is the low skilled subjects’ creative production that becomes
disrupted. We state this result below.
Result5: Low-skilled subjects engage in signiﬁcantly more build-up compared
to high-skilled subjects.
Before proceeding to discuss the implications of our key results, we brieﬂy
make a note of some additional analysis of other control variables and per-
sonality traits that we conducted. While exploratory, it was interesting that
in these regression results (see Appendix 5.6.4 for the full set of results), of
the BIG FIVE personality traits - emotional stability was positively related
to performance and reversed measure for openness was negatively linked to
the performance; and we failed to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in
performance.
5.5 Discussions and Conclusion
Creativity is key to competitive advantage. In this article we examine how
performance constraints that incentivize only high quality solutions aﬀect the
creative outcomes, and how the eﬀect of constraints depends on the creator’s
domain relevant skill level. In line with the previous literature, we ﬁnd that
piece-rate incentives by themselves, while useful for enhancing motivation and
eﬀort levels (and number of solutions), fail to improve overall performance.
Thus, traditional incentives that have been found to be useful in improving
performance in routine tasks prove unsuccessful in improving performance in
our creative task as well.
More importantly, our results reconcile two diﬀerent views on constraints
for creative tasks. By analysing interaction of performance constraints with
creator’s domain relevant skills we demonstrate that constraints can help or
hurt the overall creative performance (and even the number of high-quality
solutions) depending on the creator’s skill level. Our ﬁndings suggest that,
constraints push high skilled individuals to direct their eﬀort to part of the
solution space with higher value, and improve overall performance.
It is interesting to note that in a rational model, a creator should be able to
perform at least as well without constraints as with constraints, since she can
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always act “as if” there are constraints even when the setting is unconstrained.
However, our results show that without constraints, high-skill creators fail
to focus on high-quality solutions and instead produce (easier?) low-quality
solutions. Thus, constraints focus our high-skilled creators on more valuable
solutions. Moreover, by improving the overall performance of solutions and the
pay-oﬀs of the high-skilled creator, constraints end up being pareto improving
for both the ﬁrm and for the creative workers. This is not the case for low
skilled individuals. With lower skilled creators, imposing constraints reduces
both the overall performance and the number of high-quality solutions.
The current article oﬀered a novel measure of build-up and the ﬁrst direct
evidence in a real-eﬀort task (that we are aware of) that shows build-up in
problem solving, and its dependence on the subject’s skill level. In addition to
its theoretical contribution, from the managerial perspective, understanding
the creative process and managing build-up where people gradually improve
their solutions/inventions is a requirement for innovative organizations.
The current research, using a measure of build-up in a controlled labo-
ratory experiment, demonstrates that constraints, at least for the low-skilled
creators, impede the natural build-up from less valuable solutions to more
valuable solutions. In contrast, our results show that high-skilled creators do
not need or use build-up, and consequently do not suﬀer from constraints. In
fact, for these individuals, our results show that constraints focus their work,
prevent unproductive low-quality solutions, and guide them towards higher
performance.
Our ﬁndings have several managerial implications: Firstly, oﬀering incen-
tives for creative workers seems to have very little eﬀect on overall perfor-
mance. Still, when managing employees who are highly skilled at the creative
task, setting performance constraints (or minimum quality requirements) can
prove valuable in providing guidance, focusing attention on the better parts
of the solution space, and improving both the number and overall value of
high-quality outcomes. However, when the workers are less skilled at the task,
performance constraint impedes initial exploration and build-up towards bet-
ter solutions. In such a case, the managers are better served by not having
performance constraints and incentivizng even the less valuable solutions. Ta-
ble below summarizes these implications.
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Constrained Unconstrained
Low
skills
Buildup disrupted
Few high-quality solutions
Buildup feasible
More high-quality solutions
High
skills
Focused creative process
More high-quality solutions
Unproductive creation
Few high-quality solutions
Our study was intended to give a ﬁrst look at the interaction of creator
skills with an important feature of creative process, namely the performance
constraints. It would be useful for future research to study if other performance
pressures (such as presence of competition, or strict time pressures) interact
with creator skills in determining performance. Second, in contexts where skill
level itself can be manipulated (perhaps by interventions such as training, or
practice), it would be useful to understand how managers can eﬀectively choose
between enhancing skill levels and setting more ambitious goals, or allowing
lower-skilled workers to work with fewer constraints.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Instructions
General Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating! All the answers you provide are
conﬁdential.
In this experimental session, you will be asked to participate in an exper-
imental study, for which you will receive $5 participation fee. In addition to
this participation fee, you will also receive any money you earn in the study.
Please make sure that you read the instructions on the next pages carefully
to avoid any misunderstanding and to earn the most money. The study is
expected to take less than 10 minutes to complete.
Please, click below when you are ready to proceed to the study.
5.6.2 Word task instructions
Word Task
Please read the instructions carefully before starting on the current task.
Depending on your answers, you will receive points.
And for every 100 points that you obtain by the end of the task, you will
receive $1.
In this task you will be given 3 minutes to come up with as many words as
you can that use only a speciﬁc set of letters.
Longer words receive more points compared to shorter words.
Note that only the words that we identify as coming from a commonly used
English language dictionary will be awarded points.
The actual set of letters you have to work with, and the points you receive
for diﬀerent words lengths are given on the next page.
Before clicking below to proceed, please read the full set of rules below.
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• You may use only the letters in the set that we give you. For instance,
if the set of letters we gave you is A, E, E, L, B then words
– word ALE is allowed (since the set has the letters A, L, and E);
– the word BELL is not allowed (since the word has two Ls and the
set only has one L);
– the word EEL is allowed (since the word and the set both have two
Es).
• With the letters we provide, you may build small words or large words.
• Just repeatedly building the same words will not get any additional
points.
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5.6.3 Descriptive Statistics: Subjects’ Performance and
Skill Levels
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of score for the 4 treatments.
Mean Eng. Prof. Median Eng. Prof.
Flat constrained 5.88 6
Flat unconstrained 5.92 6
Piece constrained 5.85 6
Piece unconstrained 5.94 6
Table 5.8: English proﬁciency in each treatment
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Figure 5.7: Performance of participants and their English proﬁciency across
treatments
5.6.4 Effect of Other Covariates
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Dependent variable:
Creative Performance
OLS Tobit
Found task diﬃcult -47.243∗∗∗ -48.263∗∗∗
(10.653) (10.181)
Found task creative -4.339 -4.774
(8.984) (8.567)
Native speaker 146.534∗∗∗ 144.488∗∗∗
(25.691) (24.530)
Freq. word games 70.984∗∗∗ 70.921∗∗∗
(15.505) (14.774)
Liking word games 11.327 12.345
(10.188) (9.739)
Risk seeking 3.919 4.346
(8.660) (8.258)
Extraversion 6.303 6.900
(6.788) (6.484)
Agreeableness.R -4.052 -4.606
(6.741) (6.437)
Conscientiousness 3.568 4.012
(6.836) (6.523)
Emotional stability.R -0.070 0.019
(6.798) (6.477)
Openness 8.920 8.682
(7.919) (7.548)
Extraversion.R -6.553 -5.969
(6.435) (6.148)
Agreeableness -4.649 -5.226
(7.306) (6.975)
Conscientiousness.R -11.172 -10.803∗
(6.852) (6.535)
Emotional stability 21.604∗∗∗ 21.979∗∗∗
(6.472) (6.174)
Openness.R 20.540∗∗∗ 20.806∗∗∗
(6.901) (6.579)
Gender -12.504 -11.729
(23.622) (22.516)
Constrained ﬂat rate -42.060 -44.477
(30.373) (29.001)
Piece rate 18.871 18.625
(30.993) (29.532)
Constrained piece rate 16.259 16.143
(31.375) (29.896)
Constant 79.273 74.394
(124.977) (119.143)
Observations 218 218
R2 0.507
Adjusted R2 0.457
Log Likelihood -1,393.590
Residual Std. Error 155.775 (df = 197)
F Statistic 10.133∗∗∗ (df = 20; 197)
Wald Test 224.906∗∗∗ (df = 20)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 5.8: Average score by gender
5.6.5 Average Length of Correct Solutions
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
Flat Piece
Incentives
A
v
g
 w
o
rd
 l
e
n
g
th
Constraints
No
Yes
Figure 5.9: Average word length (only words which got a non-zero scores are
counted)
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Conclusion
6.1 Main Contributions
This thesis contributes to the economic literature on creativity. I apply exper-
imental methodology to study behaviour while and after performing routine
and creative tasks. Speciﬁcally, I investigate cooperation levels after com-
pletion of tasks and more importantly, performance on tasks under various
payment schemes. I also examine the interaction of domain speciﬁc skills with
constraints and their eﬀect on creative output. Thus, the main ﬁndings of this
work relate to:
• Cooperation after exerting creative and routine eﬀorts.
• Competitive incentives for creative and routine performance.
• Constraints for creative and routine performance.
• Role of domain-speciﬁc skills for creative performance under constraints.
6.1.1 Cooperation
Rapid advance in technological innovations increased demand for creative jobs.
In modern companies groups of creators often share their competences and
experiences to beneﬁt from each other and improve general knowledge base.
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These individuals gain their skills from diﬀerent types and levels of eﬀort. Some
behavioural scholars showed that depending on the size of eﬀort people exert,
they may become more self-oriented and hesitant to share their endowments.
This kind of inclination could have substantial adverse consequences if group
members shape their cooperative behaviour depending on their eﬀort exerted
in unrelated situations.
In chapter 2 I experimentally study whether eﬀort levels and eﬀort types
change cooperation decisions. The results show that the amount of eﬀort and
the type of eﬀort that people exert, do not change average cooperativeness
in small groups. Regardless of the source of endowments, people cooperate
depending on their personality characteristics.
6.1.2 Competition
Designing an optimal reward mechanism in organizations has been studied
since long. Managers often have a ﬁxed budget to remunerate employees.
In such conditions it is crucial to come up with an optimal reward system
to achieve the highest productivity with given limitations. While for routine
tasks monetary incentives usually increase routine performance, this is rarely
the case for creative tasks. Similarly, in contrast to routine tasks, creative
tasks are usually not motivated by competitive incentives.
In chapter 3 I report on a study which investigates diﬀerent degrees of
competition and corresponding eﬀects on routine and creative performance.
In line with the previous literature, the ﬁndings suggest that low competition
improves routine, but not creative performance. However, high competition
is not supportive for average performance on both types of tasks. Moreover,
provision of feedback before the completion of the task has a negative eﬀect
on creative performance.
6.1.3 Constraints
In companies employees often have to fulﬁl certain criteria to make their work
acceptable. In other words, principals usually want their employees to meet
predetermined standards, because other types of solutions may be worthless.
Under such circumstances, managers may want to impose quality constraints.
Although it seems rational to reward only those type of solutions which are
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valuable, a large body of research argues against constraints especially for cre-
ative tasks. The traditional view on creative thinking is that it should not
be restricted or framed. Creators need freedom to explore new ideas without
external interference. However, recent theoretical contributions to the liter-
ature and anecdotal evidence from popular press suggest that constraints in
fact may provide guidance for creators and can even motivate them by making
their task more challenging.
In the fourth chapter I study the eﬀects of low and high constraints for
routine and creative tasks. In support of a conventional view on constraints,
I ﬁnd that routine as well as creative performance decrease even when low
constraints are imposed. Further analysis shows that after the initial phase,
creators adapt to the constraints and perform as well as unconstrained indi-
viduals. More interestingly, looking at overall performance, unconstrained cre-
ators produce more high-quality solutions than the constrained ones, although
the latter are asked to produce only high quality solutions. This indicates on
possible build-up of creative solutions when the creators are not constrained.
6.1.4 Domain-specific Skills
The fact that a domain-speciﬁc or task relevant skill is helpful for creative
performance is well documented. However, it has not yet been analysed how
constraints and the skills interact when a creative task has to be done. In
general there are opposing views on how constraints aﬀect creative output.
On the one hand constraints may have a negative eﬀect, restricting formation
and the development of novel ideas. On the other hand constraints may guide
creators to focus their attention on a more valuable solution space.
In the ﬁfth chapter I research the role of a domain speciﬁc skill for creative
performance under constraints. The results show that constraints enhance
creative performance of highly competent creators. However, the same con-
straints decrease performance of less competent individuals. The main reason
is that low skilled creative workers build on their own creations. They gradu-
ally improve complexity of their solutions to achieve higher standards and the
constraints disrupt this build-up. In contrast, high skilled workers do not use
build-up, since they are able to easily overcome the hurdle provided by the
constraints.
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6.2 Policy implications
The research ﬁndings of this thesis provide several policy implications. Firstly,
the results of the second chapter imply that cooperation in small groups is
not aﬀected by the eﬀort type (routine or creative) and eﬀort levels that the
group members exerted to acquire their endowments. Individuals are rather
inﬂuenced by their personality characteristics when cooperating in a group.
Therefore, company authorities should focus on individual traits and experi-
ences, for example, whether a job candidate has previous experience in working
groups or not and how pro-social she is.
The third chapter oﬀers some implications on whether and how a man-
agement should use competitive incentives. Since eﬀort and performance for
routine tasks are closely linked, organisation leaders can use low competitive
incentives to improve routine performance. However, high competition is not
conducive to routine performance. Applying any competitive incentive is not
supportive for creative performance. Moreover, if designing a competitive in-
centive for creative tasks, managers should avoid provision of performance
feedback until completion of the task.
The research results of the fourth chapter suggest that constraints are detri-
mental for routine and creative tasks. However, it can be the case that a man-
agement can not accept low quality creative solutions. Under such circum-
stances principals should expect that it will take some time before employees
adapt to low constraints and perform as well as in unconstrained condition.
The signiﬁcant decrease in creative performance even in low constraint con-
ditions are caused by disruption of build-up, that is gradual progress towards
highly creative solutions.
Lastly, whether the constraints for creative performance have a negative or
positive eﬀect depends on creative workers’ task-related skill levels. A man-
agement can use constraints to guide high skilled employees to focus on more
valuable creative solutions. However, for low skilled workers, quality con-
straints should not be used. For them it is more beneﬁcial to reward low
quality solutions (that can be regarded as tolerating initial failure) to enable
achieving of higher creative potential.
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6.3 Future Research
While the current thesis ﬁlled research gaps in creativity research in economics,
much more work has to be done. First of all, laboratory experiments have
limited external validity, therefore the results have to be replicated and possibly
also be tested in the ﬁeld. For example, the ﬁndings of the second chapter
suggest that the source of an endowment does not determine cooperation levels.
However, it can be the case that eﬀort manipulation in a short laboratory
experiment is not suﬃcient for the emergence of a creativity eﬀect. Therefore,
longer experiments, ideally with diﬀerent tasks and real creators, have to be
designed.
Competitive incentives and provision of feedback is a complex topic. While
the research results from the third chapter provide new insights, it was impos-
sible to cover all possible treatment variations in a single study. For instance,
it would be a valuable contribution to the literature to study how feedback
aﬀects low competitive incentives for routine and creative tasks. The chapter
analysed a winner-take-all tournament. Other modiﬁcations of tournaments
should also be researched. Moreover, in this chapter feedback on ranking and
the best performance was provided before the completion of the task. Future
research should also apply other types of tournaments (such as rank-order
tournaments) and manipulate various contents of the feedback, like showing a
performance of not only the leading competitor but all the competitors.
Eﬀects of constraints on creative and innovative tasks are not well re-
searched in economics. While in this thesis I provide new perspectives on
when constraints could be beneﬁcial, there are much more interesting aspects
to explore. For example, in contexts where a skill level itself can be manip-
ulated (perhaps by interventions such as training or practice), it would be
useful to understand how managers can eﬀectively choose between enhancing
skill levels and setting more ambitious goals or allowing lower-skilled workers
to work with fewer constraints. It would also be useful for future research to
study whether other performance pressures (such as presence of competition, or
strict time pressures) interact with creator skills in determining performance.
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